Populist Online Communication – Interactions among Politicians, Journalists, and Citizens by Blassnig, Sina
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2020
Populist Online Communication – Interactions among Politicians,
Journalists, and Citizens
Blassnig, Sina
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-186001
Dissertation
Published Version
Originally published at:
Blassnig, Sina. Populist Online Communication – Interactions among Politicians, Journalists, and Citi-
zens. 2020, University of Zurich, Faculty of Arts.
  
 
 
 
 
Populist Online Communication  
Interactions among Politicians, Journalists, and Citizens 
 
 
 
Thesis (cumulative thesis) 
presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences  
of the University of Zurich 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
by  
Sina Blassnig 
 
 
 
Accepted in the fall semester 2019 
on the recommendation of the doctoral committee: 
Prof. Dr. Frank Esser (main supervisor) 
Prof. Dr. Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt 
 
 
 
Zurich, 2020
  
Cumulative dissertation in accordance with § 7 of the Regulations for Obtaining 
the Doctoral Degree at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Zur-
ich, July 8 2009 (PVO 2009), based on the following publications: 
Article I: Blassnig, S., Ernst, N., Büchel, F., & Engesser, S. (2018). Populist 
Communication in Talk Shows and Social Media: A Comparative 
Content Analysis in Four Countries. SCM Studies in Communication 
| Media, 7 (3), 338-363.  
Article II: Blassnig, S., Ernst, N., Büchel, F., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2019). Pop-
ulism in Online Election Coverage: Analyzing Populist Statements 
by Politicians, Journalists, and Readers in Three Countries. Journal-
ism Studies, 20 (8), 1110-1129. 
Article III: Blassnig, S.; Ernst, N.; Engesser, S.; & Esser, F. (2020). Populism and 
Social Media Popularity: How Populist Communication Benefits Po-
litical Leaders on Facebook and Twitter. In D. Taras & R. Davis (Ed.): 
Power Shift? Political Leadership and Social Media. Routledge, 97-111. 
Article IV: Blassnig, S., Engesser, S., Ernst, N., & Esser, F. (2019). Hitting a 
Nerve: Populist News Articles Lead to More Frequent and More 
Populist Reader Comments. Political Communication, 36 (4), 629-651. 
Article V: Blassnig, S., & Wirz, D. S. (2019). Populist and Popular: An Experi-
ment on the Drivers of User Reactions to Populist Posts on Facebook. 
Social Media + Society, 5 (4), 1-12. 
Synopsis: Blassnig, S. (2020). Populist Online Communication: Interactions 
among Politicians, Journalists, and Citizens. Synopsis of the cumu-
lative dissertation. Zurich: University of Zurich. 
  
  
ABSTRACT 
Populism continues to play a central role in the politics of Western democracies. 
The recent rise of populist politicians is often associated with their allegedly suc-
cessful use of digital media. However, although research on populist actors’ use of 
social media has increased in recent years, there is still scarce research on what 
constitutes the supposed affinity between populism and digital media. Further-
more, the role of online news media has been neglected, despite the continuing 
central role of the mass media for the visibility of populist actors and ideas. Finally, 
it is still unclear how populist online communication affects citizens’ manifest be-
havior. To answer these substantial research gaps, this thesis pursues two major 
research aims: First, it investigates drivers of populist communication in politi-
cians’ online self-presentation and online news media representation. Second, this 
thesis examines the effects of populist online communication on citizens’ behavior 
in the form of user reactions to politicians’ social media posts and reader comments 
on online news articles. By analyzing the interactions of three key actor groups—
politicians, journalists, and citizens—and by following a multimethod approach 
combining content analysis, digital trace data, and an experimental survey, this 
dissertation connects research on both the supply and demand sides of populism. 
Based on five internationally comparative studies and the overarching synopsis, 
this thesis demonstrates that populist online communication is driven by the re-
ciprocal interactions among politicians, journalists, and citizens and is influenced 
by various factors on the macro, meso, and micro levels. Furthermore, this disser-
tation shows that populist online communication resonates with citizens and is 
multiplied by them—specifically by citizens with prior strong populist attitudes. 
Thus, the recent rise of populism can be associated with a transformation of the 
relationship among politicians, journalists, and citizens that is accelerated by new 
communication technologies.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
“The others have newspapers, radio, television, banks, and corporate money—we 
have you, we have the network,”1 Matteo Salvini told his followers in a video 
posted on Facebook in February 2018, promoting a contest on the social network. 
That was one month before the Italian elections and before the leader of the popu-
list right-wing party Lega Nord became Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime 
Minister of Italy. Salvini’s message is reminiscent of a statement by Donald Trump, 
who had told Financial Times journalists in the Oval Office on April 2, 2017, “With-
out the tweets, I wouldn’t be here. I have over 100m [followers]. I don’t have to go 
to the fake media.” 2 Similar sentiments were heard from the left wing. Jeremy Cor-
byn, for example, speaking at the 2018 Labour Party Conference, called on Labour 
activists to “challenge [the British press’] propaganda of privilege by using the 
mass media of the 21st century: social media.”3 In recent years, the open disdain 
that mostly right-wing—as well as some left-wing—politicians have shown for the 
established mainstream news media has been a recurrent theme in political cam-
paigns in Western democracies. Relatedly, the attempts of these politicians to by-
pass the mainstream news media through social media are frequently discussed. 
In particular, the rise of populist politicians and parties is often associated with 
their allegedly successful use of social networking sites—and often seen as signs 
of a “populist Zeitgeist” that Mudde (2004) had predicted more than a decade ear-
lier. 
At the end of the last century, Blumler and Kavanagh (1999, pp. 219–220) ar-
gued that the expansion of media outlets and the associated new opportunities for 
the public to become politically active would increase populist tendencies and anti-
elitist popularization. Around the same time, Bimber (1998) claimed that the Inter-
net might promote an “unmediated” communication between citizens and the 
government. According to this “populist claim”, the Internet would increase citi-
zen influence on politics at the expense of elites and political intermediaries, such 
as traditional political parties, labor unions, and the mainstream press (Bimber, 
1998, pp. 137–138). Today, the assumption that politicians use the Internet to by-
pass traditional mass media and communicate directly with their followers is 
 
1 You can find the original post under the following link:  
https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10155517355258155&id=252306033154 
(08.10.2019) 
2 Financial Times (April 2, 2017). Donald Trump: Without Twitter, I would not be here. 
https://www.ft.com/content/943e322a-178a-11e7-9c35-0dd2cb31823a (08.10.2019) 
3 You can find the script of Jeremy Corbyn’s speech under the following link: https://la-
bour.org.uk/press/jeremy-corbyn-speaking-labour-party-conference-today/ (08.10.2019) 
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mostly applied to their self-presentation on social media (e.g., Parmelee & Bichard, 
2012). As the quotes above show, populists often make this claim themselves. At 
the same time, populist actors regularly succeed in attracting the attention of the 
mass media with their provocative statements that cater to media logic and news 
values (Mazzoleni, 2008). The quoted politicians, Trump, Salvini, and Corbyn, are 
all consistently featured in the media—and not uncommonly with statements they 
first made on social media. Thus, in a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017), pop-
ulist actors may also use social media to gain attention in the mass media. The 
digitization of traditional news media leads to an increased commercialization and 
audience orientation that could make news media even more susceptible to popu-
list statements (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017). Furthermore, online media provide 
citizens with more possibilities for direct feedback and interaction, for example via 
likes, shares, or comments. Surprisingly, however, for a long time, there was 
hardly any scientific knowledge about the occurrence and effects of populist online 
communication. Are populist actors more successful in garnering support on so-
cial media than politicians who do not represent populist views or communicate 
in a populist way? How do online news media report on populist statements by 
politicians, and do journalists voice populist ideas themselves? Moreover, what 
reactions does populist online communication elicit in citizens? This dissertation 
addresses these substantial research gaps. 
From a societal perspective, these questions are highly relevant against the 
background of the increasing prevalence of populism and the changing political 
communication environment. Although populist actors challenge constitutional 
democracy from within the democratic system (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p. 410), 
populism presents a serious challenge to liberal democracy because it puts the will 
of the people above the rule of law (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mudde, 2004). 
However, as Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) discusses, “populism can also be conceived 
of as a kind of democratic corrective since it gives voice to groups that do not feel 
represented by the elites, and forces them to react and change the political agenda.” 
Regardless of whether populism is considered a threat, corrective, or an inherent 
feature of a democratic system (Canovan, 1999, 2002), it is often associated with a 
political transformation that is accelerated by new communication technologies. 
To assess the dangers—and possibilities— of populism in liberal democracies, it is 
necessary to understand what makes populist ideas so widespread in the political 
and social discourse and so seemingly popular in online media. From a communi-
cation science perspective, questions arise as to what constitutes populist online 
communication, how politicians use populist messages in their self-representation, 
how populist actors and messages are portrayed in the media, and what effects 
populist communication has on citizens. 
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Scholarly awareness of the crucial role of populist communication and empir-
ical research in this area have increased immensely in the last few years. However, 
despite the early linking of populism and the Internet by Bimber (1998), for a long 
time no research has specifically analyzed populist online communication. In fact, 
at the beginning of this dissertation project, there were only a handful of empirical 
studies that investigated the use of social media by predefined populist actors, 
mostly as case studies or in single countries (J. Bartlett, Birdwell, & Littler, 2011; 
Gerbaudo, 2015; Groshek & Engelbert, 2012; van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). More 
recently, scholars have discussed the theoretical relation and affinity between pop-
ulism and the Internet (Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017; Krämer, 2017) and spe-
cifically social media (Gerbaudo, 2018; Postill, 2018). Scholars have also started to 
investigate the use of populist communication in politicians’ social media presence 
more systematically. However, most studies have focused on the social media use 
of predefined populist actors (Jacobs & Spierings, 2018; Waisbord & Amado, 2017) 
or single countries (Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Stier, Posch, Bleier, & Strohmaier, 
2017). Few studies have investigated the use of populist communication on social 
media by political actors across the political spectrum and across countries 
(Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017; Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 
2017; Zulianello, Albertini, & Ceccobelli, 2018) or focused on who follows and sup-
ports populist actors on social media (Heiss & Matthes, 2017). The complex rela-
tionship between populism and the media has been discussed theoretically (Esser, 
Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017; Mazzoleni, 2003, 2008, 2014) and analyzed empiri-
cally in the traditional press (T. Akkerman, 2011; Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 
2010; Rooduijn, 2014a; Wettstein, Esser, Büchel et al., 2018; Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, 
Wirz, & Wirth, 2018). However, to my knowledge, no studies so far have investi-
gated populism in online news media. Moreover, although it is by now an estab-
lished hypothesis that populism in the media affects media users (for an overview, 
see, e.g., Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017; de Vreese, Es-
ser, Aalberg, Reinemann, & Stanyer, 2018), there is hardly any research on the role 
of citizens and the effects that populist online communication has on their behav-
ior. Most previous research has focused on how populist communication affects 
people’s attitudes (Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2011, 2013; Hameleers, Bos, & 
de Vreese, 2017a, 2018b; Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017; 
Müller et al., 2017). Fewer studies have investigated the effects of populist commu-
nication on people’s behavior with regard to voting (e.g., Sheets, Bos, & Boom-
gaarden, 2016) or political engagement (Hameleers et al., 2018). Most studies have 
relied on experimental settings, with only a few exceptions that analyze the effects 
of populist communication under real-life conditions (Bos et al., 2013; Müller et al., 
2017; Wirz et al., 2018). 
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Thus, many questions remain unanswered. First, there is still scarce research 
on what constitutes the supposed affinity between digital media and populism, to 
what extent actors use populist communication online, and what contextual factors 
or opportunity structures promote the use of populist online communication. Sec-
ond, whereas research on populism and social media has increased, these plat-
forms are still often looked at in isolation and rarely compared to other digital or 
traditional communication channels as part of a larger information system (de 
Vreese et al, 2018) (for recent exceptions see Ernst, Blassnig, Engesser, Büchel, & 
Esser, 2019; Ernst, Esser, Blassnig, & Engesser, 2019). Specifically, the role of online 
news media has been neglected, despite the fact that the mass media continue to 
play a central role in the rise of recent populist actors (e.g., Esser et al., 2017). Third, 
although vast literature argues that citizens have come to play a more active part 
in political online communication, their role in populist communication remains 
underresearched. Very few studies investigate the effects of populist communica-
tion on citizens’ behavior or specifically in an online context. Moreover, there are 
only very few field studies that examine the effects of populist communication out-
side of an experimental context. Online media, on the one hand, enable citizens to 
directly react to politicians’ tweets or Facebook posts, as well as news articles, and 
to voice their own opinions in reader comments. On the other hand, this behavior 
is directly observable, as it manifests in digital trace data such as likes, shares, or 
comments. Finally, the supply side and the demand side of populism are still 
mostly looked at separately. 
To address these substantial research gaps, I have formulated two overarching 
questions that build the foundation of this cumulative dissertation: 
1. What are the drivers of populist online communication? 
a. With regard to politicians’ online self-presentation 
b. With regard to its representation in the online news media 
2. What effects does populist online communication have on citizens’ reac-
tions? 
a. In response to politicians’ self-presentation 
b. In response to its representation in the online news media 
Thus, in this dissertation, I extend previous research by looking at populist 
communication across different online communication platforms and by investi-
gating the interaction of three key actor groups—(1) politicians, (2) journalists, and 
(3) citizens (see also Aalberg et al., 2017)—that have so far often been investigated 
separately. I analyze (1) how politicians across the political spectrum use populist 
communication in their self-presentation, (2) how journalists represent populist 
ideas in the mass media, and (3) how citizens respond to populist communication 
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in the form of user reactions to politicians’ social media posts and reader comments 
in response to online news articles. With regard to politicians’ self-presentation, I 
contribute to the literature by examining populism in the communication of a 
broad range of political actors across the political spectrum and different commu-
nication channels. In relation to the role of journalists, as de Vreese et al. (2018, 432) 
urge, I consider the media both as a platform for transmitting populist messages by 
politicians through the media and as possible originators of populist messages in the 
form of populism by the media (Esser et al., 2017). With regard to citizens, I explore 
the role of populist citizen journalism (Esser et al., 2017) in the form of populist reader 
comments as well as the effects of populist online communication on citizens’ man-
ifest behavior in the form of popularity cues (Porten-Chée et al., 2018). Finally, by 
investigating both drivers and effects of populist communication and by combin-
ing content analysis, digital trace data, and an experimental survey, I connect re-
search on the supply side and the demand side of populism. 
The two overarching questions build the foundation of this dissertation, are 
empirically assessed in the five related publications and will serve as a guide 
through this synopsis. This synopsis continues by defining populist ideology and 
populist communication from an ideational perspective in Chapter 2 and presents 
the theoretical framework for populist online communication in Chapter 3. Chap-
ter 4 provides an overview of the methodological design. Chapter 5 summarizes 
the five individual publications and their findings. Finally, in Chapter 6, I will dis-
cuss the key findings with regard to their theoretical implications, integrate the 
main conclusions in a heuristic framework, critically review methodological con-
tributions and limitations, provide an outlook for future research, and assess soci-
etal implications with regard to populist online communication and democracy. 
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2 POPULISM: AN IDEATIONAL APPROACH 
Populism has been a highly contested concept or, as Canovan (1999, p. 3) described 
it, a “notoriously vague term.” It has been defined as an ideology (Mudde, 2004), 
a political strategy (Weyland, 2017), a style (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt, 
2016), and a discourse (Laclau, 2005). However, in the last few years, scholars have 
increasingly started to follow an ideational approach, which understands populism 
as a specific set of ideas (Hawkins, Carlin, Littvay, & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; 
Mudde, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Taggart, 2000). This approach 
shifts the focus from the organizational or policy features of specific populist par-
ties or movements to the underlying populist ideas. These populist ideas result in 
a common populist discourse and a shared way of seeing the political world (Haw-
kins & Kaltwasser, 2018, pp. 4–5). 
The ideational approach to populism has several advantages over other con-
ceptualizations. First, it allows combining research on the supply and the demand 
side of populist ideas. Second, it helps to bridge different perspectives in political 
science and communication science. More specifically, it enables researchers to 
connect the understanding of populism as a ‘thin’ ideology and as a discourse. 
Third, the ideational approach understands populism as a gradual or continuous 
variable or a matter of degree. This understanding makes it useful to compare the 
extent of populism in the communication of a wide range of actors and across dif-
ferent communication channels. Fourth, the ideational approach renders populism 
empirically measurable through different methodological approaches, most com-
monly through content analysis on the supply side and surveys or experimental 
research on the demand side (de Vreese et al., 2018; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018; 
Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). 
Following this ideational approach, I conceive of populism as a ‘thin’ ideology 
(Mudde, 2004) that manifests discursively as specific populist key messages in the 
communication of political actors, media actors, or citizens (de Vreese et al., 2018) 
and can also be measured as populist attitudes on the individual level (Hawkins 
& Kaltwasser, 2018). 
In the following, I will first elaborate on the definition of populism as a ‘thin’ 
ideology and on its core ideas. Second, I will focus on a communication-centered 
perspective (de Vreese et al., 2018; Stanyer, Salgado, & Strömbäck, 2017) and ex-
plain how this populist ideology can be expressed in the form of populist commu-
nication on the supply side. Third, I will discuss the appeal of populist ideas to 
citizens on the demand side. 
 POPULISM: AN IDEATIONAL APPROACH 
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2.1 Populism as ‘Thin’ Ideology 
In one of the most cited definitions of populism, Mudde (2004, p. 543, emphasis 
i.O.) describes populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated 
into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, 
and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general 
will) of the people.” Similarly to Mény and Surel (2002, pp. 11–13), Mudde’s (2004) 
definition emphasizes three core components of populist ideology: the people, the 
elite, and popular sovereignty. 
The first key core concept of populism is the primacy of ‘the people.’ The peo-
ple are seen as good, virtuous, and pure (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mudde, 
2017) and are regarded as homogenous or monolithic entity that can have a com-
mon will, common interests, and common desires (e.g., Canovan, 2002; Kriesi, 
2014). Second, in the populist worldview, the people are opposed by the corrupt, 
immoral, incompetent elite that has betrayed the people and is out of touch with 
their needs and interests (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mény & Surel, 2002; 
Mudde, 2004). Importantly, this fundamental juxtaposition between ‘the people’ 
and ‘the elite’ is normative and moralistic in nature (Mudde, 2017). Populism pre-
sents a Manichean worldview in which the people is inherently good and the elite 
is evil (Hawkins, 2010, p. 33) and “in which there are only friends and foes” 
(Mudde, 2004, p. 544). Third, populism postulates a struggle over political sover-
eignty (see also Engesser, Fawzi et al., 2017). According to populist ideology, poli-
tics should be a direct expression of the general will of the people (Abts & Rum-
mens, 2007; Mudde, 2004, 2017). Thus, the people is regarded as the ultimate sov-
ereign that has currently been deprived of its rights by the elite. Therefore, popular 
sovereignty must be restored (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p. 408; Mény & Surel, 2002, 
p. 13). This view is closely connected to the interpretation of the people as pure 
and homogenous and the idea of a “common sense” as the logical result of its vir-
tuousness and common will (Mudde, 2017; Taggart, 2000, p. 95). While the elites 
are portrayed as out of touch with the people, the populists can present themselves 
as voice of the people or vox populi (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p. 408; Mudde, 2017, 
p. 33). 
The monolithic conception of the people further implies that there are some 
out-groups that are not considered part of the ‘true’ people (Mény & Surel, 2002, 
p. 12). These “dangerous ‘others’” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 3) do not 
share the people’s virtues and values and are therefore seen as a threat or burden 
to society and excluded from the people (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 324). The 
elite, in contrast, is seen as conspiring with these ‘others’ against the people (Al-
bertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 5) and as serving the “special interests” of specific 
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groups instead of the general will of the people (Mudde, 2017, p. 33; Weyland, 
1999, p. 382). However, it has been disputed whether the exclusion of specific so-
cial groups should be regarded as a core concept of populism. 
Following Mudde (2004, p. 544) and Stanley (2008), populism is defined as 
only a ‘thin’ or ‘thin-centered’ ideology according to Freeden (1996). This means 
that although populism can be regarded as a distinct ideology with specific core 
concepts, it can be enriched with more substantive, thicker ideologies such as na-
tionalism or socialism (Kriesi, 2014; Mudde, 2004). Thus, the proposed definition 
of populism above is a minimal definition that is inclusive and applicable to dif-
ferent manifestations of populism across the political spectrum from left to right 
(Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). There is debate over where to draw the line between the 
‘thin’ populist ideology and the ‘thicker’ ‘add-on’ or ‘host’ ideologies. This quan-
dary applies particularly to the exclusion of ‘others’ (Engesser, Fawzi et al., 2017). 
Some authors see exclusion as an integral element of populist ideology (e.g., Al-
bertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017b) or argue that the 
‘others’ may even substitute ‘the elite’ as an out-group in a type of excluding pop-
ulism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Other authors consider the exclusion of ‘others’ 
to be an additional characteristic that is specific only to right-wing populism 
(Rooduijn, 2014b; Wirth et al., 2016). Following de Vreese et al. (2018), I assume an 
intermediate position and argue that the construction and exclusion of specific out-
groups is inherent in the populist conception of the people as a homogenous and 
monolithic in-group. However, the exclusion of a specific social group from the 
people is not seen as a necessary element of populist ideology, and the exclusion 
of ‘others’ may be more or less symbolic or explicit for different types of populism 
(Mény & Surel, 2002, p. 12). 
Depending on accompanying ‘host’ ideologies, ‘the people’—and, as a conse-
quence, also ‘the elite’ and ‘the others’—can assume different meanings. The most 
common distinction is between the people as sovereign or demos, nation or ethnos, 
or class (Canovan, 1999; Kriesi, 2014; Mény & Surel, 2000). The concept of ‘the peo-
ple’ thereby refers to an “idealized conception of the community” (Taggart, 2004, 
p. 274) or a heartland (Taggart, 2000), which refers to a romanticized version of the 
past when the world was still in order. How ‘the people’ is defined also implies 
who does not belong to this category (Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & 
de Vreese, 2017) and, thus, how ‘the elite’ and ‘the others’ are conceptualized. The 
elite may be not only the political, economic, juridical, media, scientific, or cultural 
elite but also generally the established structure of power and elite values (Cano-
van, 1999, p. 3). Similarly, the others may be conceptualized in different ways, for 
example in political, economic, or cultural terms, and juxtaposed to the people 
with regard to their needs, origin, ethnicity, citizenship, political rights, etc. (see 
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also Blassnig et al., 2019). Whereas the elite are the target of a vertical differentia-
tion from the people, the others are subject to a horizontal differentiation or even 
a “downward-oriented” social comparison (Reinemann et al., 2017, p. 21) because 
these groups are often considered the “bottom of society” (Abts & Rummens, 2007, 
p. 418). 
Thus, in this thesis, populism is understood as a ‘thin’ ideology that describes 
a Manichean conflict between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ over sovereignty in soci-
ety. Furthermore, the homogenous conceptualization of ‘the people’ as the favored 
in-group implies that there are specific social groups that are excluded from the 
people as ‘others’. Depending on the parsimony of the conceptualization, popu-
lism as a ‘thin’ ideology therefore consists of three (Mény & Surel, 2002; Wirth et 
al., 2016) or four (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Blassnig et al., 2019; Engesser, 
Fawzi et al., 2017) dimensions: people-centrism, anti-elitism, popular sovereignty, and 
the exclusion of ‘others’. 
2.2 Supply Side: Populist Communication 
Populist ideology can be regarded as a mental construct or belief system that exists 
in populists’ minds (Kriesi, 2018, p. 13).4 To express this worldview, mobilize the 
people, or obtain intended effects on an audience, populist ideas must be commu-
nicated discursively (de Vreese et al., 2018, 425; Kriesi, 2018, p. 13). Populist com-
munication can therefore be understood as the discursive manifestation of populist 
ideology in the communication of any actor, not only political actors but also me-
dia actors or citizens (de Vreese et al., 2018, p. 425). It is of secondary importance 
whether the communicators actually believe what they say or whether they are 
using populist communication strategically—either way, it will be interpreted by 
the audience as populist (Kriesi, 2018, p. 13). Thus, on the supply side, populist 
ideology can be empirically identified primarily in political discourse (Kriesi, 2018, 
p. 13). 
Identifying populist ideology in political discourse can also be referred to as a 
communication-centered approach (de Vreese et al., 2018; Sorensen, 2017; Stanyer et 
al., 2017). This approach starts by identifying key characteristics of populist com-
munication and then analyzes the extent to which different actors use these popu-
list communication elements. Consequentially, actors are not distinguished as ei-
ther ‘populist’ or ‘not populist.’ Instead, the degree to which particular actors are 
populist is determined as a matter of degree based on whether and to what extent 
they use specific populist key messages. 
 
4 See also Chapter 2.3 on populist attitudes. 
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Building on the definition of populist ideology, populist communication sim-
ilarly consists of three or four dimensions: people-centrism, anti-elitism, restoring sov-
ereignty, and the exclusion of ‘others’. The populist communicator can communicate 
these dimensions through populist key messages aimed at three target groups: the 
people, the elite, and the others. Figure 1 illustrates the different dimensions of pop-
ulist communication and their relation to the three target groups. Based on previ-
ous literature (Bos et al., 2011; Cranmer, 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Wirth et 
al., 2016), twelve populist key messages can be assigned to these four core dimen-
sions. First, people-centrism includes four key messages that advocate for the peo-
ple (Wirth et al., 2016): An actor can approach the people, praise the people’s vir-
tues, praise the people’s achievements, or describe the people as homogenous. Sec-
ond, anti-elitism combines three key messages that are hostile and conflictive to-
ward the elite (Wirth et al., 2016): An actor may discredit the elite, blame the elite, 
or detach the elite from the people. Third, restoring sovereignty comprises two key 
messages (Wirth et al., 2016): An actor may demand the people’s sovereignty or 
deny the sovereignty of the elite. Finally, the exclusion of ‘others’ contains three 
key messages that are hostile and conflictive toward specific social out-groups: An 
actor can discredit ‘others’, blame ‘others’, or exclude ‘others’ from the people (see 
also Blassnig et al., 2019). 
 
Figure 1: Core concepts of populist communication. Source: own presentation; also pub-
lished in Blassnig et al. (2019). 
These populist key messages are an expression of the core ideas of populist 
ideology and therefore focus on the content of populist communication (what?). 
‘The others’
‘The elite‘
‘The people’
Vertical differentiation
Horizontal differentiation
Populist 
communicator
Anti-elitism
Exclusion
Denying sovereignty
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This is in contrast to a populist communication style, which focuses on the form of 
populist communication (how?) (de Vreese et al., 2018; Engesser, Fawzi et al., 2017; 
Wirth et al., 2016). The use of populist key messages is often associated with the 
use of a characteristic set of style elements (Ernst, Blassnig et al., 2019; Wettstein, 
Esser, Büchel et al., 2018), and it can even be argued that populist communication 
should ultimately be regarded as a combination of both messages and style (Ernst, 
Esser et al., 2019). Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between these two 
aspects5, since only populist content can theoretically be derived directly from pop-
ulist ideology, while populism-related style elements are rather features of a “go-
ing popular” strategy (Kriesi, 2018, p. 12). Following an ideational approach, this 
thesis therefore focuses only on the content of populist communication in the form 
of populist key messages and disregards populist style elements. 
To summarize, on the supply side, populism can be investigated in the form 
of populist communication that manifests in political discourse. Populist ideology 
can be communicated by various actors by means of specific populist key mes-
sages. From a political communication perspective, three key actor groups are of 
particular interest as populist communicators: political actors, the media, and citizens 
(de Vreese et al., 2018). These groups and their interactions are specifically relevant 
with regard to populist online communication, which will be elaborated in Chapter 
3. First, however, the next chapter will outline the demand side of populism. 
2.3 Demand Side: Populist Attitudes & Effects 
Whereas populist ideas predominantly become visible in the populist communi-
cation of political actors or in the mass media on the supply side, populist ideas 
can also be conceived as a set of beliefs or populist attitudes at the mass or indi-
vidual level (A. Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 
2018). Populist attitudes can be defined as the degree of agreement with populist 
ideology (A. Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz, Müller et al., 2018). Accordingly, some-
one who supports populist ideology perceives the people as homogeneous and 
virtuous, has a negative attitude toward the elite, and supports the demand for 
more popular sovereignty. Although political actors or media actors can hold pop-
ulist attitudes as well, this perspective is most often used to examine the appeal of 
populist ideas to citizens on the demand side. In surveys, populist attitudes can be 
 
5 Jagers and Walgrave (2007) speak of populism as a “political communication style” but use ele-
ments that I would consider ideological. Other authors (most notably Moffitt, 2016) mix populist 
ideas and style elements. 
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measured based on the same core ideas as populist communication: people-cen-
trism, anti-elitism, and popular sovereignty6 (Schulz, Müller et al., 2018). 
Populist attitudes can be conceived of as a latent demand or a disposition 
(Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018). This understanding can be related to the concep-
tion of populism as a cognitive schema related to the core ideas of populist ideol-
ogy—a “populism schema”—that may be activated by populist communication 
(Krämer, 2014). Populist communication can therefore be expected to have prim-
ing effects (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Carpentier, 2002) that make 
the populist attitudes of recipients more salient (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 9; 
Krämer, 2014). Priming, specifically media priming, in general assumes that medi-
ated content affects people’s subsequent judgments or behaviors by increasing the 
(short-term) accessibility of certain concepts in the memory of recipients, thus in-
creasing the likelihood that recipients use these same concepts in their subsequent 
judgments or evaluations (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2002). Accordingly, populist 
communication activates the preexisting populist attitudes of citizens by making 
those attitudes more salient. This activation increases the likelihood that these pop-
ulist attitudes affect the evaluation of the message and, furthermore, may bias mes-
sage processing toward elements that are congruent with the populism schema 
(Galambos, Abelson, & Black, 1986; Lodge & Hamill, 1986). 
Similarly, Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2018) argue that populist attitudes can be 
activated through context and framing. From a framing perspective, populist ideas 
may serve as an interpretative framework for various events (Wirz, 2019, p. 35). 
Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2018, p. 9) further identify three cognitive mechanisms 
involved in populist framing that are also addressed by other researchers with re-
gard to persuasion processes of populist communication. First, populist commu-
nication often includes a “dispositional attribution of blame” (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 
2018, p. 9). Hameleers et al. (2017a) and Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) also em-
phasize the central role of blame attributions against the elites and other out-
groups in populist messages with regard to audience effects. Second, based on so-
cial identity theory, it can be argued that populist communication invokes specific 
in-group and out-group identities (Hameleers et al., 2017a; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 
2018, p. 9; Schulz, Wirth, & Müller, 2018): the pure ‘people’ as in-group against the 
corrupt elites and dangerous ‘others’ as out-groups (Hameleers et al., 2018b). 
Third, populist communication may trigger effects via emotional persuasion pro-
 
6 Most established definitions and measures of populist attitudes do not include the exclusion of 
‘others’ as a core element. Some studies additionally include anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g., Matthes 
& Schmuck, 2017; Sheets, Bos, & Boomgaarden, 2016), which are then, however, only applicable to 
right-wing populism. 
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cesses (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 9; Wirz, 2018b), since populism is often as-
sociated with an emotionalized style (Bos et al., 2010; Canovan, 1999; Ernst, 
Blassnig et al., 2019; Hameleers et al., 2017a). Populist messages can be explicitly 
emotional or include characteristics that make them more likely to elicit emotional 
responses through appraisal processes (Wirz, 2018b). 
Previous research has examined the effect of populist communication on dif-
ferent attitudes or behaviors. It has been shown that populist communication can 
influence populist attitudes (e.g., Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; Müller et al., 2017), 
attitudes toward migrants (e.g., Matthes & Schmuck, 2017; Wirz et al., 2018), emo-
tions (Wirz, 2018b; Wirz et al., 2018), the perception of political actors (e.g., Bos et 
al., 2013), voting behavior (e.g., Sheets et al., 2016), and political engagement (e.g., 
Hameleers et al., 2018). Furthermore, the results of most of these studies indicate 
that the effects of populist communication are dependent on certain characteristics 
of the recipients or the sender. Not all groups are equally susceptible to populist 
communication (Wirz, 2019, p. 24). For example, Müller et al. (2017) find that ex-
posure to populist messages in the news only leads to more populist attitudes 
among citizens who already agreed with populist ideas beforehand. Findings by 
Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) indicate that the effect of populist communication 
on populist attitudes depends on the support for the source of the message. More 
recently, research has also started to analyze the effects of populist communication 
on user reactions on social media, relying on content analysis instead of surveys or 
experiments (Bobba, 2018; Bobba, Cremonesi, Mancosu, & Seddone, 2018). How-
ever, research on the effects of populist communication on behavior is still less 
common than research on attitudinal effects. 
To summarize, on the demand side, populism manifests in the form of popu-
list attitudes of citizens at the individual or aggregated mass level. These populist 
attitudes can be activated by populist communication. Furthermore, populist com-
munication is expected to have effects on different attitudes and behaviors of citi-
zens that may be explained theoretically by priming, framing, blame attributions, 
social identity theory, or emotional persuasion processes. While research on the 
effects of populist communication has increased, research specifically focusing on 
populist online communication as well as the manifest behavior of citizens is still 
scarce. However, these topics may be especially relevant because the role of citi-
zens has become more central in political online communication, and the interac-
tions between politicians, journalists, and citizens have become more direct and 
immediate, as will be elaborated in the next chapter. 
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3 POPULIST ONLINE COMMUNICATION 
In the late 1990s, Bimber (1998, p. 137) voiced the notion that the Internet has the 
potential “to restructure political power in a populist direction.” A few years later, 
Blumler (2001, p. 204) cautioned that in the third age, political communication is 
becoming more populist. Similarly, more recent literature suggests that online and 
social media provide specific opportunity structures for populist communication 
and populist actors (i.a., Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017; Engesser, Fawzi et al., 2017). 
However, within a hybrid media system, older and newer media logics compete and 
complement each other (Chadwick, 2017, p. 207). This hybridity becomes visible 
in the interplay not only between online and offline communication (Pfetsch, 
Adam, & Lance Bennett, 2014) but also within political online communication. In 
addition to noninstitutionalized online communication platforms such as social 
media, traditional, well-known media brands have established themselves online 
(see, e.g., Humprecht, 2016). Therefore, different areas of political online commu-
nication follow different media logics, which may influence their roles as platforms 
for populist communication. Furthermore, online media allow for a more direct 
interaction between politicians, journalists, and citizens within the same platforms 
and therefore potentially change the relationship between these three actor groups. 
Therefore, in this dissertation, populist online communication is conceptualized as 
the interplay between (1) populist communication in politicians’ online self-
presentation, (2) journalists’ online media representation of populist communica-
tion, and (3) citizens’ responses to this written and posted content in the form of 
audience reactions (see Figure 2). These three key actor groups, their roles in the 
dissemination of populist online communication, and the effects of populist online 
communication will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
 
 
Figure 2: Three key actor groups of populist online communication. Source: own repre-
sentation. 
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3.1 Politicians: Populist Self-Presentation 
Because populism is an inherently political phenomenon, political actors have tra-
ditionally been the starting point for research on populism. Earlier research has 
mostly followed an actor-centered approach by focusing on political actors that 
were defined a priori as populist, investigating factors that might explain their 
presence and electoral strength and identifying their common communication 
strategies and styles (Stanyer et al., 2017). As elaborated in Chapter 2, this disser-
tation follows a communication-centered approach (Stanyer et al., 2017). First, this 
approach focuses on politicians in their role as communicators. Second, it assumes 
that politicians’ communication can be populist to varying degrees. Third, this as-
sumption leads to the question of what factors might explain the use of populist 
key messages. Therefore, this chapter focuses on politicians’ self-presentation and 
on possible drivers of populist communication, specifically with regard to charac-
teristics of the communication channel and parties. 
The role of politicians as communicators and, thus, their self-presentation, has 
increased enormously in importance in the environment of increasing mediatiza-
tion and personalization of politics (Esser, 2013, p. 163; Sheafer, Shenhav, & Bal-
mas, 2014, pp. 217–218). The self-presentational side of politics mostly follows the 
politics aspect of political logic, which is more power-oriented, more public, and 
more focused on tactics and strategies, in contrast to policy or polity logic (Esser, 
2013, p. 165; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014, p. 15). These characteristics can be linked to 
Landerer’s (2013) conceptualization of a market logic as distinct from a normative 
logic of political communication. Whereas normative logic is more value-oriented, 
elitist, supply-driven, and aims at problem solving, market logic is more concerned 
with the maximization of self-interested goals (e.g., vote share), more audience-
oriented, demand-driven, and follows the imperative of newsworthiness (Lan-
derer, 2013, p. 249). Thus, the self-presentation of politicians has not only become 
more important—it can also be expected to be specifically prone to populist com-
munication due to its audience- and demand-orientation and its susceptibility to 
(self-)mediatization. 
Whereas studies of politicians’ self-presentation have often investigated tele-
vision news, debates, or talk-shows (Baum, 2005; Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Schütz, 1992, 
1995), research on populism has long focused on party or election manifestos 
(Rooduijn, 2014b; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017; Rooduijn, De Lange, & van der 
Brug, 2014) or political speeches (Hawkins, 2009, 2010). An early exception was a 
study by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) that investigated the use of populist commu-
nication in the political party broadcasts (PPB) of Belgian parties. As the commu-
nication perspective has become more prevalent, research has started to compare 
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populism across different communication channels. Cranmer (2011) compared 
speeches by Swiss politicians in parliamentary committees, open parliamentary 
floors, and political talk shows and found that a public setting, specifically talk 
shows, was favorable for populist communication. Comparing Dutch political 
leaders’ statements in newspapers, television news, talk shows, and PPB, Bos and 
Brants (2014) concluded that talk shows and PPB were especially prone to populist 
communication. These results indicate that, on the one hand, a public setting and, 
on the other hand, media channels where politicians have a higher control may be 
beneficial for populist communication. 
With an increasingly interventionist approach of journalistic news, politicians 
may look for other communication channels that offer them the opportunity to 
present themselves with less journalistic interference (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; 
Paletz, 2002). In hybrid media systems (Chadwick, 2017), politicians increasingly 
use a mix of various media outlets for self-presentational purposes. Digital media, 
specifically social media, have become a central alternative to television (Lee, 2013, 
953; Stanyer, 2008, p. 415). Similar to political or entertainment talk shows, social 
media in themselves can be considered a hybrid form of mediality, in which dif-
ferent media or communication logics merge and collide (e.g., Iannelli & Giglietto, 
2015). Thus, both talk shows and social media offer politicians a combination of 
broad reach and control that may be especially appealing for populist actors whose 
aim is to reach a large following in as unmediated a way as possible. 
As summarized in Article III, characteristics of social media logic (e.g., van Dijck 
& Poell, 2013) or network media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015) offer several op-
portunity structures for populist communication and populist actors (see also 
Ernst, 2019). First, social media provide political actors with more possibilities for 
the personalization of content and communication (Hermans & Vergeer, 2013; Ja-
cobs & Spierings, 2016), permitting populist actors to portray themselves as ap-
proachable, ordinary, and no different than the ‘common (wo)man’. This approach 
conforms to populist actors’ self-presentation as belonging to the people, in con-
trast to all the other politicians who are part of the elite. Second, social media allow 
for more direct communication and, thus, for a closer, more personal, or more “hu-
man” opportunity to make contact with voters (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016, p. 23). 
This more direct connection with the people complies with the dimension of peo-
ple-centrism and specifically with populism’s claim to a “direct, unmediated ac-
cess to the people’s grievances” and the self-perception of populist actors as 
“spokesperson[s] of the vox populi” (Kriesi, 2014, p. 363). Third, social media al-
low political actors to circumvent traditional gatekeepers such as journalists and 
directly reach a large audience (e.g., Parmelee & Bichard, 2012). This allows popu-
list actors to stand up against the elite, specifically the media elite or mainstream 
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media, and question their legitimacy, for example, by criticizing them as the “lying 
press” or “Lügenpresse”. Fourth, social media provide political actors with the op-
portunity to better target specific groups, “like-minded others”, or “kindred souls” 
(Jacobs & Spierings, 2016, p. 24). Thus, politicians can reach groups that are elec-
torally or ideologically important to them and strengthen or expand their commu-
nity (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). The opportunity to better target specific groups 
also enables populist actors to attack the elite, exclude commonly perceived out-
groups, or use uncivil language within their network without having to fear criti-
cism from political opponents or critical journalists (Engesser, Ernst et al., 2017). 
Finally, the network characteristics of social media mean that politicians not only 
reach their direct followers but also potentially second-degree and even more dis-
tant connections (Kruikemeier, 2014; Stromer-Galley, 2004). The speed and magni-
tude of these social networking sites can ultimately lead to a virality of specific 
contents (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016, p. 22), which is why some researchers also 
speak of a logic of virality (Berger & Milkman, 2012; Nahon, Hemsley, Walker, & 
Hussain, 2011). The prerequisite for virality is the interactivity of citizens with pol-
iticians’ posts, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.3. 
From this perspective, social media may be beneficial platforms to communi-
cate populist ideas. However, as I argue in Article I, in contrast to highly mediatized 
formats such as political talk shows, social media also provide politicians with an 
environment where they have more control and are potentially less compelled to 
adapt their communication to the mass media logic (Sheafer et al., 2014, p. 221). 
Therefore, by bypassing traditional media, these communication channels could 
also allow politicians to take back control that they had seemingly lost due to an 
increasing mediatization, and focus more on a political logic or normative logic 
that is less prone to populist communication (Blumler, 2016). In turn, social media 
may also serve as a new, inexpensive, and easy-to-use communication channel to 
influence the agendas and frames of journalists and, thus, gain attention in tradi-
tional mass media (Chadwick, 2017; Enli & Simonsen, 2018; Kreiss, 2016). In fact, 
studies have found that politicians adapt their communication on Twitter in antic-
ipation of news coverage (Verdegem & D’heer, 2018). From this viewpoint, com-
munication on social media is still highly related to the media logic of mainstream 
mass media (Enli & Simonsen, 2018). 
In addition to different communication platforms, specific characteristics of 
political parties and actors have been identified as drivers of populist communica-
tion in politicians’ self-presentation. Previous research has shown that extreme 
parties on both ends of the political spectrum are specifically likely to use populist 
key messages in party manifestos (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017), press releases 
(Bernhard, 2016), and on social media (Ernst et al., 2017). This may be explained by 
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their frequent antagonism to the government or mainstream parties, their empha-
sis on responsiveness to the interests of ordinary citizens over responsibility (R. S. 
Katz & Mair, 2009; Mair, 2002), and a need to compensate for their weak party 
organization with a more elaborate or aggressive communication strategy (Ernst, 
Blassnig et al., 2019; Müller-Rommel, 1998). Furthermore, it has proven fruitful to 
combine a communication- and actor-centered approach comparing politicians of 
predefined populist parties with politicians of typically nonpopulist parties in 
their use of populist communication. As Ernst, Esser et al. (2019) show, politicians 
of typically populist parties not only communicate in a more populist manner; this 
difference is especially apparent in their social media communication as well as in 
their success at breaking into news media coverage with their populist messages. 
To summarize, characteristics of the communication channel—news media 
logic, network media logic, or generally a highly audience-oriented logic—as well 
as characteristics of parties—an extreme ideological position or typically populist 
parties—may act as drivers of populism in politicians’ self-presentation. Therefore, 
in this dissertation, the populist communication of politicians will be compared 
across different communication channels as well as across the political spectrum 
and different party types with regard to both its drivers (see Article I) and its effects 
on citizens’ reactions (see Article III & V). 
3.2 Journalists: Populist Media Representation 
Despite the growing importance of social media, the news media still play a central 
role in political communication—specifically with regard to populist online com-
munication. Political actors—and populist actors—continue to be largely depend-
ent on the mass media to gain prominence and to reach a large audience (e.g., Hop-
mann, 2014). In turn, the news media tend to notice and report on populist state-
ments, as they are often dramatic and controversial and thus correspond to news 
values or media logic (e.g., Mazzoleni, 2008). Therefore, also in the digital age, me-
dia representation and the role of journalists are crucial to understanding populist 
communication (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017). With online media representation, I 
refer to the propagation and dissemination of populist ideas in the form of populist 
communication in online news media. This may occur directly or indirectly, inten-
tionally or unintentionally (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 2018, p. 478). Therefore, 
it is important to distinguish between populism by the media and populism 
through the media, as suggested by Esser et al. (2017). 
First, populism by the media is closely related to the concept of a media popu-
lism (Krämer, 2014), according to which the media can express populist ideas them-
selves. Thus, media outlets or journalists may present themselves as the voice of 
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the people, promote anti-elitism, or construct in-groups and out-groups (Maz-
zoleni, 2014). In this sense, journalists can act as originators or initiators of populist 
messages (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 2018, p. 479). Reasons for this may be po-
litically motivated media ownership (Esser et al., 2017), a specific journalistic per-
spective as advocate of the people, or an anti-establishment bias of the media 
(Krämer, 2014; Mazzoleni, 2008; Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 2018). However, a 
populist reporting style may also be motivated by economic opportunism as a 
means to gain attention and reach large audiences (Krämer, 2014; Wettstein, Esser, 
Schulz et al., 2018). 
Second, described as populism through the media, the news media can dissem-
inate and thereby reinforce populist messages by other actors, mostly by politi-
cians (Esser et al., 2017). According to this perspective, intentionally or uninten-
tionally, the media can provide a favorable platform for populism that multiplies 
and amplifies populist messages by political actors (Mazzoleni, 2014). This view is 
largely based on the assumption that populist communication has high newswor-
thiness and good compatibility with media logic, specifically commercial media 
logic (Esser et al., 2017, p. 369; Mazzoleni, 2008, pp. 54–55). Additionally, populism 
through the media may be fostered by issue ownership of populist parties, the 
event environment and national issue culture, and a strict understanding of bal-
ance and fair access (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 2018, p. 478). Thus, journalists 
act as gatekeepers that “may open or close the news gates to populist political ac-
tors” (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 2018, p. 478). 
Third, journalists can also act as interpreters of populist messages. Whereas in 
their role as gatekeepers, journalists may disseminate populist messages by politi-
cians neutrally according to news values, journalists can also evaluate populist ac-
tors and their messages positively or negatively (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 
2018, p. 479). Hence, in their interpretive role, journalists can attenuate or amplify, 
criticize or legitimize populist messages by politicians. Explanations for a positive 
evaluation of populist messages may be similar as those for populism by the media. 
Other reasons may be a parallelism to populist parties or media advocacy for an 
issue owned by populist actors (Krämer, 2014; Mazzoleni, 2008; Wettstein, Esser, 
Schulz et al., 2018). Criticism of populist messages or actors may in turn result from 
the journalistic perception of populism as a threat to liberal democracy, checks-
and-balances institutions, or the freedom of the media (Esser et al., 2017; Wettstein, 
Esser, Schulz et al., 2018). 
The complex relationship between populism and the media has been dis-
cussed theoretically (Esser et al., 2017; Mazzoleni, 2003, 2008, 2014) and analyzed 
empirically in various traditional mass media channels such as the press (T. Ak-
kerman, 2011; Bos et al., 2010; Rooduijn, 2014a; Wettstein, Esser, Büchel et al., 2018; 
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Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 2018), or TV and radio newscasts (Bos et al., 2011; 
van der Pas, Vries, & van der Brug, 2013). However, the specific role of online news 
media with regard to populist communication has been largely neglected. Recent 
literature suggests that—similar to social media—online news media provide spe-
cific opportunity structures for populist communication (Aalberg & de Vreese, 
2017; Engesser, Fawzi et al., 2017). As elaborated in Article II, four characteristics 
can be identified that may foster populist communication in online news. First, 
similar to social media, online news media allow for a more direct connection to 
the people due to potentially lower levels of gatekeeping (Williams & Delli 
Carpini, 2011), an increasing audience orientation by facilitating direct feedback 
from readers (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017), and better opportunities for nonelite ac-
tors to enter the news cycle (Chadwick, 2017). Second, the attention economy of 
the Internet may further increase an orientation toward media logic. Three aspects 
of media logic are especially favorable for populist communication according to 
Esser et al. (2017): conflict framing, strategic framing, and personalization. These 
aspects may be associated with attention-driven as well as interpretative or opin-
ion-oriented journalism (Djerf-Pierre & Weibull, 2008; Hameleers et al., 2017b). 
Third, this favorability may be reinforced by an increasing commercialization of 
online news outlets due to declining or stagnant numbers of subscriptions (New-
man, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2019), a mostly advertisement-based 
business model (Nielsen, 2016), and an increasing focus on high click rates, audi-
ence metrics, and speed (Cherubini & Nielsen, 2016; Klinger & Svensson, 2015). 
Finally, although online news outlets of traditional mass media are still dominated 
by mass media logic, they are increasingly influenced by a network media logic 
(Klinger & Svensson, 2015). This influence is reflected in the fact that the dissemi-
nation of news via social media as well as the active participation of readers in the 
form of likes, shares, or comments have become increasingly important (e.g., Hille 
& Bakker, 2014; Villi, Matikainen, & Khaldarova, 2016). In addition to network me-
dia logic, this may further imply an increasing importance of the audience—in 
their role as the public, consumers, and as citizens—in relation to the media and 
politics (Brants & van Praag, 2015). 
To summarize, the news media are crucial for the wider dissemination of pop-
ulist communication, and journalists can take on different roles as originators, 
gatekeepers, or interpreters of populist messages. In online news outlets, journal-
ists may be specifically likely to voice or cite populist statements due to an increas-
ing audience orientation, the attention economy, commercialization, and an orien-
tation toward news values and network media logic. Additionally, specific char-
acteristics of news coverage, such as opinion-oriented formats or interpretative 
journalism, may act as drivers of populist online communication. Finally, these 
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tendencies may be reinforced by soliciting the active feedback, distribution, and 
participation of readers. Therefore, the next chapter focuses on the role of citizens 
as a third key-actor group with regard to populist online communication. 
3.3 Citizens: Reactions to Populist Communication 
Based on the central role of ‘the people’ in populist ideology, one could argue that 
citizens lie at the heart of populist communication. However, research on populist 
communication has long considered citizens either as an abstract object of populist 
communication or in an aggregated form as a source of electoral support for pop-
ulist actors (de Vreese et al., 2018). With an increasing audience-orientation and 
more possibilities for citizens’ direct feedback in an online environment, as well as 
with a growing interest in the effects of populist communication, citizens have be-
come a more central actor group for populist communication. 
On the one hand, citizens are recipients of and audiences for mediated populist 
messages by politicians and journalists (de Vreese et al., 2018, p. 430; Reinemann 
et al., 2017, p. 23). This perspective raises questions about the effects of populist 
communication on citizens, which have long been neglected in research on popu-
lism. Furthermore, this is connected to research on citizens’ populist attitudes and 
how these attitudes may be affected by or moderate effects of populist communi-
cation (i.a., Hameleers et al., 2017a; Müller et al., 2017; Schulz, Müller et al., 2018). 
On the other hand, citizens can also be regarded as actors in the communicative 
interactions of populist communication (de Vreese et al., 2018, p. 430). Particularly 
online, citizens can react to or engage with populist messages in online news cov-
erage or with messages shared by politicians on social media platforms by liking 
or sharing them. Citizens can also evaluate populist ideas or initiate populist mes-
sages themselves by commenting on news articles or social media posts (Esser et 
al., 2017). Moreover, citizens’ active reactions on social media platforms and news 
websites manifest in digital trace data, allowing us to investigate the effects of pop-
ulist communication based on the manifest behavior of citizens. In my dissertation, 
I therefore combine these two perspectives by examining the effects of populist 
communication on citizens as recipients and on their subsequent behavior as actors 
in populist communicative interactions. In the following, I will discuss three as-
pects that are the focus of this dissertation with regard to citizens’ reactions to pop-
ulist communication: (1) user reactions to populist communication in the form of 
popularity cues; (2) reader comments as populist citizen journalism; and (3) how 
the former two aspects can be connected to an effects perspective. 
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3.3.1 Popularity Cues: Is Populism Popular? 
Following the network media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015, p. 1248), gaining 
relevant resonance both within social media platforms and to some extent in online 
mass media depends on the ability to publish content that users will recirculate 
within their larger networks, comment on, and recommend to other users. In this 
way, social media posts can reach a secondary audience in addition to the primary 
audience of the direct followers (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015). The logic of this two-
step flow of communication (E. Katz, 1957) privileges popular content over unpop-
ular content both from the supply side and the demand side. On the supply side, 
politicians want to publish content that resonates with their followers and gains a 
large amount of attention. Followers’ reactions to tweets or Facebook posts, such 
as likes or shares, help politicians reach wider audiences. Furthermore, a high level 
of social media popularity may render political actors and their messages more 
newsworthy (Fürst & Oehmer, 2018) and give them more attention in traditional 
media (Chadwick, 2017). Likewise, online news outlets rely increasingly on social 
media as platforms for distribution as well as on social plugins on their websites 
to increase their audience reach (e.g., Hille & Bakker, 2014; Villi et al., 2016). On the 
demand side, citizens use popularity as a selection criterion to navigate the high-
choice online media environment (Porten-Cheé, Haßler, Jost, Eilders, & Maurer, 
2018) and to decide what content to click on, read, or engage with themselves (e.g., 
Dvir-Gvirsman, 2019; Knobloch-Westerwick, Sharma, Hansen, & Alter, 2005). 
The popularity of a social media post or a news item manifests in the form of 
popularity cues (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018). In a broad sense, popularity cues repre-
sent “metric information about users’ behavior or their evaluations of entities” (Haim, 
Kümpel, & Brosius, 2018, p. 190, emphasis i.o.) and, thus, a specific form of digital 
trace data (Jungherr, 2015). More specifically, following Porten-Cheé et al. (2018, 
p. 211), popularity cues can be defined as user reactions such as likes, shares, and 
other metrics that indicate the assignment of attention and relevance to, or en-
dorsement of and support for social media messages or online news items. Im-
portantly, popularity cues neither necessarily imply (reciprocal) interaction nor ac-
tual attention paid to the content of a post or article by individual users—they are 
rather a proxy for popularity or reach. Depending on the online platform, different 
options for user reactions are provided that can be differentiated with regard to 
their degree of activation (Berger & Milkman, 2010) and the user intention behind 
them (Bene, 2017a). With regard to Facebook and Twitter, which will be the focus 
of Article III, the most important popularity cues are likes and shares (respectively 
retweets for Twitter). Although both liking and sharing can be interpreted as mainly 
positive reactions to a (political) message, sharing a post seems to be the result of 
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a process of higher elaboration. Moreover, liking mainly indicates a positive eval-
uation of a message, whereas the motive for sharing seems to be the perceived 
relevance for the peer group (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018, p. 214). Regardless of users’ 
motives, both likes and shares contribute to higher popularity and possibly to vi-
rality on social media. 
As elaborated in Articles III, IV, and V, populist communication may be posi-
tively associated with popularity cues for three reasons: (1) Populist communica-
tion’s potential as a political mobilization strategy may stimulate the political par-
ticipation of otherwise marginalized or inactive groups (Jansen, 2011). (2) The high 
news value and compatibility with the media logic of populist actors and populist 
communication (Mazzoleni, 2008) may translate into a high shareworthiness 
(Trilling, Tolochko, & Burscher, 2016). (3) Populist key messages frequently 
cooccur with specific populism-related stylistic devices such as negativity, emo-
tionalization, and personalization (Ernst, Blassnig et al., 2019) that have been iden-
tified as positive factors influencing the number of popularity cues (Bene, 2017a, 
2017b; Heiss, Schmuck, & Matthes, 2018; Staender, Ernst, & Steppat, 2019). Thus, 
both populist messages and populist actors may act as drivers of popularity cues. 
This is also supported by initial empirical evidence (Bobba, 2018). 
Consequently, by liking or sharing populist messages or articles, whether will-
ingly or unwillingly, citizens can disseminate populist ideas by contributing to a 
higher popularity of and larger audience for these messages. Additionally, as men-
tioned above, readers may express populist ideas themselves on social media. In 
the following, this second aspect will be elaborated more closely with a specific 
focus on reader comments. 
3.3.2 Reader Comments: Populist Citizen Journalism 
Reader comments can be considered a special type of popularity cue. On the one 
hand, similarly to likes and shares, they contribute to high click rates and a higher 
reach (e.g., Anderson, 2011; Bene, 2017a). On the other hand, commenting allows 
readers to express their own evaluations and opinions as a direct response to 
online news articles and interact with other commenters. Moreover, reader com-
ments can significantly influence citizens’ perceptions of public opinion and even 
change readers’ personal opinions (Lee, 2012; Lee & Jang, 2010; Toepfl & Piwoni, 
2015, p. 467). As discussed in more detail in Article IV, reader comments are asso-
ciated both with positive developments, e.g., the potential to contribute to a delib-
erative online public sphere (Dahlberg, 2011), as well as with negative conse-
quences, e.g., incivility, hate speech, or echo chambers (e.g., Coe, Kenski, & Rains, 
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2014; Stroud, Scacco, Muddiman, & Curry, 2015), for the online public sphere. Fur-
thermore, as I argue in Articles II and IV, reader comments may provide a specifi-
cally fertile ground for populist communication by citizens. 
Comment functions offer citizens the opportunity to react to populist state-
ments by politicians and journalists as well as to publicly express populist ideas 
themselves. Esser et al. (2017) refer to this as populist citizen journalism and regard 
it as a third aspect, in addition to populism by and through the media. From this 
perspective, journalists again take on a role as gatekeepers: They may simultane-
ously be rather restrictive with regard to populist communication in news articles, 
while opening the gates to populist messages by citizens in the form of reader com-
ments (Esser et al., 2017, p. 371). This assumption assumes that reader comments 
are less constrained by editorial gatekeeping processes and journalistic norms. 
Thus, online mass media may provide a platform not only for populist messages 
by politicians, as described by populism through the media, but also by citizens. 
Similar to populism in news articles, this may be driven by economic opportunism 
and (network) media logic—high numbers of reader comments generate website 
traffic and high click rates (Anderson, 2011). 
Additionally, the different functions of reader comments may render them 
specifically prone to populist communication. Reader comments may serve as lib-
eral individualist, communitarian (Freelon, 2015) or counter public spaces (Toepfl 
& Piwoni, 2015). From a liberal individualist perspective, journalists may accept the 
violation of civility or deliberativeness in favor of uninhibited self-expression by 
readers (Freelon, 2015). This is reminiscent of an emphasis on the freedom of ex-
pression and the opposition to political correctness that are often associated with 
populist actors (e.g., Mudde, 2004). As communitarian spaces, comment sections 
may enable collaboration with like-minded others, community building around 
specific ideological goals, and also demarcation from outsiders (Freelon, 2015), im-
plying the identification of a homogenous collective in-group and specific out-
groups as well as an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ rhetoric that are also inherent in populist com-
munication. Finally, as counter publics, reader comments may constitute a space 
where citizens can challenge or deviate from the media or public sphere that are 
perceived as mainstream or dominant (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). This again suggests 
the construction of in-groups and out-groups as well as an antagonism against the 
establishment that often includes the mainstream media (Esser et al., 2017). 
These different functions of comment sections could foster the use of populist 
communication by citizens in reader comments in general. However, populist 
reader comments may also be interpreted as direct reactions to the news articles 
they respond to. Therefore, they are likely to be affected by the characteristics of 
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these articles, e.g., whether these articles include populist key messages or not. 
This will be discussed in the following section. 
3.3.3 Citizens’ Reactions as Effects of Populist Communication 
As direct responses to social media posts or news articles, popularity cues and 
reader comments are influenced by the content and characteristics of the posts or 
articles (e.g., Bene, 2017a; Staender et al., 2019; Trilling et al., 2016; Ziegele, Quiring, 
Esau, & Friess, 2018). From a demand-side perspective, popularity cues and (pop-
ulist) reader comments can therefore also be regarded as the manifestation of ef-
fects of populist communication that may be explained by different persuasion 
processes. 
As addressed in Chapter 2.3, from the perspective of social identity theory, 
populist communication activates specific in-group and out-group identities: ‘the 
good people’ vs. ‘the bad elite’ or ‘the dangerous others’ (Hameleers et al., 2017a; 
Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018; Schulz, Wirth et al., 2018). According to the social 
identity model of collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), this 
identification with the people as an in-group that is seemingly threatened by the 
elite or the others may have a mobilization effect and promote the likelihood that 
citizens will become politically engaged (Hameleers et al., 2018; Simon & Klander-
mans, 2001; van Zomeren et al., 2008). As Porten-Cheé et al. (2018, p. 213) argue, 
liking an online item may present a low-threshold way to support certain political 
positions and influence public opinion on the user level. Similarly, sharing can be 
regarded as a means of promoting certain political issues and positions and of 
gradually influencing what fellow users perceive to be important issues on a visi-
ble micro level (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018, p. 214). Finally, commenting allows an 
explicit expression of political opinions that may either support or criticize the con-
tent of the original post or article (e.g., Bene, 2017a). Thus, a mobilization effect 
based on the activation of specific social identities may increase the likelihood that 
recipients like, share, or comment on populist content. Additionally, an increased 
use of popularity cues could also be explained by emotional persuasion processes 
(Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018; Wirz, 2018b). As Wirz (2018b) has shown, populist 
appeals elicit stronger emotions than nonpopulist appeals, and these emotions—
specifically anger and hope—increase the persuasiveness of populist communica-
tion. Such affective reactions may also increase citizens’ likelihood to like, share, 
or comment on populist messages. 
The effects of populist communication on user reactions and specifically the 
triggering of populist reader comments may be further explained based on schema 
theory, priming, and framing. Following schema theory (see also Chapter 2.3), 
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populist messages can activate a cognitive “populism schema” in recipients’ mem-
ories. Thus, populist communication may have priming effects that make latent 
populist attitudes of recipients more salient and thus increase the likelihood that 
citizens apply this populism schema in their subsequent judgments or evaluations 
in response to a message (Krämer, 2014; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2002). On the one 
hand, this increased salience of populist attitudes may lead to a more positive eval-
uation of the populist message. On the other hand, the increased (short-term) ac-
cessibility of a populism concept in the memory of recipients may lead to an in-
creased likelihood that citizens also use populist messages in reader comments re-
sponding to populist news articles (Galambos et al., 1986; Lodge & Hamill, 1986). 
From a framing perspective, similar effects of populist communication on recipi-
ents’ attitudes or evaluations may be explained via value framing (Wirz, 2018a) or 
blame attributions (Hameleers et al., 2017a). 
As elaborated in Chapter 2.3, populist attitudes are relatively stable and are 
only marginally affected by (short-term) exposure to populist communication. 
Furthermore, based on schema theory, we can assume that populist communica-
tion mainly activates or reinforces prior populist attitudes. This assumption sug-
gests that preexisting populist attitudes act as a moderator of the effects of populist 
communication. This is also supported by previous empirical research that shows 
that exposure to populist messages in the mass media only increases populist atti-
tudes for citizens who already had strong populist attitudes beforehand (Müller et 
al., 2017). Similarly, experiments found that the effects of populist messages were 
moderated by people’s identification with the sender of the message (Hameleers 
& Schmuck, 2017) or their feeling of relative deprivation (Hameleers et al., 2018b). 
Applied to citizens’ reactions in the form of popularity cues or reader comments, 
one can similarly assume that on a micro level, populist communication will not 
lead to a higher willingness for every citizen to like or share a populist message or 
express populist messages themselves. Instead, it can be expected that these effects 
are moderated by citizens’ populist attitudes. Because user reactions can be mainly 
interpreted as positive reactions to a message, citizens with strong populist atti-
tudes are expected to like, share, or comment on a populist message, whereas for 
citizens with low populist attitudes, one would expect a reactance effect (see also 
Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017). 
To summarize, we can assume that (1) populist communication leads to more 
popularity cues and reader comments (see Articles III, IV, & V); (2) reader com-
ments are generally specifically prone to populist communication by citizens (see 
Article II); (3) populist communication in news articles elicits populist communica-
tion by citizens in reader comments (see Article IV); and (4) that these effects are 
moderated by citizens’ prior populist attitudes (see Article V). 
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4 METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW 
This dissertation draws on four data collections to investigate populist online com-
munication across different countries and communication contexts. It analyzes so-
cial media posts of politicians, online news media content, and their effects on cit-
izens’ reactions in the form of popularity cues and reader comments in up to six 
countries. Thereby, it draws on quantitative content analysis, digital trace data, 
and an online survey experiment to combine the supply and demand sides and to 
complement the advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches. In this 
chapter, I will provide a brief overview of the comparative approach, the research 
designs and data for the individual studies, and the operationalization of populist 
communication. More details on the methods, samples, and operationalization for 
the individual papers can be found in Chapter 5 and in the original articles in the 
appendix. 
4.1 Comparative Approach 
This dissertation follows a comparative approach, analyzing the manifestation of 
populist communication and its effects across different countries, communication 
channels, and actor types. All content analyses (Articles I-IV) include several coun-
tries in their research design. However, they differ somewhat in their approach. 
Article I follows the most explicit comparative approach by comparing the use 
of populist communication across four countries—Switzerland (CH), Germany 
(DE), the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US)—and by investigating 
structural aspects on the macro level as explanatory factors. The four countries 
were chosen because, on the one hand, they are broadly similar, as all selected 
countries are established Western democracies that have seen a rise of populist 
actors or movements in the last few years. On the other hand, they distinguish 
themselves with regard to several dimensions of their political systems, notably 
with regard to their systems of government and electoral systems. This allows in-
vestigating politicians’ use of populist communication in varying political and 
electoral settings and explaining differences and similarities through different con-
textual settings (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012). 
In Articles II, III, and IV, the comparative approach serves more as a compari-
son of relations, in which the different contexts work as a robustness check and 
enable a higher generalizability of the findings within Western Europe (Esser & 
Vliegenthart, 2017). Thus, in these articles, we regard populism as a transnational 
phenomenon and test different relations, for example, between populism in news 
articles and reader comments, or between populist communication and popularity 
cues, across varying contexts. Articles II and IV follow a most different systems 
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within most similar systems design in the selection of the countries. They include 
three countries—CH, FR, and UK—that have similar political, economic, and cul-
tural settings within Western Europe, hosted national elections between 2015 and 
2017, and saw rather successful (right-wing) populist parties in the last European 
or national elections. On the other hand, they again differ with regard to their types 
of political systems and media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Lijphart, 1999). 
For Article III, six Western democracies were selected: Switzerland (CH), Germany 
(DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). 
This sample provides even more diverse contexts, with variability regarding par-
liamentary vs. presidential systems, representative vs. directional systems, consen-
sus vs. majoritarian systems, strong vs. weak standing of populist parties (in par-
liament or public opinion), and higher vs. lower consumption of social media for 
political information purposes (Aalberg et al., 2017; Newman, Fletcher, Levy, & 
Nielsen, 2016). 
4.2 Research Design & Data 
Article I is based on a quantitative content analysis of politicians’ statements in po-
litical talk shows and on social media (Facebook & Twitter) in four countries (CH, 
DE, UK, US). The original material was collected by the National Center of Com-
petence in Research on ‘Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century’ (NCCR De-
mocracy), funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF). The material 
was then coded by the author of this dissertation. This study focuses on politicians’ 
self-presentation and includes statements by 74 politicians across the political spec-
trum during a routine time in 2014 (N = 2,454). 
Articles II and IV draw on a quantitative content analysis of online news cov-
erage related to the topic of immigration and responding reader comments during 
national election campaigns in France (2017), Switzerland (2015), and the United 
Kingdom (2015). These data were collected and coded within the project “Populist 
Online Communication in Europe: Self-Presentation, Media Representation, and 
Audience Reconstruction of Political Actors”, funded by the SNF. The data set in-
cludes N = 493 news articles from 14 online media outlets and N = 2,904 reader 
comments. 
Article III is based on a quantitative content analysis for which the data were 
collected and coded by the NCCR Democracy, funded by the SNF. The data in-
clude Facebook posts and tweets from 36 political leaders of 29 parties (N = 566) 
across six countries (CH, DE, FR, IT, UK, US) during a routine time in 2015. 
Finally, Article V draws on data from an online survey experiment with a 2x2 
design. The experiment was conducted in Switzerland in 2019. The participants 
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were recruited by Respondi7 from its online access panel using quota sampling for 
age, gender, and education based on Eurostat data for German-speaking Facebook 
users in Switzerland (N = 647). 
4.3 Operationalization of Populist Communication 
The most crucial variable of this dissertation is populist communication. It serves 
as the dependent variable in Articles I, II, and IV, as an independent variable in 
Articles III and IV, and as the experimental factor in Article V. Its operationalization 
was derived directly from the theoretical definition of populist ideology discussed 
in Chapter 2.1, building on previous literature (Cranmer, 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 
2007; Wirth et al., 2016). Overall, populist communication is regarded as a forma-
tive measure (Diamantopoulos, Riefler, & Roth, 2008), based on the four dimen-
sions people-centrism, anti-elitism, restoring sovereignty, and the exclusion of oth-
ers, with each indicator capturing a specific aspect of the construct. These dimen-
sions were measured mainly based on the twelve populist key messages discussed 
in Chapter 2.2 and summarized in Table 1. 
Due to the cumulative nature of this dissertation, the operationalization of 
populist communication varies slightly between the individual publications. In Ar-
ticle I, populist communication was operationalized based on three dimensions: 
people-centrism, anti-elitism, and exclusion, with the advocative aspect of restor-
ing sovereignty—demanding the people’s sovereignty—integrated within people-
centrism. Whereas anti-elitism and exclusion were operationalized as summarized 
in Table 1, people-centrism was operationalized slightly differently and comprised 
five key messages based on Cranmer (2011): advocacy, accountability, legitimacy, 
describing the people as homogenous, and demanding the people’s sovereignty. 
Articles II and IV followed the full operationalization outlined in Table 1 and de-
scribed in more detail in Blassnig et al. (2019). For Article III, populist communica-
tion was operationalized building on the conceptualization from the NCCR de-
mocracy project described in Wirth et al. (2016). This operationalization is based 
on the three dimensions of people-centrism, anti-elitism, and restoring sover-
eignty, which are measured by the same corresponding nine key messages as de-
scribed in Table 1. However, this minimal operationalization does not include the 
dimension of exclusion. Finally, in Article V, the populist stimulus also followed a 
minimal operationalization and included three populist key messages for people-
centrism, anti-elitism, and demanding the people’s sovereignty. These differences 
 
7 Respondi is a market research company that is a member of the European Society for Opinion and 
Marketing Research and certified according to ISO 26362. 
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will be further discussed in Chapter 6.2 with regard to the limitations of this dis-
sertation. 
 
Table 1: Conceptualization and operationalization of populist key messages 
Dimension Key message Description 
People- 
centrism 
Approaching 
the people 
The speaker describes himself or is described as be-
longing to the people, being close to the people, 
knowing the people, speaking for the people, caring 
for the people, agreeing with the people or perform-
ing everyday actions. The speaker claims to represent 
or embody the people. 
Praising the 
people’s vir-
tues 
The people are attributed positive traits such as mo-
rality, charisma, credibility, intelligence, competence, 
consistency, etc. The people are exempt from being 
malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, extremist, racist, 
undemocratic, etc. 
Praising the 
people’s 
achievements 
The people are described as being responsible for a 
positive development/situation, an achievement or 
benefit. Achievements include important, successful, 
‘right’ actions or other accomplishments. 
Describing the 
people as  
homogenous 
The people are described as sharing a common un-
derstanding of the world, common feelings, desires, 
opinions, or a common will. 
Anti-elitism 
Discrediting 
the elite 
Negative personality traits, mistakes, and unlawful or 
immoral behavior of the elites are stressed. The elites 
are portrayed as corrupt, malevolent, criminal, lazy, 
stupid, extremist, evil, undemocratic, etc. The elite are 
called names and denied morality, charisma, credibil-
ity, intelligence, competence, consistency, etc. 
Blaming the 
elite 
Elites are described as a threat/burden, or held re-
sponsible for negative developments/situations, spe-
cific failures, or as having committed specific mis-
takes or crimes.  
Detaching the 
elite from the 
people 
Elites are described as not belonging to the people, 
not being close to the people, not knowing the peo-
ple, not speaking for the people, not caring for the 
people, or not performing everyday actions. 
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Sovereignty 
Demanding 
popular  
sovereignty 
The speaker argues for general institutional reforms 
to grant the people more power by introducing di-
rect-democratic elements or increasing political par-
ticipation. The speaker argues in favor of granting 
more power to the people within the context of a spe-
cific issue (e.g., election, immigration, security). 
Denying elite 
sovereignty 
The speaker argues in favor of granting less power to 
elites within the context of a specific issue (e.g., immi-
gration, security). 
Exclusion 
Discrediting 
specific 
groups  
Specific social groups or population segments are dis-
credited, denounced, or stigmatized. They are por-
trayed as evil, criminal, lazy, stupid, immoral, dan-
gerous, etc. 
Blaming spe-
cific groups 
Specific social groups or population segments are 
held responsible for a negative, undesirable or harm-
ful development/situation. They are described as not 
being responsible for a positive development or situa-
tion. 
Excluding  
specific 
groups 
Specific societal groups or population segments are 
characterized as ‘others’, juxtaposed to ‘the people’, 
described as not belonging to the people, or not shar-
ing their virtues.  
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5 INDIVIDUAL PUBLICATIONS & FINDINGS 
This chapter summarizes the aim, research design, and major findings for each of 
the five articles that together form the basis of this synopsis. Certain terms have 
been adjusted, and the hypotheses of the individual articles were numbered con-
secutively across publications in favor of better comprehensibility and consolida-
tion of the different contributions. The full articles can be found in the appendix. 
5.1 Article I: Populist Communication in Talk Shows and Social Media: 
A Comparative Content Analysis in Four Countries 
Article I focuses on populist communication in politicians’ self-presentation. The 
aim of this study is to assess how politicians across the political spectrum employ 
three dimensions of populist communication—people-centrism, anti-elitism, and 
exclusion—in their self-presentation across different contextual settings, namely, 
three communication platforms (political talk shows, Facebook, and Twitter) and 
four countries (DE, CH, UK, US). Following a communication-centered approach, 
we argue that politicians can be populist to varying degrees depending on differ-
ent context factors on the macro level (system of government, electoral system) and 
the meso level (communication channel, party association), and we formulate three 
hypotheses. First, we focus on different systems of government and electoral sys-
tems as structural factors on the macro level. We argue that presidential systems 
(vs. parliamentary and directorial systems) and majoritarian electoral systems (vs. 
proportional systems) provide more incentives for populist communication due to 
a higher personalization, a more “plebiscitarian legitimacy” of presidents or the 
members or parliament (Linz, 1990; O'Donell, 1994), and a lower need to negotiate 
compromises or form coalitions (Kriesi, 2014; Lijphart, 1999; Swanson & Mancini, 
1996). Therefore, we expect politicians’ communication to be most populist in the 
United States, followed by the United Kingdom and Switzerland, and lowest in 
Germany (H1). Second, we compare the different communication channels. We 
conceptualize talk shows and social media as hybrid forms of mediality (Chad-
wick, 2017) that both provide a beneficial platform for populist communication by 
combining different media logics and offer politicians an ideal combination be-
tween outreach and control. Although we acknowledge that the network media 
logic of social media may foster populist communication, we expect politicians’ 
communication to be more populist in talk shows (H2). This expectation is based 
on three characteristics of political talk shows: (a) their highly audience-oriented 
logic (Landerer, 2013); (b) their focus on the direct confrontation of political adver-
saries; and (c) a stronger orientation towards media logic and its apprehension by 
politicians. Third, we compare politicians of different types of parties. We argue 
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that populist communication can be combined with different ideologies and that 
therefore politicians across the political spectrum may employ populist communi-
cation to a certain extent. However, we expect extreme8 parties to use more popu-
list key messages than politicians of moderate or center parties (H3) due to their 
frequent role as outsiders, their opposition to mainstream parties, and their em-
phasis on responsiveness to voters’ demands over responsibility (R. S. Katz 
& Mair, 2009; Mair, 2002). This had previously been shown based on party mani-
festos (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017) and press releases (Bernhard, 2016). 
5.1.1 Research Design 
We conducted a quantitative content analysis of politicians’ statements in talk 
shows and on social media (N = 2454). We included 74 politicians in four countries 
(CH, DE, UK, and US) during a three-month nonelection period in 2014. The study 
followed a three-step sampling procedure that allowed individual matching on the 
level of the politicians. First, we selected four countries that are broadly similar but 
differ with regard to their systems of government and electoral systems. Second, 
we identified two relevant political talk shows per country, recorded four episodes 
per talk show in March through May 2014, and listed all appearing politicians. 
Third, we sampled the social media material of the politicians’ official Facebook 
and Twitter accounts for the same time period (March 1st through May 31st 2014). 
The unit of analysis was a single statement by a politician. For each statement, it 
was coded whether one of the eleven identified populist key messages was pre-
sent. For each of the three dimensions of populist communication—people-cen-
trism, anti-elitism, and exclusion—we then calculated maximum indices: At least 
one item of the respective dimension had to be present for people-centrism, anti-
elitism, or exclusion to be considered present. The three dimensions were investi-
gated separately as dependent variables because earlier studies suggested that 
populist communication, especially on social media, occurs in a fragmented form 
(Engesser, Ernst et al., 2017). The countries and communication channels were 
coded as categorical variables. Additionally, the position of the political parties on 
the left-right spectrum was assessed based on the Chapel Hill expert survey 
(CHES) (Bakker et al., 2015; Ladner, 2017; Wagschal & König, 2015), and a dummy 
variable was calculated for parties at the two extremes of the left-right scale. To 
test the three hypotheses, we conducted analyses of variance (ANOVA) using the 
three indices for people-centrism, anti-elitism, and exclusion as dependent varia-
bles. 
 
8 In the original article, we speak of “pole parties” but the label “extreme parties” has been found 
to be the more broadly used term.  
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5.1.2 Findings 
Although we find that the country context seems to influence the extent to which 
politicians communicate populist ideas, the results do not confirm our expecta-
tions formulated in H1. People-centrist key messages were used to a similar extent 
across all four countries. Anti-elitist key messages were communicated quite often 
by politicians in the three European countries but to a significantly lower extent in 
the United States. The exclusion of specific social groups was relatively common 
in Switzerland but practically irrelevant in the other three countries. Thus, follow-
ing the typology by Jagers and Walgrave (2007), we find a most complete populism 
in Switzerland, a more anti-elitist populism in Germany and the United Kingdom, 
and a mostly empty populism in the United States. On the one hand, these findings 
imply that formal structures of the political system cannot alone explain differ-
ences in the levels of populist communication across countries. Additionally, cul-
tural, historical, and more volatile situational context factors need to be considered 
(see also Reinemann et al., 2017). This interpretation seems all the more relevant if 
we consider the developments in these countries in the years since the data collec-
tion in 2014. With the rise of Donald Trump in the United States, the AfD in Ger-
many, and with the conflict around ‘Brexit’ in the United Kingdom, the extent of 
populism is likely to have risen and become more complete in the communication 
of politicians in these countries as well. On the other hand, these findings also sug-
gest that other contextual factors on the meso level, such as the media setting or 
the ideological positioning of parties, may have a higher explanatory power. 
In fact, the study demonstrates that the extent to which politicians use populist 
key messages is dependent on the communication platform. Confirming H2, poli-
ticians’ communication was more people-centrist, more anti-elitist, and more ex-
clusionist on political talk shows than on social media. Thus, we confirm that the 
high audience orientation and strong media logic of talk shows provoke populist 
communication, and we challenge assumptions that social media are inherently a 
more populist communication channel (Engesser, Ernst et al., 2017; Ernst et al., 
2017). However, because this last finding is in conflict with a study by Ernst, Blass-
nig et al. (2019), this issue will be further discussed in Chapter 6.1. 
Finally, we find that although politicians across the political spectrum use 
populist key messages from time to time, the extent of the use of the different di-
mensions depends on the politicians’ position on the political spectrum. We partly 
find support for our assumption in H3 that politicians of extreme parties communi-
cate in a more populist way than do politicians of moderate or center parties. As 
expected, politicians on both political extremes communicated more anti-elitist key 
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messages than moderate or center parties did. However, people-centrist key mes-
sages were used to a similar extent across the political spectrum, and exclusionist 
key messages were employed almost exclusively by right-wing politicians. Refer-
ring again to Jagers and Walgrave (2007), we find that an empty populism is rela-
tively common across the political spectrum, whereas the left-wing typically em-
ploys a more anti-elitist populism, and a full populism can be mostly found for 
right-wing politicians, at least in the four countries under investigation. 
This study demonstrates that populist communication can be regarded as a 
transnational phenomenon that is widely—but not uniformly—employed in the 
self-presentation of politicians across four established democracies, different com-
munication channels, and party affiliations. This finding reinforces the argument 
made by Cranmer (2011) that populist communication is context-dependent and 
that political talk shows tend to be specifically populist communication arenas. 
Thereby, it also challenges the notion that politicians’ self-presentation on social 
media is specifically prone to populism. 
5.2 Article II: Populism in Online Election Coverage: Analyzing Popu-
list Statements by Politicians, Journalists, and Readers in Three 
Countries 
In Article II, we focus on the online media representation of populist communica-
tion during election campaigns in three countries (FR, CH, UK). This study is 
among the first attempts to investigate populism in online news and to provide 
empirical evidence for all three components of populism and the media—popu-
lism by the media, populism through the media, and populist citizen journalism—as 
proposed by Esser et al. (2017). The aim of this article is to investigate how politi-
cians, journalists, and citizens contribute to the expression and dissemination of 
populist ideas online and to identify drivers of populist communication in online 
news media. We analyze differences between online news articles and comment 
sections, political actors and media actors as speakers of populist key messages, 
and between opinion-oriented stories and straight news items, and we investigate 
how reporters contextualize the populist messages of political actors. 
First, based on the lower journalistic hurdles and the theoretical functions of 
reader comments elaborated in Chapter 3.3.2, we expect the extent of populist 
communication to be higher in reader comment sections than in news articles (H4). 
Second, we expect the extent of populist messages to be higher in opinion-oriented 
stories than in straight news items (H5). Opinion-oriented or interpretative jour-
nalism is closely related to conflictive aspects such as negativity, distrust of politi-
cal elites, personalization, or a focus on political strategies, which are all seen as 
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favorable for populism. Third, as elaborated in Chapter 3.2., media outlets may 
construct populist messages themselves or provide a stage for populist messages 
by political actors. We expect that aspects of media logic and commercialization 
that are heightened in the online environment will specifically foster the prolifera-
tion of populist messages by political actors. Therefore, we expect that the extent 
of populist messages by political actors in online news is greater than the extent of 
such messages by media actors (H6). Finally, we investigate how journalists con-
vey populist messages by politicians. Thus, we ask how the online news media 
contextualize populist messages by political speakers (R1). We investigate whether 
journalists (a) neutrally disseminate populist messages by politicians, (b) explicitly 
attenuate, scrutinize, or criticize such messages, or (c) provide a favorable setting 
for them by explicitly amplifying, supporting, legitimizing them, or by expressing 
populist messages themselves. As there had not been much empirical research on 
this, we address this as an open research question. 
5.2.1 Research Design 
We conducted a quantitative content analysis of online news coverage during na-
tional election campaigns in France (2017), Switzerland (2015), and the United 
Kingdom (2015). We focused on the topic of immigration because this topic has 
been identified as one of the driving forces of support for populist parties in West-
ern and Northern Europe (Stanyer et al., 2017). Per country, we selected six news 
outlets: the online outlets of two leading upmarket daily newspapers, the domi-
nant mass-market daily paper, and two TV-parent outlets (one public and one pri-
vate). Furthermore, we included a pure online outlet in each country. Following a 
user-based sampling approach, for each outlet, 30 news articles were sampled via 
Google site search using an immigration search string. This led to 493 news articles, 
of which 358 received at least one comment. Finally, for these news articles, the 
chronologically first 10 reader comments were sampled (N = 2904). This led to a 
final sample of 493 news articles and 358 comment sections, which served as the 
units of analysis. 
Populist communication was measured based on twelve populist key mes-
sages that correspond to the four dimensions of people-centrism, anti-elitism, re-
storing sovereignty, and exclusion (see Table 1 in Chapter 4.3). All twelve items 
were coded as dummy variables on the story level. As the dependent variable, a 
populism index was calculated, which was present if at least one of the twelve 
populist key messages was used in a story or comment. Additionally, we coded 
for each populist key message whether the speaker was a political actor, a media 
actor, or a citizen. Finally, if a story included a populist key message by a political 
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actor, it was coded whether the media story (a) disseminated the message neu-
trally, (b) explicitly attenuated or criticized the message, or (c) explicitly supported, 
reinforced, or legitimized it. For the comparison of news articles and comment sec-
tions as equal units of analysis, the comments were aggregated on the article level 
to answer H4. To test the three hypotheses, we conducted analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) using the populism index as the dependent variable. 
5.2.2 Findings 
Overall, we find the extent of populist communication to be quite high in compar-
ison to previous content analyses (Ernst et al., 2017; Hameleers et al., 2017b). We 
argue that on the one hand, this may be interpreted cautiously as evidence of an 
increasing presence of populism in the last few years and for the favorable envi-
ronment of online media. On the other hand, these high levels may reflect our 
“burning glass” perspective: by focusing on countries with relatively successful 
populist parties, election periods, and the topic of immigration, we investigate 
populist communication under most-likely conditions. 
We find clear evidence that populist communication is more prevalent in com-
ment sections than in news articles and that H4 can be supported across all three 
countries. Furthermore, we find that citizens use populist messages in their com-
ments to a similar extent in all three countries, whereas the extent of populism in 
the news articles is highest in the United Kingdom, followed by France, and lowest 
in Switzerland. Thus, as one of the first studies to explore this issue, this paper 
provides empirical evidence for the phenomenon of a populist citizen journalism in 
the form of reader comments (Esser et al., 2017) and shows that comment sections 
provide a specifically favorable environment for populist communication by citi-
zens. With regard to H5, we only find a tendency for opinion-oriented stories to be 
more populist than straight news stories overall. When we differentiate between 
the different speakers of populist communication, we see that journalists are more 
likely to express populist ideas in opinion-oriented formats, whereas populist mes-
sages by politicians are more often cited in straight news items. Moreover, we find 
clear support for the assumption in H6 that the majority of populist key messages 
in online news articles originate from politicians, not from journalists. Finally, a 
descriptive analysis for R1 shows that if articles contain populist messages by pol-
iticians, in most cases, journalists neither explicitly attenuate nor amplify these 
messages but rather disseminate them neutrally. This article therefore provides 
empirical evidence for the distinction between populism by the media and popu-
lism through the media in online news articles (Esser et al., 2017) and for the differ-
ent roles that journalists play in the dissemination of populist ideas. Journalists are 
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more likely to provide a platform for populist messages by politicians in online 
news articles than they are to make populist statements themselves. If journalists 
do express populist ideas themselves, this is mostly limited to opinion-oriented 
formats, whereas populist statements by politicians are more often cited in straight 
news articles. Finally, journalists rarely explicitly attenuate or criticize populist 
statements by political actors, at least in our sample—as this last finding seemingly 
contradicts results of another recent study by Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al. (2018), 
as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.1. 
5.3 Article III: Populism and Social Media Popularity: How Populist 
Communication Benefits Political Leaders on Facebook and Twit-
ter 
The focus of Article III lies in the connection between politicians’ self-presentation 
on social media and citizens’ reactions in the form of popularity cues. The aim of 
this study is to investigate whether populism generates a higher social media re-
sponse for political leaders on social media across six Western democracies (CH, 
DE, FR, IT, UK, US). We examine differences between platforms—Facebook and 
Twitter—as well as between leaders who are typically classified as populist in the 
literature and typically nonpopulist leaders. 
Based on a review of recent literature on populist political leaders on social 
media, we formulate three hypotheses.9 First, we expect political leaders to receive 
higher numbers of popularity cues when they communicate populist key mes-
sages. We provide three arguments for this: (a) populism’s potential for a political 
mobilization of otherwise inactive groups of citizens (Jansen, 2011); (b) populism’s 
high news value and compatibility with media logic that may translate into a high 
shareworthiness (Trilling et al., 2016); (c) empirical evidence that populist content 
elements (Bobba, 2018) and communication styles that are often associated with 
populist communication (e.g., emotionalization, negativity, and personalization) 
(Bene, 2017a; Heiss et al., 2018; Staender et al., 2019) increase the likelihood that 
social media posts are liked or shared. We expect a positive effect of populist com-
munication on popularity cues both on the statement level and on an aggregated 
actor level. On the one hand, we assume that an individual populist post receives 
more popularity cues than a nonpopulist post (H7a). On the other hand, we expect 
that the more populist key messages political leaders communicate, on average, 
the more popularity cues they receive (H7b). This is based on the assumption that 
 
9 In the original article, we do not formally label our theoretical assumptions as hypotheses but 
more generally as expectations. This is due to the purpose of the book chapter, which was intended 
to be accessible and comprehensible to a broader audience. 
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because populist communication mostly occurs in a fragmented form on social me-
dia (Engesser, Ernst et al., 2017), it may matter more how much populism social 
media users are confronted with on the average level of the political leader. Sec-
ond, we expect differences between the two social media platforms under study, 
Facebook and Twitter. We assume that Facebook has a higher affinity to populist 
communication than Twitter due to a stronger reciprocity (i.e., a stronger exchange 
between the sender and the audience), a higher degree of proximity through lower 
anonymity and stronger personal relationships, and a broader user demographic 
(see also Ernst, Engesser, Büchel et al. 2019). Ernst et al. (2017) further show empir-
ically that politicians prefer Facebook to Twitter as a platform to communicate 
populist messages. Therefore, we expect that populist communication has a 
stronger positive effect on popularity cues on Facebook than on Twitter (H8). 
Third, we contrast political leaders of parties that are typically defined as populist 
in the literature with typically nonpopulist actors. Generally, populist leaders are 
expected to communicate in a more populist way on social media (see also Ernst, 
Blassnig et al., 2019). They may also have a higher interest in circumventing tradi-
tional gatekeepers and the mass media and may therefore be more inclined to 
adapt their communication to social media or network logic. Therefore, we expect 
that tweets and posts of typically populist leaders receive more popularity cues 
overall (H9a). On the other hand, we assume that the followers of such typically 
populist leaders also have stronger populist attitudes and therefore may be more 
likely to like or share populist posts or tweets. Hence, we expect that the effect of 
populist key messages on popularity cues is stronger for populist political leaders 
than for nonpopulist political leaders (H9b). 
5.3.1 Research Design 
The study is based on a semiautomated content analysis of Facebook posts and 
tweets by 36 political leaders from six countries (CH, DE, FR, IT, UK, US) during 
three politically routine months from September to November 2015. For each coun-
try, we selected five parties: the four largest parties in parliament across the left-
right spectrum and the largest party classified as populist in the scientific litera-
ture. We focused on political leaders and selected the politicians with the highest 
hierarchical position in the party and/or country in 2015. We downloaded all social 
media posts from the politicians’ verified Twitter and Facebook accounts and 
coded all Facebook posts and tweets in which a politician made an explicit state-
ment on an issue or a target actor. The final analysis comprises 345 Facebook posts 
and 221 tweets from 36 political leaders. 
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The unit of analysis was a tweet or Facebook post by a political leader 
(speaker) that contained a statement on a target actor or an issue. Our dependent 
variable—popularity cues—was measured as the sum of likes and shares on Face-
book and the sum of favorites and retweets on Twitter. Populist communication 
was operationalized based on nine populist key messages for the three dimensions 
of people-centrism, anti-elitism, and restoring sovereignty (Wirth et al., 2016). The 
nine populist key messages were operationalized using a broad set of categories, 
and for each category, we coded whether it was present in a given social media 
statement or not. Populist communication was considered present if at least one of 
the nine populist key messages was present in a statement. Additionally, the pop-
ulism index was aggregated on the actor level, indicating the share of tweets or 
posts per actor that contain a populist key message. Based on the existing literature 
(e.g., Aalberg et al., 2017; van Kessel, 2015), we calculated a dummy variable for 
political leaders of parties that are typically classified as populist. Additionally, as 
control variables, we coded dummy variables for gender (male = 1) and party in-
cumbency. We also controlled for the general profile reach, consisting of the total 
number of Facebook page likes and the number of Twitter followers per political 
leader. In addition to these political actor categories, a dummy variable for Face-
book was calculated. 
Typical for count distributions, the distribution of our dependent variable—
popularity cues—is right-skewed and has a standard deviation larger than the 
mean. To account for this, we conducted negative binomial regressions to answer 
our hypotheses. This analytical approach is in line with other recent studies using 
popularity cues as a dependent variable (Bene, 2017a; Keller & Kleinen-von Kö-
nigslöw, 2018; Saxton & Waters, 2014; Trilling et al., 2016). 
5.3.2 Findings 
First, with regard to H7a on the effect of populist communication on the statement-
level of popularity cues, the findings do not support our assumption. Contrary to 
our expectation, political leaders did not receive significantly more popularity cues 
for individual populist social media posts than for nonpopulist posts. However, 
on the aggregated actor level, we find support for our expectation in H7b: The more 
populist key messages political leaders communicate, on average, on social media, 
the more user reactions their tweets or Facebook posts receive. Second, we examine 
the role of the social media platform and find a significant positive interaction be-
tween the populism index and Facebook. This means that on Facebook, political 
leaders receive more popularity cues for populist posts than for nonpopulist posts, 
providing support for H8. On Twitter, on the other hand, communicating populist 
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key messages seems to have a negative effect on popularity cues. Finally, we com-
pare typically populist leaders with typically nonpopulist leaders. We find clear 
evidence that leaders of typically populist parties receive overall more popularity 
cues than leaders of typically nonpopulist parties, providing support for H9a. 
However, contrary to our expectations in H9b, populist leaders do not receive more 
popularity cues in response to populist key messages than nonpopulist leaders. 
Additionally, based on two qualitative examples, we illustrate that news media 
may provide politicians with additional reach by republishing their social media 
posts in online news stories. This indicates that although only a small share of so-
cial media posts actually contain populist key messages (Ernst et al., 2017; see also 
Article I), they may receive disproportionate reach and attention, both directly on 
social media and indirectly through journalistic mass media. 
To summarize, as expected, populist posts receive more popularity cues than 
nonpopulist posts, but we only find this effect for Facebook. On both platforms, 
posts of political leaders that communicate more populist key messages on average 
have a higher popularity or reach. Thus, for Twitter, it seems to be more important 
to followers how political leaders communicate overall or what image they have. 
If political leaders regularly tweet populist key messages, this may have a spillover 
effect on their nonpopulist tweets. Finally, political leaders of typically populist 
parties receive a higher social media response than nonpopulist leaders overall. 
However, they do not profit more from using populist key messages. Conse-
quently, for both typically populist and nonpopulist political leaders, the use of 
populist key messages leads to more popularity cues on Facebook. Thus, as one of 
the first studies, this article provides empirical evidence across six Western coun-
tries that both populist communication and populist actors act as drivers of popu-
larity cues on social media. 
5.4 Article IV: Hitting a Nerve: Populist News Articles Lead to More 
Frequent and More Populist Reader Comments 
Article IV builds conceptually and theoretically on Articles II and III but focuses 
more closely on citizens and an effects perspective by analyzing how populist 
statements by journalists and politicians in online news articles affect the number 
and content of reader comments by citizens. We begin by integrating theoretical 
perspectives on populism and the media and on the role of reader comments in 
the online public sphere. On the one hand, these perspectives explain, from a sup-
ply-side perspective, why populist communication may provoke more reader 
comments as well as why reader comments may be generally prone to populist 
communication (see Chapter 3.3.2). On the other hand, previous research indicates 
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that journalistic content has an impact both on how many people comment on 
online news articles (Tenenboim & Cohen, 2014; Ziegele et al., 2018; Ziegele, 
Breiner, & Quiring, 2014) and on the content of online discussions (Gervais, 2014; 
Walter, Brüggemann, & Engesser, 2016; Ziegele et al., 2018). We complement these 
insights with a demand-side perspective by conceptualizing the presence and con-
tent of reader comments as the manifestation of effects of populist communication 
on citizens and by providing different persuasion processes such as schema theory, 
priming, and social identity theory as explanations (see Chapter 3.3.3). To sum-
marize, we expect that populist key messages by politicians or journalists in news 
articles may trigger a populism schema, in-group and out-group identifications, or 
emotions that may then influence whether and how a recipient comments on an 
article. Based on these theoretical considerations, we expect that, first, articles that 
contain populist key messages by political speakers (H10a) or media speakers 
(H10b) receive higher numbers of reader comments than nonpopulist articles. Sec-
ond, we expect that comments are more likely to be populist if they respond to an 
article containing populist key messages by political speakers (H11a) or media 
speakers (H11b). Finally, how journalists transmit and interpret populist key mes-
sages may influence how citizens react to such articles in reader comments. We 
therefore formulate an additional open research question as to whether the contex-
tualization of populist key messages in news articles has an influence on the use of 
populist communication in reader comments (R2). 
5.4.1 Research Design 
This article is based on the same data collection as Article II, i.e., on a quantitative 
content analysis of news articles and the respective reader comments during elec-
tion campaigns in France (2017), Switzerland (2015), and the United Kingdom 
(2015), with a focus on the issue of immigration. In contrast to Article II, there are 
two notable differences with regard to the sample. First, we had to exclude the 
online outlets of the private TV stations because they did not receive enough reader 
comments to be incorporated in the analysis. Second, because in this article we 
focus on the relation between the articles and the corresponding comments, we 
only included news articles that received at least one comment. This led to a final 
sample of 332 articles and 2786 reader comments. Based on the same operationali-
zation of populist communication as in Article II, we calculated populism indices 
for the three speaker types—political actor, media actor, and citizens—which were 
present if the respective speaker type used at least one of the twelve populist key 
messages in a news story or comment. The contextualization of populist key mes-
sages in the news stories was coded the same way as in Article II for whether the 
 INDIVIDUAL PUBLICATIONS & FINDINGS 
43 
media (a) disseminated the message neutrally, (b) explicitly attenuated or criti-
cized the message, or (c) explicitly supported, reinforced, or legitimized it. Addi-
tionally, the total number of comments an article received was assessed based on 
the numbers provided for each news article by the outlet below the article. 
To test H10a and H10b, we used negative binomial regression with the articles 
as units of analysis and the total number of comments each article received as the 
dependent variable. As elaborated with regard to Article III, this analysis strategy 
accounts for the right-skewed and overdispersed distribution of the dependent 
variable. To test H11a and H11b and answer R2, we conducted multilevel regres-
sion models to account for the fact that the reader comments as units of analysis 
on the first level are nested within the articles they respond to on the second level. 
5.4.2 Findings 
In a first step, we find clear evidence that news articles that contain populist key 
messages receive higher numbers of reader comments than do nonpopulist arti-
cles. Controlling for differences between countries and different news outlets, we 
find that the presence of populist statements by both political and media speakers 
in the articles positively and significantly predicts higher numbers of reader com-
ments. The incidence rate ratios of the negative binomial regression suggest that 
articles in which journalists cite populist key messages by political actors trigger 
2.28 times more reader comments, and articles in which journalists themselves 
make populist statements receive 1.80 times more comments than articles without 
any populist key messages. This provides clear support for H10a and H10b: Read-
ers are more likely to comment on an article if it contains populist key messages 
by politicians or journalists. In a second step, we investigate whether the presence 
of populist key messages in the news articles also increases the likelihood that the 
responding reader comments include populist key messages. Again, we find clear 
empirical support for this assumption. Controlling for differences between differ-
ent types of outlets and the length of a comment in a multilevel regression model, 
populist key messages by political speakers and by media speakers significantly 
predict populist key messages by citizens in reader comments. Thus, supporting 
H11a and H11b, citizens are more likely to communicate populist ideas in response 
to articles that contain populist key messages by politicians or journalists. Finally, 
to answer R2, we added fixed effects to the multilevel regression model for 
whether journalists explicitly attenuated or amplified populist key messages by 
politicians in the articles. Both attenuation and amplification do not have a signif-
icant effect on populism in the reader comments, whereas the effect of populism 
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by political speakers remains significant. Thus, the inclusion of populist key mes-
sages by politicians in news articles seems to positively affect populism in reader 
comments regardless of whether these messages are attenuated, amplified, or dis-
seminated neutrally by the media. 
The aim of this study was to investigate how populism in the news media af-
fects the behavior of media users, specifically, the number and content of reader 
comments. Our findings suggest that populism in articles triggers more frequent 
and more populist reader comments. Overall, our study contributes to research on 
populist online communication and its effects by demonstrating that (1) populist 
key messages resonate with citizens and are disseminated by them; (2) populist 
key messages multiply and lead to more populist key messages by citizens; and (3) 
journalistic contextualization does not matter significantly, at least in our case, 
where populist statements were mostly disseminated neutrally. 
5.5 Article V: Populist and Popular: An Experiment on the Drivers of 
User Reactions to Populist Posts on Facebook 
Building on the results of the previous articles, Article V also focuses on the effect 
of populist online communication on citizens’ reactions but takes a more explicit 
demand-side perspective by conducting an online survey experiment. This study 
has two main aims and contributions to the existing literature. First, it investigates 
how populist messages and populist actors interact in their effect on citizens and 
how both components foster user reactions. Second, it complements existing con-
tent analyses of digital trace data (see Articles III and IV, Bobba, 2018) by analyzing 
not only the effect of populist communication in political actors’ Facebook posts 
on user reactions but also how this effect is moderated by recipients’ populist atti-
tudes. 
In a first step, the study investigates how populist messages and populist ac-
tors contribute to the triggering of a populism schema and thus to the perception 
of a Facebook post as comprising populist ideas. According to schema theory, 
highlighting one element of a cognitive cluster is often sufficient to coactivate other 
elements of the cognitive cluster (F. C. Bartlett & Burt, 1933; Brewer & Nakamura, 
1984; Iran-Nejad, 1984). Messages that contain one element of populist communi-
cation may also make other elements more salient and activate a populism schema 
in total (Müller et al., 2017). Based on these considerations, we argue that political 
actors who are typically associated with populist ideas or known for populist com-
munication may similarly activate a populism schema. Thus, such a typically pop-
ulist actor as the source of a message may increase the recipient’s perception of a 
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message as being populist. Therefore, we expect that a Facebook post will be per-
ceived as more populist if the sender is a typically populist actor compared to a 
typically nonpopulist actor, regardless of whether the post contains populist key 
messages (H12). 
In a second step, we investigate the effect of populist communication and pop-
ulist actors on user reactions. Based on the social identity model of collective action 
(van Zomeren et al., 2008), we again expect that the activation of specific in-group 
and out-group identities leads to a higher likelihood of citizen engagement and, 
thus, a higher likelihood that citizens will like, share, or comment on a Facebook 
post. The empirical evidence of Article III further suggests that both populist actors 
and populist messages are positively associated with higher numbers of user reac-
tions on Facebook. Thus, we expect that recipients are more likely to react to a 
Facebook post containing populist messages than to a nonpopulist Facebook post 
(H13a) and to a Facebook post by a typically populist politician than by a main-
stream politician (H14a). However, based on the literature on the effects of populist 
communication, we expect that prior populist attitudes act as a moderator of the 
effects of populist communication on the micro level (e.g., Müller et al., 2017). 
Thus, we assume that these effects will be moderated by recipients’ populist atti-
tudes. Hence, we expect that recipients with higher populist attitudes are more likely 
to react to a Facebook post containing populist messages than a nonpopulist Face-
book post (H13b), and to a Facebook post by a typically populist politician than by 
a mainstream politician (H14b). Additionally, we formulate two open research 
questions. Because we assume that populist key messages and typically populist 
politicians activate a similar cognitive schema, we ask whether the content and 
actor will substitute each other or interact in their effect on user reactions (R3). 
Finally, we ask whether these effects are different for the different types of user 
reactions: liking, sharing, and commenting (R4). Because these different types of 
user reactions can be distinguished with regard to their level of activation (Berger 
& Milkman, 2010) and the user motives behind them (Bene, 2017a), they may also 
differ with regard to the effect of populist communication. 
5.5.1 Research Design 
We conducted an online survey experiment with a 2x2 design (N = 640) with a 
sample representative of the Swiss German-speaking population with regard to 
gender, age, and education. The participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four treatment groups: (1) populist message by a typically populist politician, (2) 
nonpopulist message by a typically populist politician, (3) populist message by a 
typically nonpopulist politician, or (4) nonpopulist message by a typically 
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nonpopulist politician. Each subgroup was presented with a Facebook post that 
was designed for the purpose of this study. The post consisted of a message argu-
ing for stronger control of immigration and a picture of a link to a nonfictitious 
article by the Neue Zürcher Zeitung on the negative long-term consequences of im-
migration. The claim (for more control on immigration) was constant across all 
stimuli, whereas the exact wording of the posts was adjusted according to the ex-
perimental manipulation. Populist versions of the post included populist key mes-
sages approaching the people, blaming the political elite, and demanding the peo-
ple’s sovereignty. As senders of the posts, two members of the Swiss national par-
liament were chosen that represent a typically right-wing populist party (Roger 
Köppel, Swiss People’s Party, SVP) and a typically nonpopulist moderate party 
(Gerhard Pfister, Christian People’s Party, CVP). After seeing the post, the partici-
pants reported how likely they were to (a) like, (b) share, or (c) comment on the 
post on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (highly likely). For the dependent varia-
ble, user reactions, a mean index was calculated based on these three items. Popu-
list attitudes were operationalized based on Schulz, Müller et al. (2018) using 
twelve items, for which a mean index was calculated. Additionally, as control var-
iables, the participants reported their political orientation and their support of the 
promoted claim. As treatment checks, the participants’ perceptions of populist 
communication and their recognition of the politician were assessed. 
To answer H12, we conducted a two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with a mean index for the perception of populism as the dependent variable and 
the two factors of the experimental setting, populist message and populist actor, 
as independent variables. To answer the remaining hypotheses and research ques-
tions, a moderation model was computed using PROCESS (Hayes, 2018) with a 
mean index for the user reactions as the dependent variable and controlling for 
age, sex, political orientation, and support of the promoted claim. 
5.5.2 Findings 
Our study finds clear support for the assumption that communication by typically 
populist actors can elicit a populism schema, even if the particular message does 
not contain populist key messages. Restricting the sample to those participants 
who correctly identified the party affiliation of the political actor in the post (N = 
327)10, we find that both the populist message and the populist actor have a signif-
icant positive effect on the perception of a Facebook post as representing populist 
 
10 Following schema theory, the manipulation of the source depends on the recognition of the ac-
tors; i.e., the manipulation can only be effective if the participants recognize the actors as populist 
or nonpopulist. 
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ideology (i.e., people-centrism, anti-elitism, restoring sovereignty). For both poli-
ticians, the posts that contain populist messages are perceived as more populist. 
However, posts that do not contain any populist messages are perceived as signif-
icantly more populist when the source is a typically populist politician. This sup-
ports H12. 
Furthermore, we find clear evidence that the effect of populist messages on 
user reactions is moderated by populist attitudes: Only recipients with strong pop-
ulist attitudes are more likely to react to the populist message than the nonpopulist 
message. Hence, whereas we only find a tendency that the populist message gen-
erally fosters user reactions (H13a), the expectation that we would find this effect, 
especially for participants with strong populist attitudes (H13b), is supported. In 
contrast, the assumption that user reactions would similarly be increased by a typ-
ically populist politician (H14a), particularly for participants with strong populist 
attitudes (H14b), is not supported. We also find that people with strong populist 
attitudes are generally more likely to react to a post, which is in line with findings 
by Fletcher (2019). Furthermore, we find a negative interaction between the popu-
list actor and populist messages for those participants who recognized the actors 
(R3). These participants are more likely to react to a populist message if the source 
of the message was a typically nonpopulist actor. Finally, we find different effects 
for the three different types of user reactions (R4). Liking does not seem to be influ-
enced by either the populist message or the populist actor but rather driven by the 
support for the message’s main claim. The likelihood for sharing follows our ex-
pectations most closely: Participants with strong populist attitudes are more likely 
to share the populist message than the nonpopulist message. Finally, the partici-
pants are more likely to comment on a populist message than a nonpopulist mes-
sage if it comes from the nonpopulist politician. 
We conclude that, first, a populist sender as a source of the message increases 
the perception of the message as representing populist communication. Second, 
user reactions on Facebook are driven more by the message than by the actor send-
ing the message. Third, the effect of populist communication on user reactions is 
moderated by citizens’ populist attitudes. Fourth, populist communication by a 
nonpopulist actor elicits more user reactions, which may be explained by a ‘sur-
prising’ effect and may be driven by both approval and rejection of the message. 
Finally, populist communication may have different effects depending on the type 
of user reaction. 
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6 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION & OUTLOOK 
This dissertation set out to investigate drivers of populist online communication in 
politicians’ self-presentation and online news media as well as its effects on citizens’ 
reactions. Throughout the five related publications summarized in Chapter 5, 
these two main overarching objectives have been addressed by providing answers 
to five related research questions and by providing empirical evidence in support 
of—or refuting—14 hypotheses. The research questions and the main findings 
with regard to these hypotheses are summarized in Table 2. 
In the following chapters, I will first summarize and connect the main findings 
and discuss their theoretical implications with regard to the overarching research 
aims of this dissertation. Second, I will integrate the main insights for the supply 
and the demand side and provide a heuristic model for research on drivers and 
effects of populist online communication. Third, I will discuss methodological im-
plications and address limitations. Fourth, I will propose different routes for future 
research in this field. Finally, I will discuss the societal implications, normative as-
pects, and consequences of the results for political communication in liberal de-
mocracies. 
6.1 Key Findings & Theoretical Implications 
Extant literature has focused on the supply side (e.g., Ernst, Esser et al., 2019; Jagers 
& Walgrave, 2007; Stanley, 2008) or the demand side (e.g., A. Akkerman et al., 2014; 
Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016) to explain the rise of populism. However, most studies 
have focused on the role of politicians, journalists, or citizens separately. Moreo-
ver, although the Internet has long been theoretically assumed to have high com-
patibility with populism, empirical investigations of populist online communica-
tion were very rare at the beginning of this dissertation project. By investigating all 
three key actor groups and their interactions, this cumulative dissertation provides im-
portant contributions to research on both the supply side and the demand side of 
populist online communication. In the following, I will summarize the key find-
ings and discuss their theoretical implications with regard to the overarching goals 
to investigate two major unresolved aspects in this field, the drivers of populist 
online communication and its effects on citizens’ reactions. 
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of drivers of populist 
online communication in two respects: (1) politicians’ use of populist communi-
cation in their self-presentation and (2) the media representation of populist key 
messages. 
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With regard to (1) politicians’ self-presentation, this dissertation contributes 
by showing that the extent of populist communication in politicians’ self-presen-
tation is dependent on (a) characteristics of different communication channels and, 
more specifically, that social media are not inherently more prone to populist communi-
cation. In this respect, this dissertation reinforces the conclusions of earlier studies 
that politicians adapt their use of populist communication to the communication 
channel and that political talk shows tend to specifically encourage a populist self-
presentation (Bos & Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 2011). This finding confirms theoretical 
expectations that media logic and a strong audience orientation of a communica-
tion channel foster the use of populist communication (e.g., Mazzoleni, 2008). In 
contrast, it challenges theoretical perspectives arguing that social media offer spe-
cific opportunity structures for populist communication (see Chapter 3.1). Thus, 
the findings of this dissertation imply that the phenomenon of populist online 
communication cannot be reduced to politicians’ publication of populist messages 
on social media. For a more complete understanding of populist online communi-
cation, we must consider additional communication channels, actors, and contex-
tual factors. 
However, another empirical study conducted by our research team finds the 
opposite result that politicians’ self-presentation is more populist on social media 
compared to talk shows (Ernst, Blassnig et al., 2019). Several aspects could explain 
these surprisingly contradictory results. First, methodological aspects such as the 
sampling procedure may play a role. In Ernst, Blassnig et al. (2019), we investi-
gated only those tweets and Facebook posts that expressed either a political posi-
tion or elaboration on a political issue or an evaluation or attribution of a target 
actor. In Article I, we looked at politicians’ social media communication more 
broadly, taking into account any tweet or post that had a written content of more 
than 40 characters. These could include nonpolitical posts such as event announce-
ments or personal statements that are very common on social media. It is reasona-
ble to expect that politicians are more prone to use populist key messages in state-
ments that specifically target a political issue or political actor. Going a step fur-
ther, in Ernst, Esser et al. (2019), we show that politicians are more inclined to com-
municate populist key messages in connection with specific populism-affine issues 
such as immigration or corruption. Thus, the use of populist communication on 
social media depends on specific issues and contexts. Second, in both studies, the 
communication style and content of the talk shows varied greatly from episode to 
episode depending on the issue, the actor constellation, and the audience involve-
ment. This limits the generalizability of the findings and indicates that other situ-
ational factors also matter for the use of populist communication on talk shows. 
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Overall, these findings imply that politicians’ self-presentation on social media 
is not inherently more populist but that the use of populist communication most 
likely depends on other factors, such as the situational or issue context. Accord-
ingly, Article I further identifies (b) characteristics of parties and (c) context factors on 
the country level as drivers of populist communication in politicians’ self-presenta-
tion. These aspects will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.2. Finally, the 
impression that social media are particularly prone to populism could stem from 
the fact that populist statements by politicians receive disproportionate attention 
on social media (see Article III and V) as well as in traditional news media (see Ar-
ticle II and Ernst, Esser et al., 2019). This aspect will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
With regard to the (2) online media representation of populist communica-
tion, this dissertation contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence 
for the theoretical distinction among populism by the media, populism through the 
media, and populist citizen journalism (Esser et al., 2017) and how these three forms 
of populism in the media contribute to the dissemination of populist ideas in online 
news. 
First, (a) journalists mostly act as gatekeepers for populist messages in online 
news. As Article II finds, the majority of populist key messages in online news can 
be attributed to statements by politicians that are cited directly or indirectly. Thus, 
journalists provide a stage for populism by politicians rather than voice populist 
ideas themselves. Whereas populism through the media is quite common, explicit 
populism by the media is relatively rare. This can be related to similar findings 
with regard to print news. Hameleers et al. (2017a), focusing on populism by the 
media, found that only a relatively small proportion of the news coverage included 
populist statements initiated by the media. In contrast, Ernst, Esser et al. (2019), 
focusing on populism through the media, found that print news media report ex-
tensively on populist statements by politicians. Combining and directly comparing 
these two perspectives, this dissertation shows that this pattern translates to online 
news coverage. 
Four reasons may explain why journalists report so extensively on politicians’ 
populist statements (see also Ernst, Esser et al., 2019) and why this may be ampli-
fied for online news media. First, as outlined in Chapter 3.2, populist statements 
meet the selection criteria of the media due to their frequent compliance with news 
values and media logic, especially commercial media logic (see also Mazzoleni, 
2008). Second, journalists may feel obliged to include populist statements for rea-
sons of balance (Esser et al., 2017)—specifically due to populist politicians’ issue 
ownership on contentious topics. This may particularly apply to the topic of immi-
gration that was in the focus of Articles II and IV. Third, journalists monitor what 
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politicians say on other channels and incorporate these messages in their news re-
porting. This intermedia agenda setting has become increasingly prevalent in the 
hybrid media system (Rogstad, 2016) and can be expected to be even more pro-
nounced in online articles that allow for the direct embedding of politicians’ tweets 
or Facebook posts. Fourth, and closely connected, politicians use social media chan-
nels not only to circumvent traditional gatekeepers but also to get their messages 
into the reporting of news media (Chadwick, 2017), as illustrated by two qualita-
tive examples in Article III. 
Additionally, Ernst, Esser et al. (2019, p. 183) argue that the news media often 
include populist messages by politicians in their news articles “to criticize and de-
construct them.” This argument can be related to Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al. 
(2018, p. 491), who find that journalists in print news evaluate populist actors and 
messages mostly critically and “carry out their gatekeeping function in a rather 
restrictive way.” In contrast, Article II finds very few attempts by journalists to ex-
plicitly attenuate, criticize, or deconstruct populist statements by politicians. In 
fact, this dissertation finds that online news media disseminate populist messages 
mostly neutrally and that journalists’ role as interpreters is very limited. This find-
ing contradicts Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al. (2018) and is relatively surprising. 
Stanyer et al. (2019), for example, find that journalists perceive populism mainly 
as a threat and as harmful for democracy. Additionally, populists often attack the 
media. Therefore, journalists could be expected to evaluate populist actors and 
their messages more negatively (Esser et al., 2017; Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 
2018). 
Five aspects may explain these seeming discrepancies. First, a stronger audi-
ence orientation and commercialization of online news outlets may foster uncriti-
cal reporting on populist actors and messages in exchange for attention and higher 
click rates (see also Chapter 3.2). Second, issue ownership by populist actors or 
populism-affine issues, such as the topic of immigration in the focus of Article II, 
may drive a more uncritical reporting on populist messages. Although Wettstein, 
Esser, Schulz et al. (2018) conclude that the journalistic gates are relatively closed 
for populist actors, they find that populist messages are overrepresented in the cov-
erage of issues that are typically owned by populist parties. Third, contextual and 
situational factors influence how critically journalists cover populist actors and 
messages. Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al. (2018, p. 489) find news coverage to be 
especially critical of populist actors and messages “in those systems where main-
stream parties have established an effective ‘cordon sanitaire’ around populist par-
ties.” By contrast, Article II focuses on three countries (CH, FR, UK) with rather 
strong populist parties that have been or have become central actors in politics and 
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media coverage in the last few years.11 Fourth, journalists may report politicians’ 
statements in general relatively uncritically and as unchallenged. This is indicated 
by the fact that although Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al. (2018) find that populist 
statements are more often criticized or opposed than nonpopulist statements, this 
still accounts for a relatively low share (only approximately 3% of anti-elitist and 
approximately 6% of people-centrist statements were challenged by journalists ac-
cording to Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 2018, p. 488). Finally, journalists may sel-
dom explicitly criticize populist messages themselves but more often challenge 
them implicitly by citing critique or opposing views by other sources, using them 
as “opportune witnesses” (Hagen, 1993). Whereas Article II only focuses on explicit 
contextualization by the journalists themselves, Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al. 
(2018, p. 485) also consider negative evaluations of the source, disagreement with 
the source, and contrary positions by another source in the article. To summarize, 
journalists can be expected to open their gates to populist messages and be less 
critical towards them in a more commercialized and audience-oriented online en-
vironment, in connection with issues that are typically owned by populist parties, 
and in countries with relatively strong populist parties and no established ‘cordon 
sanitaire’. 
This dissertation further finds that (b) interpretive, opinion-oriented journalism 
acts as a driver of populism by the media. If journalists make populist statements 
themselves, which occurs relatively seldom, this is mostly constrained to opinion-
oriented stories. This corresponds to similar results with regard to populism by the 
media in print news (Blassnig et al., 2019; Hameleers et al., 2017b). Whereas online 
news seems to provide incentives for populism through the media, populism by the 
media remains a rather ‘niche’ phenomenon that is heavily dependent on the jour-
nalistic reporting style (Hameleers, 2017, p. 194). Thus, this dissertation contrib-
utes to our understanding of the role of journalists in populist online communica-
tion by demonstrating that journalists mostly act as gatekeepers of populist mes-
sages by political actors and act less as interpreters or initiators. 
Finally, with regard to drivers of populism in online media representation, this 
dissertation provides the first empirical evidence for (c) populist citizen journalism 
 
11 CH, where the SVP has been the largest party since the late 1990s and is part of the government 
coalition, arguably does not have a ‘cordon sanitaire’ (Ernst, Engesser, & Esser, 2017). In the UK, 
UKIP has become a more central actor in British politics and media coverage in the last few years, 
culminating in the ‘Yes’ vote on Brexit (e.g, Hughes, 2019; Murphy & Devine, 2018). FR traditionally 
had a ‘cordon sanitaire’, specifically around the Front National (FN) (Mudde, 2007). However, the 
FN has gotten stronger, reaching a vote share of 33,9% in the second round of voting in the presi-
dential elections 2017. As a result, the media representation of populist actors and messages has 
likely increased as well (see also Blassnig et al., 2019). 
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(Esser et al., 2017). More specifically, Article II finds that reader comment sections 
convey more populist messages than the news articles they respond to. This con-
firms the theoretical expectation that the different functions of reader comments as 
liberal individualist, communitarian, or counterpublic spaces make them specifi-
cally prone to populist communication. It also reinforces Esser et al. (2017)’s expec-
tation that journalistic gates are more open to populist messages in reader com-
ments than in articles. Furthermore, this finding supports the argument that jour-
nalists mostly act as gatekeepers for populist messages in online news, not only by 
politicians but also by citizens. The online environment provides citizens with in-
creasing possibilities to participate actively in the news cycle via reader comments, 
reader polls, and other social plugins. On the one hand, due to their propensity for 
populist communication, reader comments may contribute substantially to the ex-
tent of populist ideas that readers are confronted with in online news outlets. On 
the other hand, the extent of populism in reader comments may be reinforced by 
populist news articles. 
This brings us to the (3) effects of populist online communication on citizens 
in the form of audience reactions. In this regard, this dissertation finds that (a) 
online populist communication resonates with citizens. Key findings of Articles III, IV, 
and V indicate that populist Facebook posts and news articles receive more audi-
ence reactions in the form of likes, shares, or comments than does nonpopulist con-
tent. From a supply perspective, this confirms the theoretical expectations that 
populist communication has high mobilization potential (Jansen, 2011), sharewor-
thiness (Trilling et al., 2016), and compatibility with network media logic (Klinger 
& Svensson, 2015). From an effect perspective, this finding can be connected to ex-
tant research that argues that populist communication is highly persuasive (Haw-
kins, 2010; Rooduijn, 2014a; Wirz, 2019), activates a social differentiation between 
in-groups and out-groups (Hameleers et al., 2017a; Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; 
Schulz, Wirth et al., 2018), and has a positive effect on intended political engage-
ment (Hameleers et al., 2018). Extending this research, this dissertation shows that 
populist communication similarly has a positive effect on citizens’ willingness to 
react to and engage with Facebook posts or online news articles as well as on their 
actual behavior. 
These findings are highly relevant for our understanding of populist online 
communication: by reacting to populist Facebook posts or news articles, citizens 
disseminate these messages to a larger secondary audience (Vaccari & Valeriani, 
2015) and give them a higher reach and a seemingly higher relevance or newswor-
thiness, implying that populist posts or articles receive disproportionate attention 
in political online communication. On the one hand, a disproportional popularity 
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may influence the public perception of social media or online news as being spe-
cifically populist communication channels. On the other hand, high numbers of 
popularity cues on social media may also influence how much presence populist 
actors or messages are granted in traditional news media. Chadwick (2017), for 
example, argues that Donald Trump’s Twitter use, in combination with the volume 
of favorites and retweets by his followers, played an important role in his gaining 
publicity from elite media organizations. Fürst (2018) even suggests that public 
resonance (“Öffentlichkeitsresonanz”) should be considered as a new news value, 
as journalists increasingly focus on issues that seem sought after and promise a 
high reach or virality. In this sense, by liking, sharing, or commenting, citizens also 
act as gatekeepers or rather gatewatchers (Bruns, 2018) of populist messages at the 
response level. 
Article III finds a similar positive effect on popularity cues by predefined pop-
ulist actors. Thus, typically populist actors receive overall more popularity cues 
than typically nonpopulist politicians do. Article V finds that Facebook posts by a 
typically populist politician are generally perceived as more populist but finds no 
main effect of the populist actor on citizens’ likelihood of reacting to the message. 
Thus, the image of politicians as populist and their overall extent of populist com-
munication can have a spillover effect on messages that do not contain any popu-
list elements. This may be particularly true on social media, where political actors 
send out messages with high frequency. This finding from Article V also corre-
sponds to the finding of Article III that political actors who communicate more pop-
ulist key messages on average receive more popularity cues. The contradictory 
findings with regard to the main effect of populist actors may be partly explained 
by the specific actors chosen for the experimental study in Article V but also by the 
populations of citizens that were investigated in these two studies. Whereas Article 
III examined manifest reactions of Facebook users who were probably to a large 
extent “fans” or “followers” of the politicians to whose posts they reacted, Article 
V relied on a representative sample of the general Swiss public. The methodologi-
cal implications of this difference will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.3. 
Theoretically, this implies that although typically populist politicians receive more 
popularity cues by their actual followers, the general population may not be more 
likely to like or share their posts. 
Furthermore, Article III finds that both typically populist and nonpopulist pol-
iticians received more popularity cues with populist Facebook posts, whereas re-
cipients in the experimental study for Article V were even more likely to react to a 
populist Facebook post if the source was a nonpopulist actor. These findings also 
suggest that politicians who are typically not regarded as populist can gain higher 
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resonance by communicating populist messages. This finding could partly be ex-
plained by a surprise effect. Furthermore, if a moderate politician communicates 
populist ideas, this could give recipients who support populist ideas the impres-
sion that their views have arrived in mainstream politics. From a supply perspec-
tive, this provides an incentive for politicians to use populist communication stra-
tegically to receive more user reactions and, thus, a higher reach. However, at least 
for the intention to comment, a relatively common motive of participants in Article 
V was also to criticize the content of the post. Politicians and news outlets should 
thus also expect a certain ‘backlash’ effect if they use populist communication (see 
also Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017). However, in this respect, it can be argued that 
“there is no such thing as bad publicity” (see also Ernst, Esser et al., 2019, p. 183) 
because even negative popularity cues imply an indication of relevance (Haim et 
al., 2018, p. 190). Nevertheless, in this sense, citizens can potentially also act as crit-
ics or interpreters of populist content. 
Additionally, this dissertation finds that (b) populist online communication mul-
tiplies: As Article IV demonstrates, populist key messages in online news articles 
lead to more populist key messages by citizens in reader comments. Hence, reader 
comments are not only generally more prone to populist communication; populist 
reader comments can also be interpreted as the manifestation of effects of populist 
messages in the news articles they respond to. This reinforces the theoretical as-
sumption that populist communication has priming effects (Roskos-Ewoldsen et 
al., 2002) and can activate a populism schema in citizens’ memories that is then 
more likely to be applied in subsequent judgments and evaluations (Krämer, 2014). 
Existing empirical research indicates that exposure to populist messages can make 
populist attitudes more salient (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; Müller et al., 2017) 
or affect citizens’ preferences for populist parties by activating populist blame per-
ceptions (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2018a). This dissertation extends this re-
search by demonstrating that populist key messages in online news affect citizens’ 
political online expression and increase the likelihood that commenters communi-
cate populist ideas themselves. Furthermore, Article IV finds that the contextual-
ization of populist key messages in news articles does not have an influence on the 
use of populist communication in reader comments. Hence, by including populist 
key messages in their articles—even if they contextualize or criticize them—online 
news media can trigger more populist key messages by citizens. This may be es-
pecially true for controversial and populism-affine topics such as immigration. 
Finally, this dissertation demonstrates that (c) citizens’ populist attitudes moder-
ate the effects of populist communication on audience reactions. Only citizens with 
strong populist attitudes were more likely to react to a populist Facebook post than 
a nonpopulist Facebook post in the experimental study in Article V. This finding 
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confirms the theoretical argument based on schema theory that populist commu-
nication mainly activates preexisting populist attitudes. Earlier research has 
demonstrated that exposure to populist messages reinforces prior populist atti-
tudes (Müller et al., 2017). This dissertation contributes by showing that populist 
attitudes also moderate the effects of populist communication on recipients’ in-
tended behavior. On the one hand, this finding relativizes the effects of populist 
communication on citizens’ reactions found in Articles III and IV. It indicates that 
only citizens who already agree with populist ideas beforehand are more likely to 
like or share populist messages that they come across online. A similar moderation 
effect of populist attitudes could be expected for the expression of populist mes-
sages in reader comments, although this was not empirically tested in this disser-
tation. Thus, not everyone will suddenly like and share populist messages or write 
populist reader comments as a reaction to being exposed to populist messages on 
social media or in the news. However, as Article V further finds, people with strong 
populist attitudes are generally more inclined to react to social media posts. This 
corresponds to recent results by the Reuters Digital News Report (Newman et al., 
2019), which finds that those with strong populist attitudes are heavy Facebook 
users (see also Schulz, 2018) and more likely to share and comment on news when 
they use social networks. This could further contribute to the overrepresentation 
of populist ideas and communication on social media (Fletcher, 2019). 
The key findings of this dissertation can be connected and summarized in four 
main conclusions with regard to populist online communication. First, politicians’ 
self-presentation on social media is not inherently more populist compared to other self-
presentational communication channels. Although social media provide several 
opportunity structures for populist communication, politicians’ use thereof is in-
fluenced by additional factors such as the situational context, the issue, or party 
characteristics. However, populist social media messages may receive dispropor-
tional attention, both directly from followers—specifically on Facebook—and in-
directly via traditional mass media. Therefore, politicians may use social media not 
only to circumvent gatekeepers and directly reach their followers but also to gain 
attention in the news media. Second, journalists seldom voice populist ideas themselves, 
but they readily provide a stage for populist messages by political actors in online news 
articles as well as by citizens in reader comments. Thus, journalists mainly act as 
gatekeepers for the dissemination of populist communication online and less as 
initiators or interpreters. Third, populist online communication triggers more audience 
reactions and the expression of populist messages by citizens. Thus, within an online 
context, citizens become a more central actor for the expression and dissemination 
of populist ideas. Furthermore, similar to journalists, they can assume different 
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roles as gatekeepers or gatewatchers, initiators, and interpreters of populist mes-
sages. Fourth, citizens’ populist attitudes moderate the effects of populist online commu-
nication on audience reactions. Consequently, only a limited, specific group of people 
spreads populist ideas online. However, this group seems to be especially active 
on social media and in comment sections and therefore contributes to the impres-
sion of an overrepresentation of populist messages.  
6.2 Populist Online Communication: An Integrative Model 
In this chapter, I attempt to integrate the insights of this dissertation, put them into 
a larger context, and suggest a heuristic model for future research on populist 
online communication. In Chapter 3, I set out by conceptualizing populist online 
communication as the interplay among (1) populist communication in politicians’ 
self-presentation, (2) journalists’ media representation of populist actors and pop-
ulist messages, and (3) citizens’ responses in the form of audience reactions. This 
conceptualization can be related to previous models that describe political com-
munication as a “triangular relationship between political actors, the media and 
the audience” (Brants & Voltmer, 2011, p. 3; see also, e.g., Blumler & Gurevitch, 
1995; Henn, Jandura, & Vowe, 2016). On the horizontal dimension, these models 
describe the relationship between politicians and the media—the political commu-
nication elites—whereas the vertical dimension denotes the interaction between 
these two actor groups and the citizens, who are seen as “the ultimate addressee” 
of the political messages (Brants & Voltmer, 2011, p. 3). Traditionally, political 
communication models were conceptualized as rather top-down, or as Blumler 
(2016, p. 27) phrased it: “[the] model was essentially pyramidal on a politics to me-
dia to audience slope.” Thus, these traditional political communication models re-
garded citizens or audience members simply as receivers of political messages 
from the political communication elites. However, as many researchers have 
acknowledged and discussed, relationships between politicians and journalists 
and between these communication elites and citizens have changed fundamentally 
in the last few decades. These changes have been attributed to several societal de-
velopments, including the digitization of political communication (i.a., Blumler, 
2016; Brants & Voltmer, 2011; Pfetsch et al., 2014; Van Aelst et al., 2017; Vowe & 
Henn, 2016). Amid other consequences, these developments imply a growing in-
terconnectedness between the supply and the demand side of political communi-
cation. Furthermore, political actors, media actors, and ordinary citizens recipro-
cally influence each other in their behavior, leading to a mutual influence of supply 
and demand factors. Thus, as Van Aelst et al. (2017, pp. 5–6) argue, a comprehen-
sive analysis of any political communication environment should look at both the 
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supply and the demand side. Henn et al. (2016) further suggest that the levels of 
effects of political communication are increasingly interconnected and that it is 
necessary to integrate the macro, meso, and micro levels in explanatory models. 
These changes can similarly be applied to populist communication as a spe-
cific phenomenon of political communication. As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, 
research on populism has long focused on the supply side, specifically on political 
actors. Only more recently has the role of the media in the dissemination of popu-
list communication been taken into account. Furthermore, for a long time, citizens 
have been neglected as actors and have only been considered—at most—in their 
role as passive recipients of populist messages. However, this dissertation shows 
that the roles of politicians, the media, and citizens have become more intercon-
nected and reciprocal in an online communication environment. Moreover, the 
boundary between the supply and the demand side has become increasingly 
blurred (see also Hameleers, 2018). This blurring must be considered when inves-
tigating the drivers and effects of populist online communication. Based on these 
considerations, I propose a heuristic model of populist online communication that 
integrates the lessons learned in this dissertation and findings from the broader 
literature. 
As Figure 3 depicts, at the heart of this heuristic model lie the three aspects, as 
similarly proposed in Chapter 3: (1) politicians’ self-presentation, (2) journalistic media 
representation, and (3) citizens’ (re)actions that together constitute populist online 
communication in its manifested form. As the double-headed arrows indicate, the 
three key aspects are expected to mutually influence each other, which will be dis-
cussed in more detail shortly. Additionally, the model includes influencing factors 
on three levels: (a) structural, situational, and cultural context factors on the macro 
level; (b) characteristics of political organizations, media organizations, and com-
munication channels on the meso level; and (c) characteristics of citizens on the micro 
level. In the following, I want to elaborate on these different components and their 
interactions.
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 (1) With regard to politicians’ self-presentation, on the one hand, how and to 
what extent politicians communicate populist messages depends on characteristics 
of their parties. First, as discussed theoretically in Chapter 2, populist communica-
tion is assumed to be the expression of populist ideology. Thus, as Ernst, Esser et 
al. (2019) confirm empirically, politicians’ self-presentation is more populist if they 
belong to a typically populist party. The distinction between typically populist and 
nonpopulist actors has also proven relevant in this dissertation with regard to the 
effects of populist messages on audience reactions. As this dissertation further 
demonstrates, parties with an extreme left-wing or right-wing ideology are specif-
ically prone to using populist communication. This finding confirms results from 
earlier studies (Bernhard, 2016; Ernst et al., 2017; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017) and 
extends them across two self-presentational communication channels in an inter-
national comparison. Other research indicates that the use of populist communi-
cation is influenced by the political or strategic position of a party or politician. 
Specifically, opposition, challenger, and backbencher status have been identified 
as drivers of populism in politicians’ communication (Ernst, Blassnig et al., 2019; 
Ernst, Esser et al., 2019). In addition to ideological reasons, these drivers imply a 
rather strategic use of populist communication by political actors—depending on 
their political position, electoral strength, access to the media, or financial re-
sources—to get attention from voters or in the media. This argument had already 
been implied by earlier studies (e.g., Cranmer, 2011) and has recently been rein-
forced by Ernst (2019). Generally, populism in politicians’ self-presentation can be 
expected to be influenced by political logic. In particular, politics or market logic 
may drive the use of populist communication for self-presentational purposes, as 
these logics are mostly concerned with gaining power, publicity, and votes and are 
highly audience-oriented and demand-driven (Esser, 2013; Landerer, 2013). 
On the other hand, characteristics of the communication channel need to be con-
sidered. In a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017), politicians’ self-presentation 
can include various communication channels: digital and analog, mediated or un-
mediated, and with varying degrees of journalistic interference. As elaborated the-
oretically in Chapter 3.1, mass media logic, social or network media logic, and 
generally a strong audience orientation, provide several opportunity structures for 
populist communication. Empirically, the fit between populist communication 
and these logics is not only indicated by the manifestation of populism in politi-
cians’ self-presentation on social media but also by the high presence of politicians’ 
populist statements in online news media and the effects of both on audience re-
actions (Ernst, Blassnig et al., 2019; Ernst, Esser et al., 2019). The findings of this 
dissertation further imply that populism in politicians’ self-presentation may be 
influenced reciprocally by the media representation and citizens’ reactions and by 
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politicians’ anticipation of their logics and response. If politicians presume that 
populist messages might receive more attention in the news media and more pop-
ularity cues on social media, this could provide an incentive to use populist com-
munication strategically, as will be discussed more below. 
(2) The media representation of populist communication encompasses populism 
by the media and populism through the media (Esser et al., 2017), with journalists 
acting as gatekeepers, interpreters, or originators of populist messages (Wettstein, Es-
ser, Schulz et al., 2018). How and to what extent the media report on populist mes-
sages in their news coverage is influenced by characteristics of media organizations, 
journalists, and the communication channel. As discussed in Chapters 3.2 and 6.1, 
the predominance of populism through the media found in this dissertation can be 
explained by populism’s fit with media logic and news values. For populism by 
the media, opinion orientation or interpretative journalism was identified as a 
driver. Thus, populism in online news could be driven or inhibited by specific jour-
nalistic role perceptions, as Maurer et al. (2019) demonstrate with regard to print 
news. Populism by the media could be fostered by an adversarial or interventionist 
journalistic role perception or culture, whereas populism through the media could 
be promoted by a strong market orientation (Maurer et al., 2019) or an emphasis 
on objective balance and fair access (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz et al., 2018). Addi-
tionally, populism in politicians’ self-presentation is expected to drive populism 
through the media, as journalists closely monitor politicians’ social media commu-
nication and increasingly incorporate social media statements as quotes in articles. 
(3) Citizens’ (re)actions, finally, comprise reactions by citizens to populist mes-
sages by politicians or journalists as well as populist messages by citizens them-
selves. On the one hand, this dissertation argues that audience reactions are driven 
by populism in politicians’ self-presentation and by populism in the media repre-
sentation. As the findings demonstrate, populist messages by politicians and the 
media increase audience reactions and trigger populist messages by citizens. Thus, 
when considering citizens’ role as recipients, audience reactions can be interpreted 
as effects of populist communication. As this dissertation further shows, these ef-
fects are moderated by citizens’ populist attitudes. Other research indicates that 
additional attributes of citizens, such as their identification with the source of the 
message (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017), emotions (Wirz, 2018b), or their feeling of 
relative deprivation (Hameleers et al., 2018b), can act as moderators of the effects 
of populist communication. These observations may also apply with regard to ef-
fects of populist online communication on audience reactions. Furthermore, pop-
ulist online communication could have additional direct effects on citizens’ atti-
tudes and behavior. On the other hand, I argue that citizens can exert a more active 
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role within an online environment as gatewatchers (Bruns, 2019), interpreters, or orig-
inators of populist messages. Whereas in this dissertation, the citizens’ role as orig-
inators of populist messages is empirically only investigated with regard to reader 
comments on online news platforms, citizens can also communicate populist mes-
sages via other communication channels such as blogs or social media (Hameleers, 
2018). This has two implications for the relationship between the demand and the 
supply side of populist communication. 
First, the distinction between the two is becoming increasingly blurry and 
overlapping, as citizens can be both recipients and senders of populist messages. 
This overlap can be related to Hameleers’ (2018, p. 2182) concept of populist mass 
self-communication, in which citizens become simultaneous consumers and produc-
ers of populist messages. The description of citizens as gatewatchers (Bruns, 2018) 
of populist messages further implies a two-step flow of communication (E. Katz, 
1957): By liking, sharing, or commenting on populist messages, presumably highly 
interested and active news and social media users further disseminate these mes-
sages to a larger secondary audience (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015). Thus, audience 
reactions to populism and populist messages by citizens can be expected to have 
effects on other citizens’ perceptions of public opinion, attitudes, and behavior. 
This has been shown, for example, by research on reader comments with regard to 
other topics (e.g., Lee, 2013; Lee & Jang, 2010; Zerback & Fawzi, 2016). 
Second, citizens’ role in populist online communication can be connected to a 
general “shift from a supply to a demand market in communication” (Brants & van 
Praag, 2015, p. 395). Brants and van Praag (2015) argue that wider and more open 
access to the public sphere has turned citizens into more powerful actors and given 
the vox populi a more central place in political communication. Similarly, Blumler 
(2016, p. 27) argues that “individuals have become a communicating force” with 
the arrival of the Internet. The (implicit) power of the public is reflected in the fact 
that the media and politicians increasingly anticipate what they assume to be the 
people’s needs, requests, frustrations, and resentments and adapt their behavior 
or communication accordingly (Brants & van Praag, 2015, p. 404). Brants and van 
Praag (2015) refer to this as “a logic of the public” that complements media logics. 
Applied to the suggested model for populist online communication, this implies 
that populism in politicians’ self-presentation and in the media is driven recipro-
cally by the anticipation of citizens’ demands and reactions. The prospect of re-
ceiving more audience reactions and, thus, more clicks and possibly a higher reach 
may well provide an incentive to disseminate populist messages. With regard to 
the news media, Bruns (2018, p. 230) even speaks of a “populism of metrics.” Alt-
hough, Bruns (2018, p. 231) refers to popular rather than populist content, if jour-
nalists increasingly conflate relevance with popularity—i.e., most read, most 
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watched, most commented—this could also foster populist messages in the media. 
Consequently, the effects of populist online communication could simultaneously 
act as its drivers. These hypothetical feedback mechanisms are, however, only 
speculation so far and cannot be answered empirically within this dissertation. 
What has not been discussed yet are influential factors on the macro level. In 
this regard, this dissertation indicates that in addition to the structural context of the 
political and media system, more volatile situational and issue context factors may be 
relevant as (short-term) drivers of political online communication. On the supply 
side, this may include the role and strength of populist parties, political crises, and 
other real-world conditions such as the level of unemployment or the level of im-
migration (see, e.g., Esser et al., 2019; Hameleers et al., 2018; Reinemann et al., 
2017). Other important factors could be the political and journalistic culture of a 
country (see, e.g., Maurer et al., 2019). On the demand side, citizens’ aggregated 
perceptions of issues, concerns, or anxieties—as, for example, voiced in polls—
could also affect politicians’ self-presentation and media representation from an 
audience-driven perspective (see, e.g., Esser et al., 2019). Finally, the model in Fig-
ure 3 takes into consideration that populism may not only have effects on individ-
uals on the micro level but may also lead to changes on the macro level over time. 
This longitudinal perspective was not incorporated empirically in this dissertation 
but will be touched upon from a theoretical and normative perspective in Chapter 
6.5. 
Overall, the model suggests that populist online communication is the out-
come of the reciprocal interactions among politicians, journalists, and citizens, in 
which different logics interact, merge, and collide, and that is driven or inhibited 
by various factors on the macro, meso, and micro levels. In this sense, many of the 
findings can be applied to political online communication in general. However, 
this dissertation looked only at a small selection of factors on these different levels 
of influence. Therefore, I see the proposed model not as exhaustive but more as a 
guiding concept for future research, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.4. Addi-
tional limitations as well as methodological contributions will be addressed in the 
next chapter. 
6.3 Methodological Implications & Limitations 
In addition to the discussed empirical and theoretical implications, I want to high-
light four methodological contributions of this dissertation and address certain limi-
tations. First, the findings of this dissertation emphasize the significance of incor-
porating politicians, journalists, and citizens as actor groups within the same research de-
sign and of investigating their interactions. While these three groups have previously 
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been identified as key actor groups of populist communication (see, e.g., Aalberg 
et al., 2017; Reinemann, Stanyer, Aalberg, Esser, & de Vreese, 2019), they have so 
far mostly been investigated separately. However, the interactions among these 
different actor groups have become more direct and immediate in the digital age 
and can take place within the same media platform, as Articles II and IV show. 
Furthermore, investigating these actors and their interactions jointly allows for the 
connection and integration of theoretical and empirical insights of the supply side 
and the demand side. This approach is particularly important if we want to under-
stand populist online communication and also highly relevant with regard to po-
litical communication in general. 
Second, this dissertation strengthens the argument of earlier work (Bos 
& Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 2011; Ernst, 2019; Ernst, Esser et al., 2019) that it is im-
portant to compare the use and extent of populist communication across different commu-
nication channels. With talk shows, online news media outlets, and two social media 
platforms, this dissertation encompasses online and offline self-presentational 
channels, social networking sites and traditional mass media, upmarket, mass-
market, and pure online outlets. By investigating the drivers and effects of populist 
communication across these different types of platforms, I demonstrate that their 
roles in populist online communication differ but also interact and complement 
each other in a hybrid media system. The findings further indicate that a similar 
positive effect of populist communication on the number of audience reactions can 
be found for both social media and online news media, increasing the validity and 
relevance of this finding. Comparing politicians’ communication and its effects 
across different communication channels is not just significant with regard to re-
search on populism. Studies of other current phenomena of political online com-
munication should also consider the role and interaction of different media plat-
forms in their research designs (see also Bode & Vraga, 2017). 
Third, this dissertation contributes to an internationally comparative perspective 
on populist communication. Following a comparative approach allows this disser-
tation, on the one hand, to identify how contextual factors influence the extent and 
the manifestation of populist communication in politicians’ self-presentation and 
online news coverage. On the other hand, the comparative design allows us to in-
vestigate the effects of populist online communication on audience reactions in 
varying contexts and provides a higher validity and generalizability of the findings 
within Western democracies (see also Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017). This is espe-
cially relevant with regard to a transnational political phenomenon such as popu-
lism. 
Finally, and most substantially, this dissertation integrates different methodolog-
ical approaches by combining quantitative content analysis, digital trace data, and 
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an online survey experiment. This multimethod approach complements the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the different methods to produce findings with 
higher validity. Although automated content analysis is on the rise, previous ap-
proaches have had difficulties in adequately grasping the complex and multidi-
mensional concept of populism (Hawkins & Silva, 2018). Therefore, manual con-
tent analysis is still the most common method of analyzing populism on the supply 
side. To investigate the effects of populist communication, research has mostly re-
lied on experimental settings, whereas empirical studies under real-life conditions 
are scarce (rare exceptions: Bos et al., 2013; Müller et al., 2017; Wirz et al., 2018). 
Moreover, most experiments have measured only planned behavior (e.g., 
Hameleers et al., 2018). Planned behavior is often merely a vague approximation 
of actual behavior because it may be influenced by social desirability, past behav-
ior, and anticipated emotions (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Perugini & Bagozzi, 
2001). A central contribution of this dissertation is therefore that I investigate the 
effects of populist online communication based on actual behavior manifested in 
digital trace data. This approach has the advantage of higher external validity 
(Howison, Wiggins, & Crowston, 2011) and allows the capture of citizens who ac-
tually like, share, comment on, or communicate populist messages under real-life 
conditions. This is specifically relevant with regard to populist communication. On 
the one hand, citizens may be more hesitant to express populist messages in an 
artificial experimental situation due to social desirability. On the other hand, re-
search suggests that generally only a small proportion of the public actually shares 
or comments on news or political content online (Newman et al., 2016). These ac-
tive and highly motivated users are hard to identify and recruit for experimental 
studies. In representative surveys, they usually account for only a very small share 
of respondents. Digital trace data offer an easy means to investigate these users 
and their visible behavior under real-life conditions. However, digital trace data 
usually provide only very limited information on these people’s sociodemographic 
characteristics, attitudes, or motives, thus limiting the generalizability of the found 
effects and the conclusions about the underlying persuasion processes. Fortu-
nately, this is the advantage of survey experiments: they allow for the measure-
ment of citizens’ populist attitudes and various control variables. Article V demon-
strates that this is highly relevant with regard to populist communication but, in 
exchange, reaffirms that only a small share of respondents in a representative sam-
ple react to populist messages in an artificial setting. Consequently, there is a trade-
off between the different methods. This dissertation shows that both approaches—
content analysis in combination with digital trace data and online survey experi-
ments—can corroborate and supplement each other and shed light on different 
effects of populist online communication. 
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Although this dissertation contributes to the field of populist communication 
research in several theoretical and methodological aspects, it also has its limita-
tions. An in-depth discussion of the methodological limitations of the individual 
studies can be found in the respective contributions and shall not be repeated here 
in detail. Instead, in the following, I want to address certain limitations that go 
beyond the individual contributions or relate to their connection. 
Although this dissertation pursues a comparative approach across different 
countries, communication channels, and actor types, the scope of the individual 
studies and the generalizability of their findings remain limited. The country se-
lection focuses solely on Western liberal democracies, in which foremost right-
wing populist actors have played a role in recent years. Therefore, additional em-
pirical research is needed to determine whether similar drivers and effects of pop-
ulist online communication can be identified for other geographical and cultural 
regions, specifically in a non-Western context and in countries with strong left-
wing populist parties. The generalizability is also restricted with regard to the com-
munication channels under study, particularly in light of the rapidly changing 
online communication sphere. 
Because the five articles are based on four empirical studies with different 
country and actor samples, their findings can only be compared and connected 
with caution. Most notably, whereas Articles I and III look at larger country sam-
ples, nonelection periods, and a broad range of topics, Articles II, IV and to some 
extent also Article V apply a “burning glass” perspective. By focusing on countries 
with strong populist parties (II & IV), election campaigns (II & IV), and the topic of 
immigration (II, IV, & V), they investigate populist communication under most-
likely conditions. This approach seemed appropriate because other research has 
demonstrated that “the combination of certain niche aspects is particularly likely 
to allow populist communication to display its full potential” (Ernst, 2019, pp. 49–
50). However, it must be kept in mind that the polarized context of elections and 
the controversial, populism-affine topic of immigration likely fuel populist com-
munication and audience reactions. Moreover, the topic of immigration again can 
be mostly linked to right-wing populism. Ideally, the results should be replicated 
in nonelection contexts and with regard to topics that are more associated with 
left-wing politics or are less controversial overall. In that sense, however, the indi-
vidual articles, specifically Articles III, IV, and V, already complement each other 
quite well. 
Another critical aspect is the definition and operationalization of populist 
communication. As discussed in Chapter 2.1, this dissertation maintains an am-
bivalent position with regard to the exclusion of specific social groups as a dimen-
sion of populist ideology: In Articles I, II, and IV, exclusion is included as a core 
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dimension of populist communication, whereas in Articles III and V, it is not. This 
difference again limits the comparability of the results. However, I do not regard 
exclusion as a necessary element of populist ideology in any of the contributions. 
Article I investigates the different dimensions of populism separately, and in Arti-
cles II and IV, the levels of exclusion are relatively low, so that the results would 
be very similar if this dimension were omitted. Nevertheless, although I consider 
a broad range of social groups as possible out-groups, mostly right-wing politi-
cians communicate this dimension (see Article I). In combination with the country 
selection and the focus on immigration, this contributes to the fact that the findings 
of this dissertation can be mostly applied to right-wing populism. In addition, my 
operationalization shares a more general difficulty with a large body of research 
on populist communication: Although I theoretically define populist communica-
tion as a combination of three or four dimensions, empirically the occurrence of 
one dimension suffices in order for a statement to be considered populist. This may 
lead to an overestimation of the occurrence of populism overall. However, it is 
justified by the fact that populist communication occurs mostly in a fragmented 
form and that recipients are confronted with the whole picture of populist ideology 
only on an aggregated level (see also Engesser, Ernst et al., 2017). Moreover, this 
dissertation focuses exclusively on the content—populist key messages—of popu-
list communication and disregards additional elements such as specific populism-
related communication styles. As my colleagues and I argue elsewhere, populist 
communication can also be regarded as a combination or even cooccurrence of 
specific key messages and styles (Ernst, Blassnig et al., 2019; Ernst, Esser et al., 
2019). Because the populism-related style elements are even more closely related 
to (network) media logic, they should be incorporated in future studies on populist 
communication’s effects on audience reactions. Nevertheless, I believe that popu-
list key messages, which are directly derived from populist ideology, lie at the core 
of populist communication and therefore warrant a separate investigation. 
With regard to the effects of populist communication on audience reactions, I 
only consider active reader behavior that manifests in popularity cues or reader 
comments, i.e., in digital trace data or user-generated content, and I disregard more 
passive behavior such as reading articles, Facebook posts, tweets, or reader com-
ments (Netzer, Tenenboim-Weinblatt, & Shifman, 2014). Different effects may be 
found for these allegedly passive behaviors. There are also some general problems 
with investigating popularity cues and reader comments. Likes, shares, and even 
comments do not necessarily imply that the readers have actually read a post or 
an article. Additionally, both popularity cues and reader comments involve a cer-
tain ‘black box’, for which researchers lack information: For popularity cues, this 
involves the role of algorithms on the different social media platforms; for reader 
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comments, this concerns the role of journalistic moderation of the comment sec-
tions (see Article IV in the Appendix for a more detailed discussion of the latter). 
Finally, there are some conceptual limitations. I do not empirically investigate 
whether user comments in response to politicians’ populist posts on social media 
are particularly populist. Nor do I analyze whether citizens’ populist attitudes 
moderate the likelihood that they express populist ideas in reader comments. 
However, theoretically, these effects can be expected to be similar for both types of 
communication platforms. This dissertation only looks at a small selection of in-
fluencing factors on the macro, meso, and micro levels. Chapter 6.2 discusses some 
additional factors on these levels that were addressed in other studies. Moreover, 
the self-presentation of politicians on social media and their media representation 
are not studied jointly within the same empirical framework. Thus, this disserta-
tion cannot answer to what extent journalists or media organizations incorporate 
populist (or nonpopulist) statements that politicians make on social media in the 
news. Finally, with regard to the connection of the supply side and the demand 
side, I do not investigate the extent to which the effects of populist communication 
are anticipated by politicians or journalists. Thus, I cannot assess whether politi-
cians or journalists adapt their communication to maximize audience reactions or 
use populist communication strategically. Despite these limitations, this disserta-
tion provides valuable insights into the drivers and effects of populist online com-
munication, allows for a conceptual integration of these different aspects as pro-
posed in Chapter 6.2, and provides fertile ground for future research. 
6.4 Future Research  
“Populism is sexy”, as Rooduijn (2019, p. 362) opened a recent article on the state 
of the field. The increasing appeal of populism is reflected in a fast-growing public 
and academic interest (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 1686). As populist 
ideas are thriving on the supply side and the demand side around the world, re-
search on populism will remain important in political and communication science 
in the future (see also de Vreese et al., 2018, p. 433). Focusing on the subfield of 
populist online communication and based on the heuristic model proposed in 
Chapter 6.2, I suggest five broad directions for future research. 
First, future research should delve into the assumed reciprocity among politi-
cians, journalists, and citizens. Do politicians actually use populist communication 
on social media to gain media attention? In turn, are online media more inclined 
to incorporate populist social media posts than nonpopulist posts by politicians in 
the news? What role do popularity cues play in this regard, do they truly function 
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as indicators of newsworthiness as Fürst and Oehmer (2018) suggest? These ques-
tions could be investigated by combining content analyses across different media 
platforms with contextual data, as in recent analyses on how Donald Trump’s com-
munication on Twitter drove news coverage in the 2016 presidential campaign 
(Wells et al., 2016). In a similar vein, Seethaler and Melischek (2019) investigate 
how Twitter was used for agenda building in the 2017 Austrian national election 
campaign. A related open question is whether politicians and the media anticipate 
the effects of populist communication on citizens and their reactions and adapt 
their behavior accordingly. This question is more challenging to investigate empir-
ically and would require either a longitudinal research design to evaluate changes 
in media coverage over time or in-depth interviews with politicians and journalists 
to assess their motives and judgments (see, e.g., Salgado et al., 2019; Stanyer et al., 
2019 for a qualitative approach to investigating politicians’ and journalists’ views 
on populism). Especially in comparative research, combined analyses of the inter-
play between politicians’ communication, news coverage, and effects on citizens 
are still rare and methodologically challenging. Such questions are, however, rele-
vant not only to future research on populist online communication but also to po-
litical communication in hybrid media systems in general (see, e.g., Esser, 2019 
with regard to election campaign communication). 
Second, future studies on populist online communication should build on ex-
isting research and investigate additional factors on the macro, meso, and micro 
levels as well as connect the different levels within the same research design. With 
regard to the macro level, future research should aim at broadening the scope by 
going beyond the context of Western democracies. Most research focuses either on 
a European, Northern American, or Latin American context, but comparative em-
pirical studies across these different geographical areas are rare (for an exception, 
see, e.g., Zulianello et al., 2018). Even rarer is research on populism in African or 
Asian countries. Moreover, future comparative work should go beyond descrip-
tive analyses and follow a more explanatory approach (Esser, 2019) to determine 
which factors on the country level—structural, situational, or cultural (or a combi-
nation thereof)—best explain differences in the use of populist communication or 
in the relationships between the three actor groups. On the meso level, future re-
search on populist online communication should aim at multichannel comparisons 
(see also Ernst, 2019, p. 56) and consider social media beyond the ‘usual suspects’ 
Facebook and Twitter. Although Facebook is still the most important social net-
work for news and is preferred by people with strong populist attitudes, other 
platforms such as WhatsApp and Instagram are gaining importance as gateways 
to news (Newman et al., 2019). Moreover, the role of YouTube and generally of 
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audiovisual content remains underexplored. Creating alternative television pro-
grams has been an integral part of the communication strategy of, for example, 
populist actors such as Podemos (Casero-Ripolles, Feenstra, & Tormey, 2016) or for-
mer SVP leader Christoph Blocher (“Teleblocher”12). Recent research further pro-
vides evidence that the consumption of “alternative media” is related to strong 
populist attitudes (Müller & Schulz, 2019). Thus, future studies should consider 
the role of alternative and niche media and their interplay with social and mass 
media for the dissemination and reinforcement of populist ideas. With regard to 
the characteristics of parties and politicians, the combination of populism with 
add-on ideologies such as nationalism, nativism, Euroscepticism, and socialism 
should be further explored (see also Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 1670). A 
rigorous comparison of right-wing and left-wing populism would allow us to dis-
cern whether the same drivers and effects can be found for both. On the micro 
level, future studies should conceptualize effects on citizens’ behavior more 
broadly and incorporate passive behavior such as browsing websites or reading 
articles and posts (Netzer et al., 2014). Recent research has demonstrated that pop-
ulist attitudes influence the media and news use of citizens (Fletcher, 2019; Schulz, 
2018). Future research should therefore explore the relationship among populist 
online communication, populist attitudes, and citizens’ political information be-
havior in greater depth. In this way, the link between the supply and the demand 
side could be further explored. Another promising avenue worth exploring is the 
idea of a two-step flow of populist online communication. Do popularity cues, for 
example, increase exposure to populist communication or moderate its effects? 
Generally, research on popularity cues indicates that they can have effects on news 
exposure, the perception of public opinion, and even attitudes (see Porten-Cheé et 
al., 2018 for an overview). Specifically, differences between affirmative and critical 
audience reactions to populist communication could be further explored. An ad-
ditional question in this regard is whether citizens react similarly to populist mes-
sages from other citizens than from politicians or journalists. An experimental 
study by Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) indicates that populist messages by citi-
zens have similar effects to those of politicians if citizens identify with or support 
the sender of the message. Under real-life conditions, the perceived similarity with 
the source of a message could even render populist social media messages by citi-
zens more effective than messages by politicians. 
 
12 “Teleblocher” is a weekly broadcast in cooperation with Schaffhauser Television, in which the 
former SVP leader and federal councilor Christoph Blocher talks with a journalist who is also the 
author of a book about Christoph Blocher (see https://www.teleblocher.ch).  
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Third, we need more comparisons over time to understand the long-term ef-
fects of populist online communication. On the macro level, longitudinal designs 
could investigate the causal relationship between the presence of populist mes-
sages in politicians’ self-presentation, news coverage, and support for populist 
ideas and parties in public opinion (Hameleers & Vliegenthart, 2019) and identify 
patterns of agenda-setting and agenda-building (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2017) with 
regard to populism-affine issues. On the meso level, the findings of this disserta-
tion lead to the question of whether mainstream political actors change or adapt 
their communication as a response to a rise in populism. Similarly, we need to ask 
whether news coverage of populist actors or media populism is increasing or 
changing. So far, research has found evidence that both supports (Hameleers 
& Vliegenthart, 2019; Rooduijn, 2014a) and negates (Manucci & Weber, 2017) the 
increasing presence of populism in print news media. Future longitudinal research 
should investigate populism in the media in a more nuanced way and analyze 
whether the contextualization of populist messages by the media changes over 
time or differs between traditional print and digital native outlets. On the micro 
level, panel surveys could detect long-term effects of populist online communica-
tion on citizens’ populist attitudes, support for populist actors, and perceptions of 
public opinion. 
Fourth, now that research on populism has already provided a wealth of 
knowledge, we should leave our “comfort zone” and link studies on populism 
with other fields of study (see also Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Within po-
litical communication, several other highly topical fields of research, such as dis-
information, polarization, or selective exposure, exhibit connections to populism 
that merit further exploration. A connection between populism and online disin-
formation and misinformation has already been established theoretically (e.g., 
Waisbord, 2018a) but requires more empirical investigation. Continuous exposure 
to populist communication could contribute to an increasing polarization of soci-
ety (see also Müller et al., 2017). Previous research further indicates a relation be-
tween populist communication and selective exposure (Hameleers et al., 2018b). 
Both aspects may be exacerbated in an online context due to increasingly frag-
mented audiences13 (Sunstein, 2002; Van Aelst et al., 2017) and opportunity struc-
tures for selective exposure (Dvir-Gvirsman, Tsfati, & Menchen-Trevino, 2016; 
Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2005). Such integrative approaches could enable a bet-
ter distinction and connection of these phenomena and provide a more compre-
hensive understanding of current political and societal developments. 
 
13 However, several empirical studies challenge the argument that online media lead to increasing 
audience fragmentation (e.g., Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Webster & Ksiazek, 2012). 
CHAPTER 6  
 74 
Finally, future research on populist online communication faces several meth-
odological challenges. As discussed in Chapter 6.3, the combination of different 
methodological approaches is essential to grasp a full picture of populist online 
communication. Therefore, I want to call on future research to follow a multi-
method approach that combines content analysis with surveys or experiments 
(e.g., Müller et al., 2017). In addition, computational methods such as automated 
content analysis and tracking of political information behavior will become more 
central. However, the possibility of analyzing more and more detailed content and 
behavioral data should not come at the expense of a thorough theoretical ground-
ing. Another challenge is that online data are becoming increasingly difficult to 
access. On the one hand, social media platforms such as Facebook are closing off 
their APIs (Bruns, 2019). On the other hand, increasingly popular private messag-
ing services such as WhatsApp do not allow researchers to access user data—or 
only allow restricted access in cooperation with the tech companies—for obvious 
privacy reasons. For these and other reasons, researchers should therefore combine 
quantitative methods with qualitative approaches, for example, with qualitative 
interviews with politicians or journalists (Salgado et al., 2019; Stanyer et al., 2019) 
or focus groups with citizens. 
To summarize, this dissertation provides several starting points for prospec-
tive studies. For a comprehensive understanding, future research on populist 
online communication should strive to be comparative across different countries, 
time points, communication channels, and actor groups; it should integrate the 
supply and the demand sides; it should incorporate the macro, meso, and micro 
levels; and it should go beyond populism by connecting it to other fields of re-
search. That is, there is still a great deal to explore. 
6.5 Populist Online Communication & Democracy 
The ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy is notorious. On 
the one hand, populism is often described as a threat to democracy (Abts & Rum-
mens, 2007, p. 407; Mazzoleni, 2003, p. 2; Taggart, 2002), specifically liberal democ-
racy, because it rejects minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of pow-
ers (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 1670). On the other hand, populism can 
also be regarded as a corrective (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012) or, as Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2018, p. 1670) phrase it, “an illiberal democratic response to undemo-
cratic liberalism.” Hence, populism can also be the expression of legitimate criti-
cism and emphasizes the fundamental democratic concern that the people should 
exert some control over the government (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, 
p. 1670; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Nevertheless, the homogenous conception of the 
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people and the demand for an unrestricted implementation of its will are highly 
problematic and may negatively impact political communication (Waisbord, 
2018b). In this light, this final chapter will discuss the findings of this dissertation 
from a societal perspective and outline practical implications for politicians, the 
media, and citizens in liberal democracies. 
One of the aims of this dissertation was to identify possible drivers of popu-
lism in political online communication. With regard to politicians, this dissertation 
argues that in addition to ideological reasons, mass media logic, network media 
logic, and a strong orientation towards the public can drive the use of populist 
communication. So far, mostly outsiders—such as extreme, opposition, or chal-
lenger parties—make use of populist communication in their self-presentation. 
However, the findings also show that populist messages of typically nonpopulist 
actors receive more popularity cues on social media and that, overall, populist 
statements are often cited uncritically in the media. Thus, from the point of view 
of mainstream politicians, it could make sense to “jump on the bandwagon of suc-
cess” (Ernst, 2019, p. 53) and strategically adopt populist communication or focus 
on populism-affine issues. In fact, one of the biggest impacts of populist parties 
may be to influence the policy positions of mainstream parties—specifically with 
regard to the topic of immigration (Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018). However, main-
stream politicians may also face a backlash from voters—specifically from those 
with low populist attitudes—if they suddenly imitate populist actors. Thus, main-
stream politicians should be aware that adopting populist communication could 
have unforeseen consequences (see also de Vreese, Reinemann, Stanyer, Esser, & 
Aalberg, 2019). 
In terms of the media, this dissertation has demonstrated that most populism 
in online news stems either from cited statements by politicians that are often dis-
seminated uncritically or from opinion-oriented formats. Therefore, as de Vreese 
et al. (2019, p. 243) urge, journalists and media organizations must “reflect on their 
values and their role in democracy.” They need to be aware of their roles as origi-
nators of populist ideas but also as gatekeepers and interpreters of populist mes-
sages by politicians and citizens. Journalists should critically reflect and contextu-
alize populist messages, correct wrong statements, and call out violations of dem-
ocratic norms (see also de Vreese et al., 2019). As research has shown, it is above 
all undisputed populist statements or a populist bias in news reports that lead to a 
polarization of populist attitudes (Müller et al., 2017). Consequently, balanced or 
critical reporting could contribute to counteracting this tendency (see also Wirz, 
2019). Furthermore, this dissertation has shown that the media are particularly le-
nient towards populism in reader comment sections. Although populist reader 
comments are not necessarily uncivil or nondeliberative, anti-elitist or exclusionist 
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comments can contribute to a deconstructive, adversarial, or even hateful atmos-
phere in comment sections. As research on incivility demonstrates (Ziegele & Jost, 
2017), an interactive moderation of comment sections and factual responses by 
journalists can improve the discussion atmosphere without overly restricting free 
speech. This approach may also be applicable to populist messages in reader com-
ments and attenuate the effects of populist communication. Such a balance be-
tween valuing free speech and critically challenging false or problematic state-
ments may be specifically important with regard to populist commenters, as they 
often hold strong anti-media sentiments or do not feel represented by mainstream 
news coverage (Schulz, Wirth et al., 2018). Finally, journalists should not mistake 
popularity for relevance (Bruns, 2018, pp. 230–231). As Loosen and Schmidt (2017, 
p. 363) argue, “one major challenge for journalists is to reconcile the (assumed) de-
mands of the dispersed and heterogenous, yet often silent, mass media audience 
with the (verbalized) demands of the connected audiences they face in comment 
sections and social media.” This challenge can be specifically seen with regard to 
populist online communication, as the following point also illustrates. 
Another central finding of this dissertation is that populism in social media 
posts or news articles leads to more frequent and more populist reactions by citi-
zens. Considering populism’s problematic stance on central ideas of liberal democ-
racy, this multiplication and propagation of populist ideas to a larger audience 
through citizens is highly problematic. In contrast, from the viewpoint of partici-
patory democracy, it can also be interpreted as positive if populist communication 
contributes to the increased participation of citizens and possibly opinion diversity 
in the online public sphere, especially against the background that traditional po-
litical participation, such as voting in elections, as well as membership and engage-
ment in political parties or trade unions, has declined dramatically (Brants & Volt-
mer, 2011, p. 8). Moreover, citizens’ use of political news is declining (Van Aelst et 
al., 2017). Thus, if populism did indeed contribute to the political engagement and 
mobilization of otherwise inactive groups of citizens (Jansen, 2011), this could be 
seen as desirable. In fact, a recent study found that citizens with strong populist 
attitudes are more likely to partake in expressive noninstitutionalized modes of 
participation such as signing petitions, expressing political views online, and in 
some contexts participating in demonstrations (Anduiza, Guinjoan, & Rico, 2019). 
However, the study did not find any relationship between populist attitudes and 
voting. Similarly, exposure to populist communication may contribute to in-
creased online participation or other noninstitutionalized forms of political en-
gagement, but it may not motivate people to vote. The existence of such a discrep-
ancy cannot be determined within this dissertation but could have problematic 
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consequences. Again, this can be related to the changing relationship between cit-
izens and the political and media elites and between the supply and the demand 
side. As Blumler (2016, p. 29) argues, the emergence of a political communication 
ecology with two levels—he refers to them as “institutionalized” vs. “grass-
roots”—may, on the one hand, lead to citizens’ experience of higher levels of effi-
cacy resulting from their ability to communicate more easily in peer-to-peer net-
works. On the other hand, citizens may continue to experience high inefficacy in 
their vertical communication with political elites and their impact on the govern-
ment. Applying this to political online communication, liking, sharing, or com-
menting provides citizens with an easy means of responding directly and imme-
diately to politicians or journalists online but may not actually translate into real-
world political actions or influence. This “lopsided efficacy” (Blumler, 2013) may 
further deepen the perceived chasm between the people and the elite that is prop-
agated by populist ideology. 
Finally, this dissertation shows that specific groups are more likely to react to 
populist messages than others are. This finding corroborates earlier research and 
reinforces the argument that populist communication contributes to an increasing 
polarization of society into populist and anti-populist camps (see also Müller et al., 
2017; Wirz, 2019). This is currently reflected in an increased legitimacy of extreme 
positions as well as an increasingly hardened conflict between opposing political 
camps in several Western countries. Examples are the ‘Remain’ vs. ‘Leave’ cam-
paigns with regard to the ‘Brexit’, proponents vs. opponents of President Trump, 
or pro- vs. anti-immigration groups in Europe. The rhetoric in these conflicts is 
increasingly Manichean, hostile, and absolutistic. Moderate positions and compro-
mises no longer seem to have room in these discussions. Taken together with the 
findings that populist messages trigger more populist messages and that people 
with higher populist attitudes are generally more active online, this may discour-
age more moderate citizens from voicing their opinions in online discussions in a 
spiral of silence (see also Zerback & Fawzi, 2016) or create “echo chambers” or 
niches of populism (Walter et al., 2016 argue similarly with regard to user com-
ments on climate change). These developments present politicians, journalists, and 
citizens with major challenges and require further investigation. I hope that my 
dissertation will provide the foundation and serve as inspiration for such future 
research.  
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Populist communication in talk shows and social media 
A comparative content analysis in four countries 
Populistische Kommunikation in Talk-Shows und Social Media
Eine vergleichende Inhaltsanalyse in vier Ländern
Sina Blassnig, Nicole Ernst, Florin Büchel & Sven Engesser
Abstract: To understand populism, it is crucial to understand populist political communi-
cation. We investigate how politicians across the political spectrum employ populist com-
munication in different non-institutionalized communication arenas. Populism is defined 
as a thin ideology and three dimensions of populist communication are distinguished: 
people-centrism, anti-elitism, and exclusion. We analyze politicians’ statements in talk 
shows and social media (Twitter and Facebook) in four Western democracies. The analysis 
shows that populist communication is context-dependent and that the use of the three di-
mensions varies across political systems, media channels, and party types. 
Keywords: Populism, political communication, talk show, social media, political parties
Zusammenfassung: Um Populismus zu verstehen, ist es essentiell populistische politische 
Kommunikation zu verstehen. Wir untersuchen, wie Politiker entlang des politischen Spek-
trums populistische Kommunikation in verschiedenen nicht-institutionalisierten Kommu-
nikationsarenen verwenden. Populismus wird als dünne Ideologie definiert und drei Di-
mensionen populistischer Kommunikation werden unterschieden: Volks-Zentrismus, 
Anti-Elitismus und Exklusion. Wir analysieren Aussagen von Politikern in Talk-Shows und 
sozialen Medien (Twitter und Facebook) in vier westlichen Demokratien. Die Analyse 
zeigt, dass populistische Kommunikation kontextabhängig ist und dass die Nutzung der 
drei Dimensionen über politische Systeme, Medienkanäle und Parteitypen hinweg variiert.
Schlagwörter: Populismus, politische Kommunikation, Talk-Show, soziale Medien, politi-
sche Parteien
1. Introduction
Populism has been highly topical in the mass media and the scientific debate (i.a. 
Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017; Albertazzi & McDon-
nell, 2008; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Taggart, 2004; Torre, 2015). A 
crucial aspect to understand political populism is to understand populist political 
communication (Stanyer, Salgado, & Strömbäck, 2017). Political communication 
is the central mechanism in the articulation of political interests, their aggrega-
tion, as well as their implementation and the legitimization of political decisions. 
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The role of politicians as communicators has become increasingly important 
(Sheafer, Shenhav, & Balmas, 2014). Moreover, empirical research shows that 
populist messages can have far-reaching effects on citizens such as reinforcing 
populist attitudes or contributing to opinion polarization (Hameleers & 
Schmuck, 2017; Müller et al., 2017). Therefore, we follow a communication-
centered approach (Stanyer et al., 2017) and address the first research question: 
How do politicians employ populist communication? 
Many studies have investigated populism in the mass media (e.g. Akkerman, 
2011; Bos, van der Brug, & Vreese, 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn, 
2014b), party or election manifestos (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017; Rooduijn, 
De Lange, & van der Brug, 2014), or political speeches (Hawkins, 2009, 2010). 
Yet, only very few have examined populist communication in talk shows (Bos & 
Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 2011) or social media (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 
2017; Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017; Groshek & Engelbert, 
2012; Van Kessel & Castelein, 2016).
These communication channels are, however, the perfect arena to investigate 
politicians’ self-presentation because they are hybrid forms of mediality (Chad-
wick, 2013): They combine different media logics and offer different degrees of 
freedom for politicians’ self-presentation. Due to this hybridization, these com-
munication channels provide the ideal combination between outreach and control 
to politicians. This may be especially attractive for populist actors who try to 
reach a large audience as unmediated as possible.
Research on political populism – especially in Europe – has often focused on 
radical right-wing parties (see Mudde, 2007) and pre-defined populist political 
actors. However, in theory, populism has been described as “chameleon” (Tag-
gart, 2000, p. 5) or “empty shell” (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 324) that “lacks 
core values” (Taggart, 2004, p.  274). This implies that populism is not con-
strained to a specific political camp and can be complemented with different ideo-
logical elements, resulting in varying types of populism. This is especially relevant 
with regard to populist communication. Indeed, previous research has shown that 
both right-wing and left-wing, and even mainstream politicians, use populist 
communication (Cranmer, 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Therefore, this study 
investigates populism in the communication of politicians across the political 
spectrum.
We consider populist communication as the expression of populist ideology 
and analyze populist key messages that are related to the content (the what) of 
populist communication (in contrast to populist communication style, which re-
fers to the how) (Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017). Following a communication-
centered approach, political actors can be described as more or less populist 
(Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017) “based on the extent to which they engage in 
populist communication” (Stanyer et al., 2017, p. 353). If we assume that politi-
cal actors are not either populist or non-populist but more or less populist, this 
raises the second research question: How does the use of populist communication 
depend on the contextual setting? 
The aim of this study is to assess how politicians of different party families 
employ three dimensions of populist communication – people-centrism, anti-elit-
https://doi.org/10.5771/2192-4007-2018-3-338, am 01.10.2018, 10:11:16
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
342 Studies in Communication and Media, 7. Jg., 3/2018
Full Paper
ism, and exclusion – in their self-presentation across different contextual settings 
(country specifics and media setting). The analysis is based on a quantitative con-
tent analysis comparing politicians’ self-presentation in political talk shows and 
on social media (Twitter and Facebook) in Switzerland, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.
2. Defining populism
Populism was long seen as a “notoriously vague term” (Canovan, 1999, p. 3). It 
has been defined as an ideology, a political strategy, a style, or a discourse (Hawk-
ins, 2010; Jagers &  Walgrave, 2007; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2004; Weyland, 
2001). Despite this lack of consensus and conceptual clarity, in the last few years 
scholars have increasingly agreed to conceive political populism as a thin ideolo-
gy (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Kriesi, 2014; Mud-
de, 2004; Stanley, 2008; Wirth et al., 2016) and to understand it as a “set of ide-
as” (Hawkins, 2009; Rooduijn, 2014b; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017; Taggart, 
2000). Currently one of the most popular and most applied definitions of politi-
cal populism is by Mudde (2004, p. 543), who describes populism as
 an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homog-
enous and antagonistic groups – ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, 
and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté géné-
rale (general will) of the people.
Following this definition, populist ideology first states the existence of a homog-
enous and ‘good’ people and demands its empowerment and sovereignty. Second, 
populist ideology juxtaposes the people to the elite in a normative and moralistic 
manner. It presents a Manichean worldview in which “the Good people are ex-
ploited by the Evil elite” (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017, p. 2). Third, these first 
two aspects of populist ideology are dependent on a monolithic conception of 
‘the people’ with a common understanding of the world. Thus, populism treats 
‘the people’ as a homogenous category, a discrete entity, or a corporate body that 
is capable of having common interests, common desires, and a common will. This 
monolithic conception also implies that there are some specific segments of the 
population – “the dangerous ‘others’” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 3) – 
that do not share ‘the people’s’ ‘good’ characteristics, values, and opinions. These 
out-groups are excluded from ‘the people’ and seen as a threat or a burden to 
society (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). 
We conceive populism as a thin ideology that can be combined with different 
ideological positions from the left to the right, thus, with more substantive, thick-
er ideologies like nationalism or socialism. It has been disputed where the line is 
to be drawn between the thin populist ideology and the add-on ideologies, in 
particular with regard to the exclusion of ‘others’ (see Engesser, Fawzi, & Lars-
son, 2017). While some authors see it as a constitutive element of populism (e.g., 
Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2017) and argue that there is a type of excluding pop-
ulism (where exclusion substitutes anti-elitism) (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), others 
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consider the exclusion of ‘others’ only as a part of right-wing populism (Roodui-
jn, 2014a; Wirth et al., 2016). We assume an intermediate position. Following 
Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, and de Vreese (2017), we argue that the 
construction of specific out-groups is inherent in the populist construction of a 
monolithic ‘people’ as a favored in-group. Depending on the conception of the 
people each type of populism holds, the respective out-groups vary. However, not 
all types of populism necessarily exclude specific social groups from the people 
and not all types of populism are equally explicit in their exclusion. In this regard, 
it is valuable to include exclusion as a dimension of populism in our theoretical 
model to differentiate between different types of populism.
3. Populist communication
The definition of populism as an ideology is not without its critics (see Aslanidis, 
2016). Other authors have conceived populism rather as a communication style, 
discourse or frame (Aslanidis, 2016; Bos et al., 2011; Canovan, 1999; Cranmer, 
2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Laclau, 2005). We argue that these approaches 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive (see also Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 
2017). While the ideological core of populism often remains hidden, populist 
communication is open to our observation and may be used to identify populist 
actors empirically (Kriesi, 2014; Stanyer et al., 2017).
Based on our definition of populism as an ideology, we focus on the content of 
populist communication or populist key messages (What?) – in contrast to popu-
list style, which is interested in the form of populist communication (How?) (En-
gesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017). Building on the theoretical considerations on 
populist ideology and the existing literature discussing populist communication 
(Cranmer, 2011; Ernst, Engesser, Büchel et al., 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; 
Reinemann et al., 2017; Wirth et al., 2016), we derive three dimensions of popu-
list key messages: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and exclusion. 
People-centrism relates to the first core element of populist ideology, the ho-
mogenous ‘pure’ people. However, not all references to the people are populist. We 
consider five key messages as populist: If a political actor 1) speaks in the name of 
‘the people’ and claims to defend its will (advocacy); 2) claims to be accountable 
to ‘the people’ and refers to the importance of responding to ‘the people’s’ will (ac-
countability); 3) uses a reference to ‘the people’ to legitimize certain claims (legiti-
macy); 4) demands the sovereignty of ‘the people’ (demanding popular sovereign-
ty); or 5) describes ‘the people’ as homogenous (stating a monolithic people) 
(Cranmer, 2011). The first three key messages relate directly to the in-group favor-
itism of the ‘good’ people. By way of populist communication, political actors try 
to appeal to the people, identify with the people, and justify their actions with the 
will of the people (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Demanding sovereignty of the peo-
ple captures the ideological element of the primacy of ‘the people’. It entails the 
idea that ‘the people’s’ will should have priority over other regulatory mechanisms 
such as laws or morals (e.g. human rights or supranational law). Consequently, 
only what is decided by the popular will is right (Kriesi, 2014). Stating a mono-
lithic people means treating ‘the people’ as a united and indivisible entity with 
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common feelings, common desires, and a common will, which is also central to 
populist ideology. It is in direct contrast to a pluralist vision of the people with 
many diverse values and opinions (Abts & Rummens, 2007). 
The second dimension, anti-elitism, refers to the vertical differentiation be-
tween the people and the elite. First, populist anti-elitist key messages emphasize 
the distance and estrangement between the people and the elites. The elites are 
differentiated and excluded from the people by depicting them as being above 
ordinary citizens, out of touch with reality, and ignoring the people’s will. Second, 
the elites are denounced as corrupt or incompetent. Third, they are blamed for 
any failures, problems, and undesirable developments in politics and society. The 
elite can thereby not only be political but also economic, cultural, or the media 
elite (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).
The third dimension of populist communication is the rhetorical exclusion of 
specific social out-groups from the people. This refers to a differentiation along 
the horizontal dimension. As mentioned earlier, a typical element of populism is 
that the people are seen as a homogenous and monolithic body, while some spe-
cific population segments are excluded (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Mudde, 2004; 
Taggart, 2000). In contrast to the elite, these out-groups are not above but within 
the people, thus subject to a horizontal differentiation. Although, according to 
Abts and Rummens (2007) it can also be seen as a second vertical antagonism 
since it is often a downward comparison between the people and groups that are 
considered the “bottom of society.” Similarly to the elites, these out-groups can 
take on various forms depending on the constitution of the people as a nation, 
class, or ethnos (Canovan, 1999; Mény & Surel, 2000; Pasquino, 2008).
As these dimensions are directly derived from populist ideology, it is assumed 
that populist communicative content expresses the core ideas of populist ideology 
and translates them into typical claims, attributions, accusations, and demands 
that are conceived as populist key messages. However, the political actors do not 
have to be aware of the key messages they use. As mentioned above, following a 
communication-centered approach, it is seen as an empirical question to what 
degree a political actor is populist. Furthermore, political actors’ communication 
can be more or less populist depending on the situational context. 
4. Contextual factors and hypotheses
The first aspect investigated in this study refers to specific factors on the country 
level that may influence the occurrence of populist communication in politicians’ 
self-presentation. Political communication is highly dependent on the contextual 
setting of different political systems (Pfetsch & Esser, 2012). Therefore, structural 
and situational macro-level factors are also expected to influence the use of popu-
list communication (Reinemann et al., 2017). In this study, we focus primarily on 
more formal and long-term structural factors. Different systems of government 
and different electoral systems may provide different incentives and constraints 
for political actors to communicate in a populist manner. With regard to the sys-
tem of government, we expect that in presidential systems, politicians have more 
incentives to speak populist than in parliamentary systems due to a higher per-
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sonalization and the “plebiscitarian legitimacy” of presidents (Linz, 1990; 
O’Donell, 1994). In a directorial system, in contrast, political communication is 
expected to be less populist. According to Lijphart (1999, p. 274), consensus de-
mocracies are overall “kinder” and “gentler”. The collegial government and con-
sensus orientation lead to a low concentration of media attention on national 
leaders or specific politicians (Kriesi, 2012), a need to form mandatory catch-all 
coalitions, and, thus, to lower incentives for politicians to use populist communi-
cation. With respect to the electoral system, drawing on Swanson and Mancini 
(1996) and Esser, de Vreese, and Hopmann (2017), we expect that majoritarian 
systems encourage more people-centrist and anti-elitist rhetoric due to unlikely 
coalitions, higher personalization, lower need to negotiate compromises, and a 
plebiscitarian legitimacy of the members of parliament. In proportional systems, 
on the other hand, politicians are less encouraged to adopt populist communica-
tion since the prospect of likely coalitions is expected to constrain anti-elitism, 
and elections via party-lists may provide fewer incentives for a people-centrist 
rhetoric.
Of course, additional historical, cultural, or situational factors may contribute 
to the extent of populist communication in a given political system (Reinemann 
et al., 2017). These factors are confounded with aspects of the political system 
and, thus, cannot be controlled for. Therefore, we formulate a hypothesis that is 
based on the formal structures of the political systems, in order to test whether 
these aspects alone can explain variations in the extent of populist communica-
tion. Based on these theoretical considerations, we would expect the self-presen-
tation of politicians to be most populist in the United States (presidential, majori-
tarian), followed by the United Kingdom (parliamentary, majoritarian) and 
Switzerland (directorial/direct-democratic, proportional), and lowest in Germany 
(parliamentary, proportional). This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: Politicians’ communication is most populist in the United States, follo-
wed by the United Kingdom and Switzerland, and lowest in Germany.
Our second level of comparison is the communication channel. In a hybrid media 
system, political actors rely on a variety of different communication channels, 
whose logics complement each other (Chadwick, 2013). Comparing populist 
communication across different media platforms acknowledges this reality of the 
contemporary media environment (Bode & Vraga, 2017). Furthermore, it allows 
analyzing whether and how the context and affordances of different platforms 
influence the use of populist communication. This is highly relevant, because ear-
lier research shows that the amount of populist communication is influenced by 
characteristics of the public setting and the communication channel (Cranmer, 
2011; Ernst, Engesser, Büchel et al., 2017). The incentives to apply populist com-
munication are higher in a media context compared to non-public settings, since 
the media provide a perfect stage for populists to present themselves and win vot-
ers (Mudde, 2004). This is connected to the assumption that populist communi-
cation complies with news values and media logic (Esser, Ste ¸ pin ´ ska, & Hopmann, 
2017; Mazzoleni, 2008, 2014). Thus, intentionally or not, media can provide a 
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conducive platform for populist communication. Political actors may of course 
also anticipate and exploit this.
Talk shows are often associated with a “tabloidization process” that fosters 
media logic and therefore could encourage the use of populist communication 
(Albertazzi, 2008). First, political discussions in talk shows follow a highly audi-
ence-oriented logic, which is favorable for populist communication (Landerer, 
2013). The frequent presence or even participation of a live audience could spe-
cifically trigger people-centrist key messages. Second, the direct confrontation of 
political adversaries may foster the conflictive dimensions of populist communi-
cation (anti-elitism and exclusion). The sharp language, negativity, and taboo-
breaking that are often inherent to anti-elitist and excluding statements also per-
fectly fit media logic and news values (Esser, Ste  ¸pin ´ ska et al., 2017; Mazzoleni, 
2008). Third, the apprehension of media logic as well as the competition for at-
tention could make politicians more prone to use populist communication. Thus, 
talk shows may provide specific incentives for politicians to adopt a more popu-
list communication. This assumption is also supported by the empirical results of 
Bos and Brants (2014), who show that populism is more prominent in talk shows 
compared to various other news media outlets. 
New media such as social media, on the contrary, provide new platforms for 
politicians where they are less dependent on news media logic and are potentially 
less influenced by processes like mediatization (Sheafer et al., 2014). However, 
there are also indications that the network logic of social media may be an op-
portunity for populists to circumvent media institutions and journalistic gate-
keepers (Engesser, Ernst et al., 2017). Furthermore, it has been observed that new 
media platforms such as Twitter may be used by populist politicians as a tool of 
permanent opposition against mainstream parties (Van Kessel &  Castelein, 
2016). In turn, theoretically, talk shows could also act as pluralist communication 
arenas that promote a rather deliberative than populist dialogue (Kessler & 
Lachenmaier, 2017). However, Kessler and Lachenmaier (2017) show that, em-
pirically, politicians’ speeches in political talk shows are mostly focused on domi-
nance, allegations, proclamations, personalization, and the creation of closeness 
to the audience. Thus, contextual aspects of talk shows such as their immediacy, 
staged informality, confrontation, and audience-orientation may foster the use of 
populist communication in the heat of an interview situation or panel discussion. 
Deduced from these arguments, the second hypothesis is formulated: 
H2: Politicians’ communication is more populist in political talk shows 
than on social media.
Finally, differences in the usage of populist communication are expected in con-
nection with party association. Although, following Cranmer (2011), it is as-
sumed that the use of populist communication is not exclusively bound to politi-
cians of specific parties, we expect the extent of populist communication 
(respectively of its three sub-dimensions) to be different for politicians of different 
types of parties. Specifically, politicians of pole parties are more prone to employ 
populist communication than moderate or center party politicians (Ernst et al., 
2017). Similar to opposition parties, pole parties often oppose the governing and 
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‘mainstream’ parties, denouncing them as “cartel” or as being “indifferent to the 
desires of ordinary citizens” (Katz & Mair, 2009, p. 759) thereby emphasizing 
responsiveness to voters’ demands over responsibility (Mair, 2002, 2009). Moreo-
ver, populism has become an attractive alternative for radical political actors to 
overcome the stigma of being associated with fascism, Nazism, or communism 
(Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). The assumption that politicians of radical parties 
on both extremes of the political spectrum are particularly inclined to employ 
populist communication is also supported by comparative content analyses of 
party manifestos (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017; Steenbergen & Weber, 2015), 
press releases (Bernhard, 2016), and social media (Ernst et al., 2017).
Following these theoretical considerations and empirical findings, we argue 
that political actors across the whole spectrum of political ideology employ popu-
list communication but that the extent of populism depends on how extreme po-
litical actors are positioned. We expect that political actors on both opposite ends 
of the political left-right spectrum use more populist key messages than moderate 
and center political actors. Thus, follows the third hypothesis:
H3: Politicians of pole parties use more populist key messages than politi-
cians of moderate or center parties. 
5. Data collection and sample
The four countries – Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), the United Kingdom 
(UK), and the United States (US) – are chosen because they are broadly similar 
but distinguish themselves in several dimensions of their political systems. This 
allows to explain differences and similarities in the use of populist communica-
tion through different contextual settings and to reach insights beyond a single 
country (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012). All four selected countries are established 
Western democracies and they have seen a rise of populist actors or movements in 
the last few years. Yet, the strength and the institutionalized success of these ac-
tors varies between the four selected countries. Moreover, the countries differ in 
crucial aspects of their political system. First, they represent different systems of 
government: The United Kingdom and Germany have a parliamentary system, 
the United States has a presidential system, and Switzerland – being an exception 
– a directorial system with direct-democratic elements (Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 
2000). Second, the selected countries have different electoral systems and there-
fore different candidate selection modes: While the United States and the United 
Kingdom have a majoritarian election system (first-past-the-post; in the US with 
caucuses and primaries), Germany and Switzerland have a system of proportional 
representation (Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 2000). This permits us to investigate pop-
ulist communication in varying political and electoral settings.
Politicians’ statements are analyzed in political talk shows, Facebook posts, 
and Tweets. These communication channels are chosen deliberately: Since this 
study focuses on politicians’ self-presentation, thus, on how politicians communi-
cate and present themselves and not on how they are represented by the media, it 
is useful to select media channels with as little journalistic influence as possible. 
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Talk shows and social media suit these needs perfectly: They are used by politi-
cians not only to discuss current topics and issues, but also for self-presentational 
reasons such as connecting with their voters, mobilizing supporters, and shaping 
their image (Lee, 2013; Schütz, 1995). In that sense, both talk shows and social 
media can be conceived of as hybrid media in which different media logics coin-
cide (Chadwick, 2013). In such formats, political actors can present themselves 
with a stronger situational control than in traditional mass media outlets or press 
releases. Nevertheless, the degree of publicity and control by the politicians varies 
between social media and talk shows – with the latter showing a slightly higher 
amount of journalistic control and a higher influence of news media logic than 
the former. It is therefore interesting to compare the use of populist key messages 
in these different formats.
Since the politicians under scrutiny in this investigation must be kept equal 
across both talk shows as well as social media, the most pragmatic approach is to 
sample the relevant talk shows first, then list all politicians appearing in these talk 
shows and add their social media account.1 To do so, two political talk shows are 
selected for each country and four episodes in March through May 2014 are in-
vestigated (see Table 1). This three-month routine period was deliberately chosen 
in order to investigate the exact same time frame across all four countries. This 
way, we ensure that we capture debates on a variety of political issues – possibly 
also on transnational issues – and do not only analyze the communication of the 
main candidates or frontrunners, as it would be the case during election times. 
Moreover, most comparative studies investigating populism focus on election 
times. We therefore contribute to the field by analyzing the daily communication 
in a routine period. The chosen political talk shows are normal, routine time 
shows that are broadcast weekly and on a regular basis. To ensure comparability 
between the political talk shows in each country, several selection criteria have 
been identified in order to create functionally equivalent research objects across 
the countries. They represent the two most influential and highest market share 
talk shows2 per country that cover political content, incorporate some sort of 
panel or roundtable discussion with politicians and other experts, focus the dis-
cussion mainly on current and crucial political issues, and have a duration of 
about 60 minutes. Only talk show episodes in which at least one politician ap-
peared are incorporated in the sample. In general, only statements by politicians 
that are present live in the studio and part of the main discussion panel are in-
cluded in the study.3 Statements by the moderator, non-politicians in the panels, 
1 There is an inherent selection bias in this sampling procedure in that politicians that regularly 
appear in talk shows are likely to show a certain media affinity and be popularly known. They 
also might be more controversial, provocative, and outspoken and, thus, more interesting for the 
media narrative. However, we argue that this is not problematic in the study at hand: Firstly, this 
selection bias is held constant across all politicians and thus affects all individual sampling deci-
sions. Furthermore, such vocal politicians are also more likely to maintain a social media account.
2 Whenever possible, public as well as private channels have been selected. The shows themselves 
do not show a clear, explicit political bias (left or right).
3 Some exceptions had to be made for The Andrew Marr Show, Meet the Press, and This Week due 
to their different program designs and country specifics. In these shows, one-on-one interviews 
and video-interviews were also coded in addition to panel discussions.
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and members of the audience are not coded. A new statement is coded if there 
was a change in the speaker, topic, or speaking situation.4 Overall, 74 politicians 
appear in the selected talk show episodes (CH: 21, DE: 14, UK: 18, US: 21). 
Table 1. Investigated talk shows
Country CH DE UK US
Show Arena SonnTalk Günther Jauch
Maybrit 
Illner
Andrew 
Marr 
Show
Question 
Time
Meet  
the Press
This 
Week
Channel SRF 1 Tele Züri ARD ZDF BBC 1 BBC 1 NBC ABC
Public/
private public private public public public public private private
In a second step, official Facebook and Twitter profiles for each of the 74 appear-
ing politicians are identified. Overall, 47 of the 74 politicians are present on one 
or both of these social media channels and their Tweets and Facebook status up-
dates are analyzed for the same time period as the aired talk shows. By imple-
menting this individual matching procedure on the micro level of politicians, the 
study ensures the comparability of communication on the two different media 
channels and thus avoids ecological fallacies. For each politician, a random sam-
ple of 20 Tweets and 20 Facebook posts is drawn from March 1st through May 
31st, 2014. For those who have less than 20 Tweets or posts, the time period is 
extended to the whole year or, if necessary, to all of their Tweets and posts. Only 
Tweets and Facebook posts that include sufficient written content are taken into 
the sample. This excludes for example posts that only contain a link or a profile 
picture update. Tweets and Facebook posts are regarded as single statements, re-
gardless of their length.
The time period is chosen so as to represent normal routine time. There were 
no national elections or extraordinary referendums in any of the investigated 
countries between March and May 2014. However, the United States had its mid-
term election on November 4th of the same year, and the European parliament 
election was held from May 22nd to May 25th. In Switzerland, one of its four an-
nual popular votes took place on May 18th. Thus, the chosen material may con-
tain statements that are connected to electoral or voting campaigns. All talk 
shows were recorded. Social media posts from Facebook and Twitter were ob-
tained via Facepager (Keyling & Jünger, 2013). Both audiovisual and text files 
were manually coded and the intra-coder reliability is satisfactorily high: For all 
variables, Cohen’s Kappa and Krippendorff’s Alpha is above .60 and the agree-
ment above 90 percent (overall average:  .85, α = .85). Overall, the final sample 
comprises 926 statements by 74 politicians in talk shows, 648 Facebook posts, 
and 880 Tweets (N = 2,454).
4 The speaking situation refers to the addressee of a statement. Does the politician address the mo-
derator/journalist, another politician, non-political panel members, the present audience, or the 
disperse audience (the camera)?
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6. Operationalization of populism
The main dependent variable is the extent of populist content in politicians’ com-
munication. Populist communication is operationalized building on previous lit-
erature (Cranmer, 2011; Engesser, Ernst, et al., 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; 
Wirth et al., 2016), distinguishing the three dimensions discussed above: 1) peo-
ple-centrism, 2) anti-elitism, and 3) exclusion.
People-centrism, comprises references to ‘the people’ that take the meaning of 
1) advocacy, 2) accountability, 3) legitimacy, 4) demanding sovereignty of the peo-
ple, or 5) stating a monolithic people as described in the theory section. Refer-
ences to the people can be made with words such as ‘(the) people’, ‘(the) public’, 
‘(the) citizen(s)’, ‘(the) voter(s)’, ‘(the) taxpayer(s)’, ‘(the) resident(s)’, ‘(the) 
consumer(s)’, ‘(the) population’, or ‘(the) nation’ (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). 
However, only references to the people that adhere to one of the five people-cen-
trist key messages are coded. Anti-elitism, is coded if a political actor blames or 
denounces an elite, their behavior, values etc., and/or detaches them from ‘the 
people’. The elite can be political (parties, government, the state, institutions, 
etc.), economic (banks, multinationals, oligarchs, employers, etc.), cultural (intel-
lectuals, universities, writers, etc.), or media elites (Canovan, 1999; Jagers & Wal-
grave, 2007). The third dimension, exclusion, is coded if a political actor de-
nounces or blames specific societal groups or population segments – such as 
foreigners or religious groups – and excludes them from ‘the people’ (Cranmer, 
2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).
The operationalization of populist communication, its three dimensions and 
sub-dimensions are summarized in Table 2. Each item is coded as a dummy vari-
able. For all three dimensions of populist communication, maximum indices are 
constructed. This means that at least one item of the respective dimension has to 
be present in order to be considered people-centrist, anti-elitist, or exclusionist. 
The three dimensions are looked at separately, since earlier studies suggest that 
populist communication, especially in social media, occurs in a fragmented form 
(Engesser, Ernst, et al., 2017).
Table 2. Operationalization of populist communication strategies
People-centrism: Politician makes an explicit reference to ‘the people’
Advocacy: politician talks in the name/on behalf of ‘the people’, referring primarily to its will
Accountability: politician refers to the importance of responding to what is portrayed as 
‘the people’s’ will
Legitimacy: use of ‘the people’ to legitimize certain claims
Demanding sovereignty of ‘the people’
Stating a monolithic people: ‘the people’ is understood/depicted as a homogenous/mono-
lithic construct with common feelings, wishes and opinions
Anti-elitism (vertical differentiation): denouncing, blaming or detaching of the elite
Political elite (e.g. “classe politique”, the government, the administration)
Economic elite (e.g. banks, companies, “oligarchs”)
Cultural elite (e.g. intellectuals, Universities, artists)
Media (e.g. “Lügenpresse”, “Staatsfernsehen”)
Supranational or foreign institutions (e.g. the EU or foreign governments)
Other elites or not specified
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Exclusion (horizontal differentiation): denouncing, blaming or criticizing of specific social groups
Foreigners (e.g. immigrants)
Religious Groups (e.g. muslims, jews)
Other countries or people in other countries (e.g. USA, Germany if not explicitly against 
the elite)
Other groups or not specified
7. Results
Overall, the findings show that 12.5 percent of all statements contain at least one 
element of the three populist communication dimensions. People-centrist (7.2%) 
and anti-elitist (6.8%) statements are almost equally common, whereas exclusion 
(1.4%) is much less frequent. Thereby, statements containing only one of the 
three dimensions (9.7%) are most common, followed by statements combining 
two of the three dimensions (2.6%), while the simultaneous occurrence of all 
three dimensions is almost absent (0.1%). 
To answer our hypotheses, first, we analyze differences in populist communica-
tion across the four investigated countries. In this respect, we expect political com-
munication to be more populist in countries with presidential and majoritarian 
systems and less populist in countries with parliamentary respectively directorial 
and proportional systems. Looking at the frequencies of statements which include 
at least one reference to the different dimensions, people-centrism occurs most of-
ten in the United Kingdom but closely followed by the United States and Switzer-
land (see Figure 1). The other two dimensions, anti-elitism and exclusion, occur 
most often in Switzerland. Swiss politicians tend to most often blame, denounce, or 
exclude some elite or a specific social group. The frequencies of the three dimen-
sions also reveal that politicians in all countries refer to the people or make anti-
elitist statements much more frequently than they exclude certain social groups on 
the horizontal dimension. Figure 1 compares the country means, which simultane-
ously correspond to the share of statements that contain at least one reference to 
the respective populist dimension. 
Figure 1. Shares for each dimension by country
Notes: See also Table 3.
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To investigate whether these country differences are significant, analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) are conducted with the maximum indices for people-centrism, anti-elit-
ism, and exclusion as dependent variables (see Table 3)5. With regard to people-
centrism, there are no significant country differences. However, the countries differ 
significantly with regard to anti-elitism and exclusion. The United States scores sig-
nificantly lower than Switzerland, Germany, and the United Kingdom on the anti-
elitism index. Exclusion is significantly higher in Switzerland compared to the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Germany, and the United States. Other country differences are not 
statistically significant. This means that, overall, there are no significant country 
differences with regard to people-centrism, although people-centrist key messages 
tend to be used more in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Switzerland 
than in Germany. Anti-establishment or anti-elitism is quite common among the 
three European countries, but not as much in the United States. The exclusion of 
immigrants, foreigners, religious, or other social groups is relatively common in 
Switzerland, but practically irrelevant in the other three countries. These results 
mostly dispute our assumptions with regard to influences of the system of govern-
ment and the electoral system on populist communication. As Figure 1 illustrates, 
levels of people-centrism come closest to the hypothesized pattern with higher 
shares in the United States and the United Kingdom, followed by Switzerland and 
lowest in Germany. However, these differences are not statistically significant. Fur-
thermore, the country levels for anti-elitism and exclusion are contrary to the pre-
sumed pattern, with the highest shares in Switzerland, followed by the United King-
dom and Germany and the lowest shares in the United States. This refutes our first 
hypothesis and suggests that other context factors besides the political system are 
more crucial for the extent of populism in politicians’ communication.
Table 3. Country diﬀerences with regard to the three dimensions of populist 
communication
  CH DE UK US
 
n = 485 n = 542 n = 670 n = 757
  M SE M SE M SE M SE F η2
People-centrism 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 2.05 .003
Anti-elitism 0.08a 0.01 0.08a 0.01 0.08a 0.01 0.04b 0.01 4.73** .006
Exclusion 0.04a 0.01 0.01b 0.01 0.01b 0.00 0.00b 0.00 10.58*** .013
Notes: N = 2454. Single-factor variance analyses (post-hoc test: Games-Howell). **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
Groups with diﬀerent identification letters (a, b) are significantly diﬀerent at the 5% level.
The second hypothesis claims that politicians’ communication is on average more 
populist in talk shows than on social media. Figure 2 shows that the means for all 
three dimensions are higher for talk shows than social media. Single factor ANO-
VAs confirm that the levels of people-centrism, anti-elitism, and exclusion are 
5 Since our dependent variable is a dummy variable, we have verified all results with logistic re-
gressions. However, due to reasons of comprehensibility and illustration, we have decided to focus 
on the results of the ANOVAs in the paper.
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significantly higher in talk shows than on social media (see Table 4). To ensure 
that these results are not due to a sampling bias, the same calculations are repli-
cated with just the 47 politicians that are actually present on both channels. The 
significant differences between talk shows and social media can be confirmed for 
people-centrism (F(1, 2079) = 94.86, p < .001, η2 =.044) and anti-elitism (F(1, 
2079) = 42.73, p < .001, η2 =.020). For exclusion, however, the difference is not 
significant with this reduced sample (F(1, 2079) = 3.52, ns). Overall, these results 
indicate that the channel through which politicians communicate does indeed 
have an influence on the level of populist communication. In our analyzed sam-
ples, the investigated politicians use more references to the people, a stronger an-
ti-elitist discourse, and a higher exclusion of social groups on talk shows than on 
Facebook and Twitter, which supports H2.
Figure 2. Shares for each dimension by medium
Notes: See also Table 4.
Table 4. Diﬀerences between communication channel with regard to the three 
dimensions of populist communication
 
Talk Show Social Media
   
n = 926 n = 1528
  M SE M SE F η2
People-centrism 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.01 75.57*** .030
Anti-elitism 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.01 28.27*** .011
Exclusion 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 13.19*** .005
Notes: N = 2454. Single-factor variance analyses. ***p < .001.
To answer H3, politicians are placed on a left to right scale according to their 
party association based on the Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES) (Bakker et al., 
2012; Ladner, 2014; Wagschal & König, 2015). To investigate the differences be-
tween pole parties and center respectively moderate parties, a dummy variable is 
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created for pole party politicians that comprises politicians of the two categories 
at the extremes of the left-right scale. Single factor ANOVAs for the three sub-di-
mensions of populism reveal that while there are no significant differences with 
regard to people-centrism (F(1, 2452) = 0.01, ns), the mean differences for anti-
elitism (F(1, 2452) = 61.92, p < .001, η2 = .025) and exclusion (F(1, 2452) = 
51.05, p < .001, η2 = .020) are highly significant. Thus, while pole parties’ com-
munication is not more people-centrist than center or moderate parties’ state-
ments, they employ the two conflictive dimensions associated with populism – 
anti-elitism and exclusion – more often. H3 is therefore only partially supported.
To further investigate empirical patterns with regard to differences along the 
political spectrum, Figure 3 plots the mean values of the different party families 
of the investigated politicians on the left-right scale for the three dimensions. The 
graph shows that in our sample right-wing politicians have the highest mean val-
ues for all three dimensions of populism. However, there is also a clear ‘bathtub’ 
shape for the second dimension: not only right-wing, also left-wing politicians 
score higher on anti-elitism than moderate and center parties. Exclusionist com-
munication, in contrast, is almost only used by right-wing politicians.
Figure 3. Shares by party types on the left-right scale
Notes: See also Table 5.
One-way ANOVAs confirm that party ideology along the left-right scale has a 
significant effect on people-centrism, anti-elitism, and exclusion (see Table 5). Ac-
cording to post-hoc tests (Games-Howell), however, no party types differ signifi-
cantly from each other in their level of people-centrism. With regard to the sec-
ond dimension, right-wing politicians communicate significantly more anti-elitist 
than politicians of all other parties. Yet, left-wing politicians also show a signifi-
cantly higher degree of anti-elitism in their communication compared to politi-
cians of center parties and moderate-right parties. With regard to exclusion, right-
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wing politicians use significantly more excluding key messages in comparison to 
all other parties, while no other party types differ significantly.
Table 5. Diﬀerences between party types with regard to the three dimensions of 
populist communication
  Left Moderateleft Center
Moderate 
right Right  
n = 339 n = 952 n = 152 n = 788 n = 223
  M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE F η2
People-Centrism 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.02 2.42* .004
Anti-Elitism 0.09a 0.01 0.05a,b 0.01 0.02b 0.02 0.05b 0.01 0.21c 0.02 23.65*** .037
Exclusion 0.01a 0.01 0.00a 0.00 0.00a 0.01 0.01a 0.00 0.10b 0.01 38.41*** .059
Notes: N = 2454. Single-factor variance analyses (post-hoc test: Games-Howell). *p < .05, ***p < .001. 
Groups with diﬀerent identification letters (a, b, c) are significantly diﬀerent at the 5% level.
To summarize, these results show that although parties across the political spec-
trum use populist key messages to some extent, the level of populist communica-
tion, or rather the level of its different dimensions, in politicians’ statements is in 
fact dependent on party membership. While politicians on both extremes of the 
political spectrum exhibit higher levels of anti-elitism, they do not refer to the 
people more often than other parties do. Furthermore, in our sample, only right-
wing party affiliation leads to a more populist communication with regard to all 
three dimensions, and especially with regard to exclusion.
8. Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this paper was to investigate populist communication in the self-
presentation of politicians and to examine possible contextual variations for dif-
ferent countries, media settings, and party families. In particular, possible differ-
ences in the use of populist communication in different non-institutionalized 
communication arenas of politicians across the political spectrum were of inter-
est. We defined populism as a thin ideology and derived three dimensions of 
populist communication: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and exclusion. These di-
mensions were looked at separately in order to account for a possibly fragment-
ed form of populism on social media and to investigate differences as well as 
similarities in their use.
Our hypothesis with regard to the influence of the political system on populist 
communication is not supported. This implies that formal structures of the politi-
cal system cannot alone explain differences in the levels of populist communica-
tion across countries. Nevertheless, interesting differences are found between the 
four countries that may rather be explained by cultural, historical, or situational 
contexts. The levels of anti-elitism and exclusion are highest in Switzerland, fol-
lowed by the United Kingdom, while people-centrism is highest in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Although not all differences are statistically sig-
nificant, this provides interesting insights. 
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Populism in Swiss politicians’ communication seems to come closest to a com-
plete populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). While it is contrary to our expectation 
that directorial and proportional systems constrain populist communication, the 
high level of populism in Switzerland is not entirely surprising. Albertazzi (2008) 
even labeled Switzerland as “another populist paradise.” On the one hand, this 
has to do with the prominent role and success of the right-wing Swiss People’s 
Party (SVP). On the other hand, some features of the Swiss political system that 
have previously been seen as impediments to the rise of populism may actually 
provide favorable opportunity structures for populist actors. These include direct 
democratic instruments and the logic of consociationalism (Ernst, Engesser, & 
Esser, 2017). In fact, the regular popular votes may promote a permanent popu-
list campaign and, thus, override constraining effects of the directorial and pro-
portional system. This may have been especially relevant since our investigation 
took place shortly after a widely discussed popular initiative against mass immi-
gration. In addition, the Swiss political culture with its ‘militia system’, pro-
nounced localism, and Euroscepticism provides fertile ground for populist rheto-
ric (Albertazzi, 2008). Moreover, in multi-party parliamentarian systems, some 
parties may also use populist communication to set themselves apart from all the 
other parties in the competition for attention. 
In Britain, the extent of populism in politicians’ communication had been 
expected to be quite high based on previous research. Not only has the United 
Kingdom seen the rise of the populist right-wing United Kingdom Independent 
Party (UKIP) in recent years (Dennison & Goodwin, 2015; Halikiopoulou & 
Vasilopoulou, 2014), British mainstream parties have also been known for their 
populist rhetoric (Fella, 2008). Furthermore, the majoritarian electoral system 
was expected to promote populist communication. In comparison to Switzer-
land, horizontal exclusion of specific social groups is, however, much lower. 
Hence, populist communication in the United Kingdom seems to correspond 
more closely to anti-elitist populism with high levels of people-centrism and 
anti-elitism but low levels of exclusion (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). 
The lower levels of populism in Germany confirm the existing literature and 
our theoretical expectations. Due to restrictive institutional conditions such as 
Germany’s parliamentary system of proportional representation and federal 
structure, as well as due to the historical burden of the Nazi past, right-wing pop-
ulism has long remained a peripheral matter in Germany. Left-wing populism has 
been slightly more successful, yet also to a limited extent (Decker, 2008; Fawzi, 
Obermaier, & Reinemann, 2017). Horizontal exclusion of specific social groups is 
indeed very low. Hence, similarly to the United Kingdom, populist communica-
tion in Germany seems to match anti-elitist populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), 
although with a lower degree of people-centrism. 
Finally, based on our assumptions regarding government and electoral systems, 
politicians in the United States were expected to have the highest use of populist 
communication. References to the people are relatively common and strong in the 
United States. Anti-elitism and exclusion are, however, the lowest among the four 
countries. Thus, populism in the United States seems to come closest to an empty 
populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). In contradiction to the previous literature, 
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there may be fewer incentives for populism in two-party systems, because they 
already have an inherent antagonism between the ruling party and the opposi-
tion. Ware (2002, p. 104) also notes that populism in the United States “lacks 
much of the anti-regime character evident in other countries” and that “’the con-
frontational element’ is often, though not always, muted.” However, with the 
election of Donald Trump and his explicitly divisive rhetoric against the political 
elite as well as specific social groups a more complete or confrontational pop-
ulism is also on the rise in the US. 
To summarize, while our expectations regarding the influence of the govern-
ment and electoral system could not be confirmed, there is evidence that different 
political settings lead to different levels and forms of populist communication. 
However, other contextual aspects such as the media setting may influence politi-
cians’ use of populist communication more directly.
The study demonstrates that the amount of populist communication is depend-
ent on the specific characteristics of different communication channels. In our 
sample, politicians tend to speak more populist on talk shows than on social me-
dia. Aspects of talk shows such as their immediacy, staged informality, and direct 
interaction with the audience, as well as a strong media logic may provoke a 
more populist tone. Furthermore, political talk shows often stage conflicts be-
tween invited political actors intentionally in order to present both sides of an 
argument and to provide a lively debate – which might incentivize the politicians 
to utter populist messages. The present live audience may further foster the poten-
tial that politicians directly address the people by using people-centrist key mes-
sages. However, the extent of populism may vary greatly from show to show de-
pending on the topic, the actor constellation, and the context. In our sample, one 
episode of the Swiss talk show Arena about a popular initiative on mass immigra-
tion, featuring politicians of both left- and right-wing parties, and including mem-
bers of the audience in the discussion, was found to be especially populist. There-
fore, the generalizability of the findings may be limited. 
Populist communication was found in the self-presentation of politicians of all 
party families across all four investigated countries. This confirms the theoretical 
assumption – as well as findings of earlier studies (Cranmer, 2011; Ernst, Engess-
er, Büchel et al., 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) – that populist content may be 
employed by any politician regardless of his or her position along the ideological 
spectrum, although not necessarily to the same extent. In fact, differences be-
tween party families were found with regard to the use of populist communica-
tion. Politicians of pole parties are more anti-elitist and excluding but not more 
people-centrist than moderate or center parties are. It makes sense from a theo-
retical perspective that pole party politicians are more prone to challenge the cur-
rent political elite. However, they seem to do so more by attacking the elite in-
stead of by identifying and siding with the people as Jagers and Walgrave (2007) 
suggested. It could also be shown that although politicians across the political 
spectrum adopt populist communication from time to time, their ideological posi-
tion has an influence on which dimensions are used. While people-centrist key 
messages are distributed most evenly across party families, anti-elitist key mes-
sages are applied to a greater extent by pole politicians on both sides, and exclu-
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sionist key messages are almost only used by right-wing politicians. This empiri-
cally supports the often-made assumption that right-wing populism is more 
exclusionist than left-wing populism.
This study has certain limitations. From a theoretical perspective, as discussed 
above, it is disputable whether exclusion is a core aspect of populism. However, 
we included it as a populist communication dimension, first, because we consider 
the construction of specific out-groups as inherent in the populist construction of 
a monolithic people. Second, exclusion is an important feature of current pop-
ulism trends in Western Europe as well as in the United States. Third, by investi-
gating the three dimensions separately, exclusion (as well as the two other dimen-
sions) is not defined nor empirically tested as a necessary feature of populism. 
This allows for the comparison of the three dimensions and the identification of 
different types of populism across contextual settings.
More generally, our sampling strategy may lead to some selection bias with 
regard to the countries, selected talk shows, politicians, and time frame. Although 
historically, in the United States and in Germany left-wing populism has been 
more prevalent (Fawzi et al., 2017; Ware, 2002), mostly right-wing parties or 
movements have stood out as populist in the analyzed countries in the last few 
years: the SVP (Albertazzi, 2008; Ernst, Engesser, & Esser, 2017), the Alternative 
for Germany (AfD) (Häusler, Teubert, & Roeser, 2013), UKIP (Fella, 2008), and 
the Tea Party Movement (Groshek & Engelbert, 2012), among others. This may 
explain why in our sample populism is highest in the communication of right-
wing politicians. While there are individual representatives of left-wing parties 
such as Die Linke in Germany or the Green Party of England and Wales included, 
right-wing politicians are overrepresented in our sample. Thus, we expect that if 
our study would be expanded to other countries and deliberately include more 
extreme left-wing parties, populism and especially anti-elitism would also be 
higher at the left end of the political spectrum. 
Another constraint is that only 47 of the 74 politicians in the investigated talk 
shows were also active on social media. We were able to show that politicians 
who are present on both channels talk more populist in talk shows than on social 
media. However, our sampling strategy may exclude politicians who do not have 
access to the main political talk shows but instead – or maybe as result – are 
more active and populist on social media. Furthermore, it is possible that politi-
cians who appear in talk shows more often are more populist than the average 
politician is because their populist rhetoric matches well with media logic. How-
ever, we expect this to be similar across countries. Moreover, this would not affect 
our findings with regard to our second hypothesis. Nevertheless, the dominant 
role of the right-wing populist SVP in Switzerland as the largest party and the 
consequential high presence of SVP politicians in Swiss talk shows may partly 
explain the high levels of populism in Switzerland.
It also has to be kept in mind that social media messages – especially Tweets – 
are usually much shorter and condensed than statements in talk shows. Social 
media posts themselves often do not contain much content. Instead, they may in-
clude links to videos, news articles, websites, or other platforms. Thus, it is pos-
sible that the text of a Tweet or Facebook post itself is not populist, but the linked 
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content does contain populist elements. This could not be captured in this investi-
gation, since only the actual content of the posts was coded. Although this study 
deliberately put the focus solely on direct statements by politicians, it would be 
interesting for future research to investigate the shared and linked content as well.
Finally, we are looking at a short period of routine time in 2014. The political 
circumstances in general and specifically with regard to populism have since al-
ready changed quite a bit – especially in the United States but also in the other 
three countries. It would therefore be necessary to investigate how the use of 
populist communication has changed in the meantime. Another important aspect 
for future studies would be to investigate the specific role of populist communica-
tion in election campaigns – especially since we expect the electoral system to in-
fluence the use of populist communication.
To conclude, by taking a communication-centered approach this study shows 
that populist communication is not applied uniformly in the self-presentation of 
politicians across four established democracies, media channels, and party affilia-
tion. It reinforces Cranmer’s (2011) argument that populist communication is 
context dependent and demonstrates that political TV talk shows tend to be spe-
cifically populist communication arenas.
References
Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Reinemann, C., Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C. (Eds.). (2017). Popu-
list political communication in Europe. New York: Routledge.
Abts, K., & Rummens, S. (2007). Populism versus democracy. Political Studies, 55(2), 
405–424.
Akkerman, T. (2011). Friend or foe? Right-wing populism and the popular press in Britain 
and the Netherlands. Journalism, 12(8), 931–945. 
Albertazzi, D. (2008). Switzerland: yet another populist paradise. In D. Albertazzi & D. 
McDonnell (Eds.), Twenty-first century populism: the spectre of Western European 
democracy (pp. 100–118). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2008). Introduction: a new spectre for Western Europe. 
In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), Twenty-first century populism: the spectre of 
Western European democracy (pp. 1–11). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Aslanidis, P. (2016). Is populism an ideology? A refutation and a new perspective. Political 
Studies, 64(suppl 1), 88–104. 
Bakker, R., Catherine de Vries, Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Marks, G.,. . . Vachudo-
va, M. A. (2012). Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey 
trend file, 1999–2010. Party Politics, 21(1), 143–152. 
Bernhard, L. (2016). Left or Right? Populist communication of political parties in recent 
Western European elections. Zürich: NCCR Democracy, Working Paper No. 92. 
 Retrieved from http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/publications/workingpaper/pdf/
wp_92.pdf 
Bode, L., & Vraga, E. K. (2017). Studying politics across media. Political Communication, 
9(2), 1–7. 
Bos, L., & Brants, K. (2014). Populist rhetoric in politics and media: a longitudinal study 
of the Netherlands. European Journal of Communication, 29(6), 703–719.
https://doi.org/10.5771/2192-4007-2018-3-338, am 01.10.2018, 10:11:16
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
360 Studies in Communication and Media, 7. Jg., 3/2018
Full Paper
Bos, L., van der Brug, W., & Vreese, C. de. (2011). How the media shape perceptions of 
right-wing populist leaders. Political Communication, 28(2), 182–206.
Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political 
Studies, 47(1), 2–16.
Chadwick, A. (2013). The hybrid media system: politics and power. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Cranmer, M. (2011). Populist communication and publicity: an empirical study of contex-
tual differences in Switzerland. Swiss Political Science Review, 17(3), 286–307.
Decker, F. (2008). Germany: right-wing populist failures and left-wing successes. In D. 
 Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), Twenty-first century populism: the spectre of West-
ern European democracy (pp. 119–134). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dennison, J., & Goodwin, M. (2015). Immigration, issue ownership and the rise of UKIP. 
Parliamentary Affairs, 68(suppl 1), 168–187. 
Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F., & Büchel, F. (2017). Populism and social media: How 
politicians spread a fragmented ideology. Information, Communication & Society, 
20(8), 1109–1126. 
Engesser, S., Fawzi, N., & Larsson, A. O. (2017). Populist online communication: Introduc-
tion to the special issue. Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1279–1292.
Ernst, N., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Blassnig, S., & Esser, F. (2017). Extreme parties and pop-
ulism: An analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries. Information, Commu-
nication & Society, 13(2), 1–18. 
Ernst, N., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2017). Switzerland: favourable conditions for growing 
populism. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. de Vreese (Eds.), 
Populist political communication in Europe (pp. 1512–164). New York: Routledge.
Esser, F., de Vreese, C., & Hopmann, D. (2017). The explanatory logic: factors that shape 
political news. In C. H. de Vreese, F. Esser, & D. N. Hopmann (Eds.), Comparing polit-
ical journalism (pp. 22–32). London, New York: Routledge.
Esser, F., & Hanitzsch, T. (2012). On the why and how of comparative inquiry in commu-
nication studies. In F. Esser & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), Handbook of comparative commu-
nication research (pp. 3–22). New York, N.Y: Routledge.
Esser, F., Ste  ¸pin ´ ska, A., & Hopmann, D. (2017). Populism and the media: cross-national 
findings and perspectives. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. de 
Vreese (Eds.), Populist political communication in Europe (pp. 365–380). New York: 
Routledge.
Fawzi, N., Obermaier, M., & Reinemann, C. (2017). Germany: is the populism laggard 
catching up? In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. de Vreese (Eds.), 
Populist political communication in Europe (pp. 111–126). New York: Routledge.
Fella, S. (2008). Britain: imperial legacies, institutional constraints and new political op-
portunities. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), Twenty-first century populism: 
the spectre of Western European democracy (pp.  181–197). Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Groshek, J., & Engelbert, J. (2012). Double differentiation in a cross-national comparison 
of populist political movements and online media uses in the United States and the 
Netherlands. New Media & Society, 15(2), 183–202. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/2192-4007-2018-3-338, am 01.10.2018, 10:11:16
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
361
Blassnig/Ernst/Büchel/Engesser | Populist communication in talk shows and social media
Halikiopoulou, D., & Vasilopoulou, S. (2014). Support for the far right in the 2014 Euro-
pean parliament elections: a comparative perspective. The Political Quarterly, 85(3), 
285–288.
Hameleers, M., Bos, L., & Vreese, C. H. de. (2017). Shoot the messenger? The media’s role 
in framing populist attributions of blame. Journalism, 38(1), 1–20.
Hameleers, M., & Schmuck, D. (2017). It’s us against them: a comparative experiment on 
the effects of populist messages communicated via social media. Information, Com-
munication & Society, 20(9), 1425–1444.
Häusler, A., Teubert, H., & Roeser, R. (2013). Die „Alternative für Deutschland“–eine neue 
rechtspopulistische Partei. Materialien und Deutungen zur vertieften Auseinanderset-
zung. [The „Alternative for Germany“ – a new right-wing populist party. Materials and 
interpretations for in-depth discussion.] Düsseldorf: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Nordrhein-
Westfalen.
Hawkins, K. A. (2009). Is Chavez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative 
perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 42(8), 1040–1067.
Hawkins, K. A. (2010). Venezuela’s Chavismo and populism in comparative perspective. 
Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical 
study of political parties‘ discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research, 
46(3), 319–345. 
Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (2009). The cartel party thesis: a restatement. Perspectives on Poli-
tics, 7(4), 753–766. 
Kessler, S. H., & Lachenmaier, C. (2017). Ohne Belege in den Talkshow-Olymp: Belegmus-
ter und Akteure in Polit-Talkshows zur Griechenlandkrise. [Without evidence into the 
talk show Olympus: argumentation patterns and actors in political talk shows on the 
Greek crisis.] Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft, 65(1), 64–82. 
Keyling, T., & Jünger, J. (2013). Facepager. An application for generic data retrieval 
through APIs. Retrieved from https://github.com/strohne/Facepager 
Kriesi, H. (2012). Personalization of national election campaigns. Party Politics, 18(6), 
825–844.
Kriesi, H. (2014). The populist challenge. West European Politics, 37(2), 361–378.
Laclau, E. (2005). On populist reason. London: Verso.
Ladner, A. (2014). Politische Parteien [Political parties]. In P. Knoepfel (Ed.), NZZ Libro. 
Handbuch der Schweizer Politik (5th ed.). Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
Landerer, N. (2013). Rethinking the logics: a conceptual framework for the mediatization 
of politics. Communication Theory, 23(3), 239–258. 
Lee, E.-J. (2013). Effectiveness of politicians’ soft campaign on Twitter versus TV: cognitive 
and experiential routes. Journal of Communication, 63(5), 953–974.
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in 
 thirty-six countries. New Haven Conn. u.a.: Yale Univ. Press.
Linz, J. J. (1990). The perils of presidentialism. Journal of Democracy, 1(1), 51–69.
Mair, P. (2002). Populist democracy vs party democracy. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel (Eds.), 
Democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 81–98). Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Mair, P. (2009). Representative versus responsible government, MPIfG Working Paper 09/8.
https://doi.org/10.5771/2192-4007-2018-3-338, am 01.10.2018, 10:11:16
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
362 Studies in Communication and Media, 7. Jg., 3/2018
Full Paper
Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Populism and the media. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), 
Twenty-first century populism: the spectre of Western European democracy (pp. 49–
64). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mazzoleni, G. (2014). Mediatization and political populism. In F. Esser & J. Strömbäck 
(Eds.), Mediatization of politics: understanding the transformation of Western democ-
racies (pp. 42–56). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mény, Y., & Surel, Y. (2000). Par le peuple, pour le peuple: le populisme et les démocraties. 
[By the people, for the people: populism and democracies.] Paris: Fayard.
Mudde, C. (2004). The populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 542–563.
Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge, UK, New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2012). Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat 
or corrective for democracy? Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wettstein, M., Schulz, A., Wirz, D. S., Engesser, S., & Wirth, W. 
(2017). The polarizing impact of news coverage on populist attitudes in the public: 
Evidence from a panel study in four European democracies. Journal of Communica-
tion, 21(4), 617.
O‘Donell, G. A. (1994). Delegative democracy. Journal of Democracy, 5(1), 55–69.
Pasquino, G. (2008). Populism and democracy. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), 
Twenty-first century populism: the spectre of Western European democracy (pp. 15–
29). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pfetsch, B., & Esser, F. (2012). Comparing political communication. In F. Esser & T. Ha-
nitzsch (Eds.), Handbook of comparative communication research (pp. 25–47). New 
York, N.Y: Routledge.
Powell, G. B. (2000). Elections as instruments of democracy: majoritarian and proportio-
nal visions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Reinemann, C., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C. (2017). Populist po-
litical communication: Toward a model of its causes, forms, and effects. In T. Aalberg, 
F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. de Vreese (Eds.), Populist Political Commu-
nication in Europe (pp. 12–25). New York: Routledge.
Rooduijn, M., & Akkerman, T. (2017). Flank attacks: Populism and left-right radicalism in 
Western Europe. Party Politics, 23(3), 193–204.
Rooduijn, M. (2014a). The nucleus of populism: in search of the lowest common denomi-
nator. Government and Opposition, 49(04), 573–599. 
Rooduijn, M. (2014b). The mesmerising message: the diffusion of populism in public de-
bates in Western European media. Political Studies, 62(4), 726–744. 
Rooduijn, M., De Lange, S. L., & van der Brug, W. (2014). A populist Zeitgeist? Program-
matic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe. Party Politics, 20(4), 563–575.
Schütz, A. (1995). Entertainers, experts, or public servants? Politicians’ self!presentation 
on television talk shows. Political Communication, 12(2), 211–221.
Sheafer, T., Shenhav, S., & Balmas, M. (2014). Political actors as communicators. In C. 
Reinemann (Ed.), Handbooks of Communication Science. Political communication 
(pp. 211–229). Berlin: de Gruyter Mouton.
Stanley, B. (2008). The thin ideology of populism. Journal of Political Ideologies, 13(1), 
95–110.
https://doi.org/10.5771/2192-4007-2018-3-338, am 01.10.2018, 10:11:16
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
363
Blassnig/Ernst/Büchel/Engesser | Populist communication in talk shows and social media
Stanyer, J., Salgado, S., & Strömbäck, J. (2017). Populist actors as communicators or po-
litical actors as populist communicators: cross-national findings and perspectives. In T. 
Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. de Vreese (Eds.), Populist political 
communication in Europe (pp. 353–364). New York: Routledge.
Steenbergen, M. R., & Weber, E. (2015). Populism, ideology, and party politics: prelimi-
nary analyses in space and time. Conference Paper. 8th NCCR Democracy Internal 
Conference, 1–16.
Swanson, D. L., & Mancini, P. (Eds.). (1996). Politics, media, and modern democracy: An 
international study of innovations in electoral campaigning and their consequences. 
Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Taggart, P. (2004). Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe. Journal 
of Political Ideologies, 9(3), 269–288. 
Torre, C. de la. (2015). The promise and perils of populism: global perspectives. Lexing-
ton: The University Press of Kentucky.
Van Kessel, S., & Castelein, R. (2016). Shifting the blame. Populist politicians’ use of Twitter 
as a tool of opposition. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 12(2), 594–614.
Wagschal, U.-P. U., & König, P. (2015). Die Links-Rechts-Positionierung der Parteien bei 
den Bundestagswahlen 2005 bis 2013: Eine empirische Analyse anhand des Wahl-O-
Mat [The left-right positioning of the parties in the Bundestag Elections 2005 to 2013: 
an empirical analysis based on the ‚Wahl-O-Mat‘]. In K.-R. Korte (Ed.), Die Bunde-
stagswahl 2013 (pp. 185–210). Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien.
Ware, A. (2002). The United States: populism as political strategy. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel 
(Eds.), Democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 101–119). London: Palgrave Mac-
millan UK. 
Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a contested concept: populism in the study of Latin Ameri-
can politics. Comparative Politics, 34(1), 1–22. 
Wirth, W., Esser, F., Engesser, S., Wirz, D., Schulz, A., Ernst, N.,. . . Schemer, C. (2016). The 
appeal of populist ideas, strategies and styles: A theoretical model and research design 
for analyzing populist political communication. Zürich: NCCR Democracy, Working 
Paper No. 88, pp. 1–60. Retrieved from http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/publica-
tions/workingpaper/pdf/wp88.pdf 
https://doi.org/10.5771/2192-4007-2018-3-338, am 01.10.2018, 10:11:16
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
 APPENDIX 
137 
D.2  Article II 
Populism in Online Election Coverage: Analyzing Populist Statements by Poli-
ticians, Journalists, and Readers in Three Countries 
 
Sina Blassnig, Nicole Ernst, Florin Büchel, Sven Engesser, & Frank Esser 
 
This article was originally published in: 
[Blassnig, S., Ernst, N., Büchel, F., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2019). Populism in 
Online Election Coverage: Analyzing Populist Statements by Politicians, Journal-
ists, and Readers in Three Countries. Journalism Studies, 20 (8), 1110-1129. DOI: 
10.1080/1461670X.2018.1487802] 
 
POPULISM IN ONLINE ELECTION
COVERAGE
Analyzing populist statements by politicians,
journalists, and readers in three countries
Sina Blassnig, Nicole Ernst, Florin Büchel, Sven Engesser, and
Frank Esser
This article investigates the extent to which populist key messages are distributed via online news
articles and reader comments, as well as how media actors, political actors, and readers employ
populist online communication during election periods. Populism is deﬁned as a thin ideology,
and four dimensions of populist communication are distinguished: people-centrism, anti-elitism,
popular sovereignty, and exclusion. We analyze online news articles and reader comments
during election campaigns in France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. We ﬁnd that
comment sections are more populist than online news articles and that the majority of populist
key messages in online news articles originate from politicians, not from journalists. However,
we further show that compared with straight news items, opinion-oriented stories are more
prone to conveying populist key messages from media actors, whereas straight news favors popu-
lism by political actors. Finally, we investigate how online news media moderate populist key mess-
ages disseminated by political actors.
KEYWORDS content analysis; election campaigns; online news; populism; political communi-
cation; reader comments
Introduction
From the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States to the apparent
electoral defeat of the Front National in the French elections to the entry of the right-wing
populist AfD into the German Parliament, populism and its inﬂuence on election campaigns
has been a major topic in most recent elections in Western democracies. Populism has been
described as being “on the rise” (Kriesi 2014, 361), or even as the current “Zeitgeist” (Mudde
2004). To understand political populism in election campaigns, it is essential to understand
populist political communication (Stanyer, Salgado, and Strömbäck 2017). Political com-
munication is the central mechanism of election campaigns. The mass media—and increas-
ingly the online news media—play a vital role in mediating and moderating the ﬂow of
political communication during election campaigns (e.g. Strömbäck and Kiousis 2014).
Online news media not only enable campaign communication by political actors, they
also offer ways for readers to actively participate in the news cycle, for example, by com-
menting on news articles (e.g. Kalogeropoulos et al. 2017).
Although scholarly awareness of the complex relation between populism and the
mass media has increased, the area of populist online communication has long been
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neglected (Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017). A variety of publications have addressed the
importance of online communication in the political process (i.a. Chadwick 2013; Coleman
and Blumler 2009) and the role of the internet as a public sphere (i.a. Dahlgren 2005; Ger-
hards and Schäfer 2010). However, most have either ignored the concept of populism or
alluded to it only very brieﬂy. More recently, research has started to examine populist com-
munication speciﬁcally in connection with the internet (Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017;
Krämer 2017) or on social media (Engesser et al. 2016; Ernst et al. 2017; Groshek and Engel-
bert 2012; Van Kessel and Castelein 2016). However, as far as we know, no studies so far
have speciﬁcally focused on populism in online news media and attendant user comments.
This is rather remarkable because there is much to suggest that online media provide
speciﬁc opportunity structures for populism (Aalberg and de Vreese 2017; Engesser,
Fawzi, and Larsson 2017; Krämer 2017). Taking a communication-centered approach to
populism (Stanyer, Salgado, and Strömbäck 2017), we therefore address the ﬁrst overarch-
ing question: To what extent are populist key messages distributed via online news articles
and reader comments?
Online news media can take on different roles. First, they can voice or propagate
populist resentments themselves, a role often referred to by the term media populism
(Krämer 2014) or populism by the media (Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017, 367–
369). Second, the media can act as a gatekeeper of populist messages disseminated by
other actors—mostly by politicians. The media can neutrally disseminate, strengthen, or
legitimize the populist messages of other actors, which can be related to populism
through the media (369–371). In contrast, journalists can also oppose and criticize populist
messages or actors and thus attenuate, delegitimize, or warn against them. Furthermore,
online media may open the gates to populist messages created by audience members in
the form of reader comments, which has been referred to as populist citizen journalism
(371). Thus, different actors contribute to the distribution of populist communication in
online news media. These considerations lead to the second guiding question: How do
media actors, political actors, and readers employ populist key messages during election
times?
To address these questions, we conducted a quantitative content analysis of online
news coverage and reader comments on immigration topics during national election cam-
paigns in France (2017), the United Kingdom (2015), and Switzerland (2015). We analyze
differences in the use of populist communication between online news articles and
comment sections (H1), political actors and media actors (H2), as well as opinion-oriented
stories and straight news items (H3). Finally, we investigate how reporters moderate the
populist messages of political actors (RQ1). Thereby, the three countries serve as a compari-
son of contexts (Esser and Vliegenthart 2017).
Deﬁning Populism and Populist Communication
Consistent with much recent research on populism and populist communication, we
conceive of populism as a thin ideology (Abts and Rummens 2007; Kriesi 2014; Mudde 2004;
Stanley 2008; Wirth et al. 2016) or as a set of ideas (Hawkins 2009; Taggart 2000). At the core
of populism lies the normative, moralistic, and Manichean vertical differentiation between
two groups: the ﬁrst is the “corrupt elite,” who are out of touch with the second group, “the
pure people” (Mudde 2004, 543). Furthermore, populism postulates the empowerment and
sovereignty of the people. Finally, these core ideas of populist ideology are dependent on a
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monolithic conception of “the people” as a discrete entity, or as a corporate body that is
capable of having common interests, common desires, and a common will. This implies
that groups who do not share the people’s “good” characteristics, values, or opinions are
perceived as out-groups or as “dangerous ‘others’” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 3).
Thus, populists may exclude speciﬁc segments of the population from the group of “true
people” and see them as a threat or a burden to society (Jagers and Walgrave 2007). In con-
trast to the elites, these out-groups exist not above but rather within the people and are,
thus, subject to horizontal differentiation.
Following this conceptualization, populist ideology consists of four dimensions:
people-centrism, anti-elitism, popular sovereignty, and the exclusion of others. While the
ﬁrst three elements apply to all ideological variants of populism (Mudde 2004), the
fourth element is more closely connected to right-wing populism (which is widespread
in France and Switzerland, two of the countries studied here). Based on these theoretical
dimensions of populism and the existing literature discussing populist communication
(Cranmer 2011; Ernst et al. 2017; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Wirth et al. 2016), 12 populist
key messages are derived and assigned to 1 of the 4 dimensions of populism.
The ﬁrst dimension—people-centrism—consists of four key messages that advocate
for the people. A populist actor can demonstrate his closeness to the people, stress their
virtues, praise their achievements, or describe them as a monolithic group. The second
dimension—anti-elitism—combines three populist key messages that are all conﬂictive
toward the elites. Populist actors discredit or blame the elite and detach the elite from
the people. The third dimension of populism—restoring sovereignty—comprises two key
messages. On the one hand, populist actors may demand the people’s sovereignty. On
the other hand, populist actors can also establish a negative and conﬂictive approach by
denying the sovereignty of the elite. Finally, exclusion contains three conﬂictive key
FIGURE 1
Conceptual model of populist communication
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messages toward speciﬁc social groups. Just as they blame the elite, populist actors may
discredit or blame speciﬁc social groups or exclude them from the people. Figure 1 visual-
izes the relations between the four dimensions of populist communication.
Perspectives on Populism and the Media
Like all political actors, populist actors depend largely on the mass media for their
communication. In turn, the news media tend to welcome the often dramatic and contro-
versial statements of populist actors, as they lead to attention from a larger audience. Thus,
the role of the media is crucial to understanding populist communication as well as the rise
and success of recent populist political actors (Aalberg and de Vreese 2017).
Esser, Stępińska and Hopmann (2017) identify three perspectives with regard to
populism and the media: populism by the media, populism through the media, and popu-
list citizen journalism. The ﬁrst perspective, populism by the media, “refers to media organ-
izations actively engaging in their own kind of populism” (Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann
2017, 367). Thus, the media may themselves construct in- and out-groups, promote hostility
against elites, or appeal to moral sentiments (Mazzoleni 2014). Krämer (2014) has a similar
notion of media populism as populism propagated by the media themselves. This may be
due either to a speciﬁc journalistic ideology or to an increasing popularization of news cov-
erage, which promotes certain stylistic elements. The second perspective, populism through
the media, is focused on the dissemination and strengthening of populist messages by poli-
ticians and other actors. In this way, media outlets provide populists with a platform that
multiplies and magniﬁes their messages. This is based on the notion of “media complicity”;
the assumption that there is a—usually unintentional—convergence of goals between the
“production logic” of commercialized media and that of populist political movements
(Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017, 369; Mazzoleni 2008, 54–55). This perspective
assumes that media logic creates a structure conducive to populist messages and allows
for their seamless—and mostly unconscious—integration into editorial considerations
and news content (Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017). Charismatic, media-savvy
leaders, sharp language, and the often taboo-breaking rhetoric of populist actors perfectly
ﬁt media logic and news values (Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017; Mazzoleni 2008).
Populists may, of course, also anticipate and exploit these traits. Thus, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, the media can provide a favorable platform for populism (Mazzoleni 2014). The
third perspective introduced by Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann (2017, 371) is populist
citizen journalism, which “occurs when media organizations open the gates to populist
messages by audience members—usually in the form of reader comments on their web-
sites.” Comments on online news websites are less constrained than news articles by edi-
torial gatekeeping processes and norms. Hence, while newspapers may formally abstain
from populism in their editorial content, they may allow the dissemination of populist
rhetoric in their comment sections (Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017).
Online News Media as Platforms for Populist Communication
The notion that there is a close relation between populism and online communi-
cation was already highlighted in the late 1990s (Bimber 1998). Both the internet and popu-
lism have been regarded as potential correctives as well as potential threats to democracy
(Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017). Recent literature suggests that the internet has
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particular functions for populist actors (Krämer 2017) and that online media provide speciﬁc
opportunity structures for populist communication logic (Aalberg and de Vreese 2017;
Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017). With regard to online news, the four characteristics dis-
cussed below may foster the potential of populist communication among politicians, jour-
nalists, and readers.
First, with regard to ideological aspects, online media provide political as well as
media actors with more direct connections to the people, which is consistent with popu-
lists’ claims to represent, advocate, and speak on behalf of the people (Engesser, Fawzi,
and Larsson 2017). While these connections are often related to social media, the
hurdles of journalistic gatekeeping are potentially also lower in online news outlets (Wil-
liams and Delli Carpini 2011). Moreover, online news facilitates direct feedback from
readers in the form of likes, shares, and comments, and it is therefore increasingly driven
by readers (Aalberg and de Vreese 2017). Furthermore, online media may provide non-
elite actors with better opportunities to enter the news cycle (Chadwick 2013), a situation
that is closely related to populists’ anti-elitism and their self-presentation as political
outsiders.
A second aspect of online communication that may be favorable for populist com-
munication is the attention economy of the internet (Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017).
This aspect is connected to the above-mentioned assumption that there is compatibility
between media logic and populist communication logic. Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann
(2017) note three aspects of media logic that are especially favorable to the dissemination
of populism: (a) conﬂict framing, (b) strategic framing, and (c) personalization. Conﬂictive
aspects such as negativity against or distrust of political elites, personalization, or a focus
on political strategies have also been associated with interpretative journalism (Djerf-
Pierre and Weibull 2008; Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese 2017). Thus, both attention-
driven as well as interpretative journalism may be beneﬁcial for populist communication.
As it is mostly commercialized media logic that is seen as favorable for populism, it is
thirdly assumed that highly commercialized media, such as commercial broadcasters or
mass-market tabloid newspapers, are especially susceptible to the populist messages of
political actors (Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017; Mazzoleni 2008). This susceptibility
may also apply to online news outlets as high click rates, speed, and an increasing focus
on audience metrics gain in importance. Thus, while the online outlets of traditional
mass media are still dominated by mass media logic, they are also inﬂuenced by network
media logic (Klinger and Svensson 2015). This may render online news media more suscep-
tible than traditional print media to populist messages by political or other actors, as
network media logic has been described as beneﬁcial for populist communication (Enges-
ser et al. 2016; Ernst et al. 2017).
Finally, this commercialization process may be reinforced by soliciting the active par-
ticipation of readers via reader comments (Mazzoleni 2014). Commenting on news articles
is currently one of the most practiced forms of audience participation on news websites
across Western democracies and may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence readers’ perceptions of
public opinion or even change readers’ personal opinions (Lee 2012; Lee and Jang 2010;
Toepﬂ and Piwoni 2015). Depending on the theoretical perspective, comment sections
can take on various functions and logics. While earlier research on reader comments has
focused on deliberative quality, Freelon (2015) suggests a liberal individualist and a commu-
nitarian perspective. According to the former, user comments serve “the single-minded
pursuit of uninhibited self-expression, usually at the expense of civility and responsiveness”
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(Freelon 2015, 774). From a communitarian perspective, comment sections foster collabor-
ation with like-minded others to advance ideologically speciﬁc goals and disengagement
from outsiders (Freelon 2015). Additionally, as Toepﬂ and Piwoni (2015) suggest, the
comment sections of news websites may also act as counterpublic spaces (see also
Downey and Fenton 2003), where readers promote arguments that challenge a perceived
dominant or mainstream public sphere and strengthen a sense of collective identity among
counterpublic commenters. Aspects of all three perspectives are reminiscent of the charac-
teristics of populist communication: the liberalist individualist perspective brings to mind
populists’ emphasis on freedom of expression in opposition to political correctness and
taboos (Mudde 2004). Both the communitarian and counterpublic perspectives imply the
construction of in- and out-groups, the use of “us” vs. “them” rhetoric (Mudde 2004), and
the conception of a people with a closed, collective identity (Abts and Rummens 2007). Fur-
thermore, counterpublic spaces are reminiscent of populist hostility against the establish-
ment, which often includes the mainstream media (Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017).
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Since hardly any literature focuses explicitly on populism in online news so far, we
derive our hypotheses and research questions based on the theoretical considerations out-
lined above as well as existing empirical analyses about populist communication in tra-
ditional media.
The theoretically discussed functions of reader comments as liberal individualist,
communitarian, or counterpublic spaces may foster populist communication in the form
of populist citizen journalism. Furthermore, reader comments are less constrained by edi-
torial gatekeeping processes and norms, and they may be tactically ignored, deleted, or
addressed if necessary (Krämer 2017). Thus, it can be expected that the barriers to publi-
cation for populist messages are lower in comment sections than for the editorial
content of news. This is supported by initial empirical evidence that letters to the editor
are more populist than opinion articles in print newspapers (Rooduijn 2014). As reader com-
ments in online news outlets can be published with less personal effort and fewer editorial
restrictions than letters to the editor, we expect this difference to be even more pro-
nounced for online news outlets. From these considerations follows the ﬁrst hypothesis
on the platform level:
H1: The extent of populist messages is higher in reader comment sections than in news
articles.
Interpretative or opinion-oriented journalism (Umbricht and Esser 2014) may be
especially prone to populist messages. First, columns and editorials provide a platform
for various political actors to voice their opinions in the news media. Second, the
media’s advocative attitude on behalf of the people, as well as its critical stance toward
the political establishment, may be more pronounced in editorials and commentaries
(Djerf-Pierre and Weibull 2008; Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese 2017). Thus, opinion-oriented
stories may offer more space and freedom for populist messages than do straight news
items, where journalistic professional norms such as objectivity apply more strictly.
Finally, opinion-oriented stories may be more prone to conﬂict or strategic framing as
well as personalization, which are seen as beneﬁcial for populist communication (Esser,
Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017). This leads to the second hypothesis on the news item level:
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H2: The extent of populist messages is higher in opinion-oriented stories than in straight
news items.
As described above in the distinction between populism by the media and through
the media, populist communication in news articles may originate from different sources.
While media outlets intentionally construct populist messages themselves rather rarely,
they may often provide a stage for political actors, thereby multiplying and amplifying
their statements. The ideological aspects of online media, such as providing a closer con-
nection to the people, may of course also foster populism by media actors—especially in
online outlets whose owners are politically motivated (Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann
2017). However, with regard to the online outlets of more traditional or commercially
motivated news media, aspects of media logic and commercialization may be more rel-
evant for the proliferation of populist communication. As described above, this may be
especially beneﬁcial to the populist messages of political actors due to their high news
value. Thus, we formulate the third hypothesis on the speaker level:
H3: The extent of populist messages by political actors is greater than the extent of such
messages by media actors.
However, even if populist messages by politicians are cited in news articles, journal-
ists may convey them in different ways. First, they may neutrally disseminate them based
on criteria such as newsworthiness, impartiality, or objectivity. Second, they may scrutinize
or criticize such messages, for example, in an attempt to expose populism as a threat to
democracy or to push back against media criticism by populists (Esser, Stępińska, and
Hopmann 2017). Finally, journalists may also provide a favorable setting for populist mess-
ages by supporting, reinforcing, legitimizing them, or by uttering populist messages them-
selves. As there has not been much empirical research on this, we additionally address this
open research question:
RQ1: How do the online news media moderate populist messages by political speakers?
Method
We conducted a quantitative content analysis of online news coverage and reader
comments on the issue of immigration in online news outlets during national election cam-
paigns in France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland.
Sample
This article looks at national election periods because, ﬁrst, they are prototypical
events in which political communication cultures and strategies crystallize (Esser and
Strömbäck 2012). Second, populism is most likely to manifest itself in the polarized environ-
ment of election campaigns (Plasser and Ulram 2003). Therefore, we included only
countries that hosted national elections between 2015 and 2017, and focused on France,
the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. All three countries hosted rather successful right-
wing populist parties in the last European or national elections. The Front National (FN),
UK Independence Party (UKIP), and Swiss People’s Party (SVP) all stand for a restrictive
migration policy and strong opposition to EU integration, and all three parties are led by
divisive but inﬂuential leading ﬁgures. However, the countries also differ signiﬁcantly in
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their types of political systems and media systems. With regard to political systems, France
has a (semi)presidential democracy with a majoritarian electoral system (majority-plurality),
the United Kingdom a parliamentary democracy with a majoritarian electoral system (ﬁrst-
past-the-post), and Switzerland has a directorial democracy with proportional represen-
tation (Lijphart 1999). With regard to media systems, according to Hallin and Mancini
(2004), France has a polarized-pluralist media system, the United Kingdom a liberal
system, and Switzerland a democratic-corporatist media system. By focusing on these
three Western European countries, this article maximizes the heterogeneity of populist
communication approaches as well as of the political and media contexts found in this
region. This design allows a comparison of relations or contexts that serves as a robustness
check to ascertain whether a relationship holds in various countries (Esser and Vliegenthart
2017).
The study investigates six online news outlets per country, including print-parent, TV-
parent, and pure online outlets (see Table 1). For each country, we selected the online
outlets of two leading up-market daily newspapers, the dominant mass-market daily
paper, and two TV-parent outlets (one public and one private1). Furthermore, we included
the most important pure online outlet in each country.
The period of investigation spans six weeks before the most recent, regular national
elections in the selected countries. For the United Kingdom, these were the national parlia-
mentary elections on May 7, 2015,2 for Switzerland the national parliamentary elections on
October 18, 2015, and for France the presidential elections, with the ﬁrst round on April 23
and the second round on May 7, 2017. Furthermore, the project focuses on the topic of
immigration because this topic seems to have been one of the driving forces of support
for populist parties in Western and Northern Europe (Stanyer, Salgado, and Strömbäck
2017). It is particularly vulnerable to right-wing populist rhetoric and poses a particular chal-
lenge to responsible media coverage.
All material was sampled using a search string consisting of words related to immi-
gration, translated into the three respective languages. To ensure that only articles on immi-
gration related to domestic politics or the election campaigns were included in the sample,
the search strings additionally contained the commonly used abbreviations or labels for
four selected parties per country.3 This article aims to cover a broad political spectrum
within the country and to include both presumed populist and non-populist actors. As pre-
sumed populist parties, the search string included one social democratic, one nationalistic,
TABLE 1
Online news outlets
Country
Switzerland United Kingdom France
Print-parent Up-market Nzz.ch Telegraph.co.uk Leﬁgaro.fr
Tagesanzeiger.ch Theguardian.com Lemonde.fr
Mass-market Blick.ch dailymail.co.uk Leparisien.fr
TV-parent Public Srf.ch Bbc.co.uk Info.france2.fr
Private – News.sky.com Lci.fr
Pure online Watson.ch Hufﬁngtonpost.co.uk tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/
rue89
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and one separatist party from each country. Additionally, as the “control group” of pre-
sumed non-populist parties, the search string also included the respective liberal party
as a fourth party.4
The sampling process followed a so-called user-based sampling approach. This
means that we place the user perspective at the center and incorporate search strategies
into the sampling procedure that are common in the everyday practice of the average inter-
net user. To sample the relevant online news material, we used Google to search for the
speciﬁc news websites, as it is the largest and most popular text-based search engine in
the Western world (e.g. Pan et al. 2007) and a widely used news aggregator (Newman
et al. 2017). To ensure comparability and replicability, we used the same web browser
(Google Chrome) in the “incognito” browsing mode for all searches and disabled the
search history. For each news outlet, we then googled the respective search string,
restricted the search to the respective news website (site: website.com) and the time
frame to the selected 6 weeks, and downloaded the ﬁrst 30 listed news items (the ﬁrst 3
pages).5 Finally, for each news article in the sample (n = 493), the ﬁrst 10 reader com-
ments—that is, the ﬁrst 10 comments, chronologically, that were posted in direct response
to the article6—were sampled (n = 2904). Overall, the sample comprises 493 news articles,
of which 358 have at least one comment.
Operationalization and Coding Procedure
Type of story. The distinction between opinion-oriented stories and straight news
items was coded on the story level based on the genre of the article. Opinion-oriented
stories comprise not only editorials, columns, and commentaries but also interviews, fea-
tures, and interpretative analyses, whereas straight news items are characterized by a
lack of opinionated and interpretive elements (Umbricht and Esser 2014).
Populist key messages. Populist communication is regarded as a formative measure
(Diamantopoulos, Rieﬂer, and Roth 2008) based on the 4 dimensions and the correspond-
ing 12 populist key messages described above. The key messages were operationalized as
dummy variables based on Cranmer (2011), Jagers and Walgrave (2007), and Wirth et al.
(2016). For each category, we coded at the story level whether a given populist key
message was present in an article or comment—regardless of the speaker. Additionally,
a category can be coded more than once if the speaker or the target of the populist key
message changes. As dependent variable, a populism index is calculated, which is
present if at least 1 of the 12 populist key messages is used in a story.
Speaker. For each populist key message, we coded whether the speaker is a political
actor, a media actor, a citizen, or another actor. A speaker is an actor who is quoted in the
story either directly or indirectly. If the journalist herself makes a populist statement, the
speaker was coded as a media actor.
Moderation. In the event that there is a populist key message in a story or reader
comment, we coded whether the author (i) disseminates the message neutrally, (ii) expli-
citly attenuates or criticizes the message, (iii) provides a favorable context for the
message that helps to support, reinforce, or legitimize it, or (iv) whether the author
utters populist key messages himself.
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Several steps were taken to ensure inter-coder reliability. First, a team of 10 coders
who are proﬁcient in at least two of the three languages (German, English, and French)
received an intensive ﬁve-day coder training. In a second step, we conducted several
pre-tests, based on which some variable descriptions and deﬁnitions were revised and dis-
cussed in an additional coder training session. In a third and ﬁnal step, we formally tested
the inter-coder reliability based on English-language material (31 online news articles and
30 reader comments, n = 61). As reliability measures, we report Fretwurst’s (2015a, 2015b)
standardized S-Lotus as well as Brennan and Prediger’s (1981) Kappa.7 Overall, the coding
performance of all variable groups achieved satisfactory inter-coder reliability scores. The
average S-Lotus across all key messages is .84 and the average Brennan and Prediger’s
Kappa is .75. For the two speaker types (political speaker and media speaker), the
average S-Lotus is .87 and Brennan and Prediger’s Kappa is .79. Finally, moderation displays
an S-Lotus of .80, and a Brennan and Prediger’s Kappa of .82.
Findings
Overall, 65 percent (n = 319) of all articles and 34 percent (n = 991) of all individual
comments contain at least one populist key message. In both, articles and comments, state-
ments related to the anti-elitism dimension are most common, followed by people-centrist
and exclusionist statements, while sovereignty is the least frequently used dimension.
H1 predicts that reader comments are more susceptible to populist communication
than are news articles. To compare news articles and reader comments as equal units of
analysis, we aggregate the comments on the article level. In other words, we compare
the news articles with their associated comment sections in terms of their populism
content. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows that H1 is supported (F(1, 851) =
57.17, p < .001, η2= .063). As predicted, the extent of populism is signiﬁcantly higher in
comment sections (M = .87, SD = .34) than in online news (M = .65, SD = .48). This means
that 65 percent of all articles, compared to 87 percent of all comment sections, contain
at least one populist statement. A two-way ANOVA, in which we additionally include a
country variable, shows that both the main effects of comment sections (F(1, 851) =
71.68, p < .001, η2 = .078) and the country (F(1, 851) = 19.51, p < .001, η2 = .044), as well as
their interaction, are signiﬁcant (F(1, 851) = 11.66, p < .001, η2 = .027). Both factors together
explain 14 percent of variance in the populism dummy variable (R2 = .14). Simple effects
analysis using marginal means further conﬁrms that comment sections are signiﬁcantly
more populist than news articles across all three countries (see Table 2).
TABLE 2
Estimated means of populism index: comparison of country by comment/article
CH FR UK
n = 485 n = 543 n = 670
M SD M SD M SD
News articles (n = 493) .43a .49 .68b .47 .81c .40
Comments (n = 358) .87d .34 .84d .37 .94d .24
Notes: N = 851. Two-factor variance analysis (post hoc test: estimated marginal means (country by
platform)). Groups with different identiﬁcation letters (a, b, c, d) are signiﬁcantly different at the 0.5
percent level.
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Furthermore, while there are no country differences with regard to populism in reader
comments, the extent of populism in news articles differs signiﬁcantly across the three
countries (see Table 2). The share of articles with populist key messages is highest in the
United Kingdom, followed by France, and lowest in Switzerland. Possible reasons for these
differences are elaborated in the discussion. Interestingly, the reactions of readers are
almost identical in the three countries: everywhere, election news stories on immigration
trigger reactions particularly from those readers who wish to make populist comments
(the country shares of “citizen populism” vary in these cases between .84 and .94).
H2 expects the extent of populism to be higher in opinion-oriented stories than in
straight news items. Overall, this hypothesis is not supported (F(1, 493) = 3.14, p = .077).
Populism tends to be higher in opinion-oriented stories (M = .70, SD = .46) than in straight
news items (M = .62, SD = .49), but the difference is slightly below generally agreed levels of
signiﬁcance. This can partly be explained by the different types of speakers expressing
populist messages. Supporting our hypothesis, populism by journalists is signiﬁcantly
higher in opinion-oriented stories (M = .36, SD = .48) than in straight news items (M = .14,
SD = .35) (F(1, 493) = 33.43, p < .001, η2= .06). This tendency can be shown across all
three countries, although the difference is not signiﬁcant in France.8 In contrast, populism
by political actors is signiﬁcantly higher in straight news items (M = .47, SD = .50) than in
opinion-oriented stories (M = .38, SD = .48) (F(1, 492) = 5.07, p < .05, η2 = .01). Looking at
the countries separately, this only holds true for the United Kingdom, while there are no
signiﬁcant differences between opinion-oriented stories and straight news with regard to
political actors in Switzerland and France.9 Thus, H2 can only be conﬁrmed for populist
communication by media speakers, while populism by political speakers tends to be
higher in straight news items. Formulated differently—and similar across all three
countries—while populist messages by political actors clearly dominate in straight news
items, opinion-oriented stories contain similar levels for both speaker types (see Figure 2).
The ﬁndings for H2 indicate that there is a difference between populist communi-
cation by political actors and media actors. This assumption is also the basis for H3,
which postulates that the share of articles with populist messages by politicians is higher
than the share of articles with populist messages by media actors. A one-sample t-test
(t(1, 493) = 7.52, p < .001) comparing the mean difference between the speaker types (M
= .23, SD = .68) against zero conﬁrms that, in fact, there are more stories with populist
key messages by political speakers (M = .44, SD = .50) than by media speakers (M = .21,
SD = .41).10 Hence, H3 is supported. A look at the inter-country comparison shows that in
the United Kingdom, it is mainly statements by politicians that lead to high proportions
of populism in election news, whereas in France, it is more often statements made by
the journalists themselves. Switzerland has the lowest proportion of populism in election
news (as shown in Table 2) and occupies a middle position with regard to political and
media sources.11
After evaluating our hypotheses, it is insightful to compare the four dimensions of
populist communication across the three speaker types: political actors, media actors,
and citizens. The results in Figure 3 underscore that across all three countries, the extent
of populism by citizens (in comment sections) is higher than the extent of populism by pol-
itical actors and that populism by media sources occurs least often. Furthermore, Figure 3
shows that for all three speaker types and all three countries, anti-elitism is clearly more
common than people-centrism or exclusion. By contrast, demands to restore popular sover-
eignty occur very rarely. It is also obvious that there is something akin to a transnational
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agreement among media professionals to hold back any exclusionist rhetoric, whereas citi-
zens are much more inclined to make exclusionist statements in their comments (30
percent in the United Kingdom and roughly 10 percent in France and Switzerland).
FIGURE 2
Comparison of speakers between opinion-oriented stories and straight news items
FIGURE 3
Dimensions of populist communication across speakers and countries
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Figure 3 presents French journalists as the least restrained—compared to their British or
Swiss colleagues—with regard to uttering populist messages themselves; this ﬁnding sup-
ports our earlier results regarding H3. Finally, British journalists distinguish themselves by
being the most generous in granting speaking opportunities to populist politicians.
While across all three countries, the majority of populist key messages in online elec-
tion news stories consistently originate from political actors, the contribution of journalists
remains a fact. As articulated in RQ1, journalists also play an important role as gatekeepers
and interpreters of populist messages from other sources. To explore RQ1, we focus only on
articles in which journalists have included at least one populist statement by a political
actor (n = 211). A descriptive analysis indicates that in most cases, journalists disseminate
populist statements by political actors neutrally (n = 186, 86.9 percent). This means that
in these articles, the reporter puts populist messages in a context that is neither explicitly
positive nor negative. However, approximately one-tenth of articles containing populist
messages by political actors (n = 24, 11.2 percent) provide a favorable setting. This may
mean that the journalist either explicitly endorses, defends, or legitimizes a populist state-
ment by a politician or that the reporter expresses a populist statement herself. In contrast,
journalists in our sample only very rarely explicitly attenuate or openly criticize populist
messages by politicians (n = 4, 1.9 percent). Again, this pattern can be found similarly
across all three countries.
Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of this article was to investigate, ﬁrst, the extent to which populist messages
are distributed via online news articles and reader comments and, second, how media
actors, political actors, and readers employ populist online communication during election
campaigns. We show that during election periods in France, the United Kingdom, and Swit-
zerland, reader comment sections are more populist than online news articles. Further-
more, the majority of populism in online news articles originates from political actors.
However, more than a third of opinion-oriented stories in our sample contain people-cen-
trist, anti-elitist, or exclusionist messages from journalists. Moreover, every 10th article con-
taining populist messages from politicians provides a rather benevolent platform for them,
while only 5 percent of articles explicitly criticize such messages. Thus, we provide initial
empirical evidence for the distinction of populism by the media, through the media, and
by citizens (Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017), as well as evidence of the different
roles of these pathways in the dissemination of populist online communication.
Overall, we ﬁnd populist communication to be quite high in comparison to previous
content analyses of populist communication (Engesser et al. 2017; Hameleers, Bos, and de
Vreese 2017), as 65 percent of all articles and 87 percent of all accompanying comment sec-
tions in our sample contain at least one populist key message. On the one hand, this may
reﬂect an increase in populism in political communication during the last few years and
may provide evidence for a populist “Zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004). On the other hand, these
high levels should be interpreted with caution against the background of our sampling
strategy, which provides a “burning glass” perspective. This means that we investigate
populist communication under most-likely conditions: this study focuses on online
media, national election periods, and the topic of immigration, all of which have been
described in the literature as favorable opportunity structures for populist communication.
Furthermore, we focus on three countries where populist parties have been very successful
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recently. However, in this regard, the high levels of populism found here can also be inter-
preted as empirical evidence that the combination of these contextual factors is highly ben-
eﬁcial for populist communication.
Moreover, there are differences across the four dimensions of populism analyzed
here. Across all countries and speakers, anti-elitism is particularly salient, followed by
people-centrism. The blaming, discrediting, or exclusion of speciﬁc social groups, in con-
trast, occurs noticeably less often. Key messages proclaiming or defending the people’s
sovereignty are almost absent. This is in line with earlier research (Ernst et al. 2017; Hamel-
eers, Bos, and de Vreese 2017) and indicates that it is socially more acceptable to blame
powerful elites than powerless societal out-groups such as refugees (Hameleers, Bos, and
de Vreese 2017). Remarkably, this is different for political actors in Switzerland, who use
exclusionist messages more often than people-centrist ones. This may be attributed to
the fact that the right-wing populist Swiss People’s Party has become the country’s strongest
party since 1999 and, as such, has made immigration restrictions and exclusionist rhetoric
socially acceptable (Ernst, Engesser, and Esser 2017).
As one of the ﬁrst studies of this topic, this article provides empirical evidence for the
phenomenon of populist citizen journalism in the form of reader comments. We demon-
strate that, in fact, reader comment sections are more prone to populist communication
than are news articles. Reader comments not only blame or discredit the elite more
often; they also contain more people-centrist and exclusionist messages. Especially with
regard to the exclusion of speciﬁc social groups, these higher levels may be due to
lower barriers and editorial control, which allow controversial, uncivil, or even racist com-
ments. Overall, our ﬁndings indicate that citizens may substantially contribute to the disse-
mination of populist messages on online news platforms and provide fertile ground for
people-centrist, anti-elitist, and exclusionist messages by politicians or journalists in articles.
With regard to the relationship between online media and populism, our study pro-
vides further empirical evidence for the distinction between populism by the media and
populism through the media (Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017). Our results show
that while populism in straight news mainly originates from political actors, journalists
are more populist in opinion-oriented formats such as columns, editorials, or commentaries.
Thus, populism by the media is mainly constrained to opinion-oriented stories, while popu-
lism through the media is also widespread in straight news. These ﬁndings assert that these
are two different aspects of populism in online news that need to be distinguished.
The results also conﬁrm theoretical assumptions and earlier empirical ﬁndings
(Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese 2017) that populism by the media is less common than
populism through the media. As our results show, the majority of populism in online
news results from the dissemination of populist messages by political actors. As discussed
theoretically, this may be fostered by the attention economy, the increased commercializa-
tion of the media, as well as the mix of mass media logic and network media logic found in
online news. Populist messages are often controversial and of high news value, which
promises high click rates and a high resonance in comment sections or on social media
platforms. This may be especially pronounced during election campaigns, when the
news media speciﬁcally focus on parties and politicians. Thus, while journalists are less
likely to voice populist statements themselves, they are highly willing to disseminate
such messages voiced by political actors.
This leads to the question of how journalists treat populist messages voiced by poli-
ticians. On the one hand, they act as gatekeepers who decide which statements to include
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in an article. On the other hand, they also act as interpreters by moderating, discussing, or
commenting on populist statements. However, in our sample, the majority of articles
provide a mostly impartial platform for populist messages by distributing them without
any explicit attenuation or ampliﬁcation by the author. This indicates that populism
through the media should not be dismissed as less relevant than populism by the
media. However, our operationalization only includes explicit moderation by journalists
themselves. More often, journalists may provide implicit criticism by quoting opportune
sources. Furthermore, we only assess moderation at the story level and not for each popu-
list statement individually. Therefore, further research is needed that investigates how jour-
nalists moderate populist statements in a more ﬁne-grained manner. Nevertheless, our
study provides initial evidence that online news media rarely explicitly condemn or criticize
populism by political actors during election times.
Overall, these ﬁndings can be mostly corroborated across the three investigated
countries. However, some country differences need to be addressed. Most notably, populist
key messages are overall more prominent in British newspapers than in France or Switzer-
land. As we show, this is mostly due to populist statements by political actors that are cited
in British news, whereas in France populist key messages by journalists are more common
than in the other two countries. The reasons for these different shares of populism in online
news may be found in the national campaign context, national media system context, or in
more situational factors such as a higher salience of immigration topics in the United
Kingdom (Dalmus, Hänggli, and Bernhard 2017) and a strong issue ownership of this
topic by UKIP (Dennison and Goodwin 2015). However, the differences may also be due
to the sample of news outlets, as The Telegraph and the Daily Mail have a greater proximity
to populist parties (mostly UKIP) than the selected newspapers in France and Switzerland.
This study has some additional limitations thatmust be considered. Our sample is con-
strained to election campaigns as well as to the topic of immigration. As discussed above,
these selection criteria are based on theoretical considerations. However, it would be inter-
esting to investigatewhether our ﬁndings hold true for routine periods or other topics. More-
over, our study is limited to three countries. While France, the United Kingdom, and
Switzerland provide fruitful cases as well as a certain range of different contextual factors
with which to test our hypotheses, the ﬁndings are based on a limited sample from which
generalizations can only be drawn with care. Furthermore, the countries under investigation
are mostly known for right-wing populism (although we also examine left-wing and centrist
parties in each country). In sum, we call upon future researchers to compare election times to
routine periods and to consider countries with strong left-wing populist parties.
In conclusion, this article advances research on populist communication in several
ways: First, it answers calls in the literature to analyze the role of online populism by speciﬁ-
cally focusing on online news platforms and reader comments. Second, it corroborates—
across three countries—that reader comments play a crucial role in the dissemination of
populist online communication. Third, it reveals differences in the use of populist online com-
munication by political and media actors and, thus, contributes to the distinction between
populism by themedia and through themedia. Finally, it indicates that themajority of popu-
lism in online news on the topic of immigration stems frompolitical sources and that journal-
ists rarely mitigate or criticize these statements. The next steps for future research would be,
on the one hand, to investigate in more detail how journalists moderate politicians’ populist
messages, and, on the other hand, to investigate whether populism in reader comments is
inﬂuenced by characteristics of the article or other context factors.
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NOTES
1. In Switzerland, private broadcasters exist only at the regional and local levels. Further-
more, the existing ones do not publish news on their websites. For lack of a functional
equivalent, we therefore decided not to sample this category for Switzerland.
2. The United Kingdom held an additional election in 2017. However, since this was not a
regular ﬁxed-term election but set between the usual ﬁve-year intervals, we chose the
2015 election for reasons of comparability.
3. Switzerland: Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP), Sozialdemokratische Partei (SP), Lega dei Tici-
nesi (Lega), and Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP); United Kingdom: Labour, Scottish
National Party (SNP), Liberal Democrats (LibDems); France: Front National (FN), Parti Socia-
liste (PS), Corsica Libera, and Parti Liberal Démocrate (PLD). The party lists are only used for
the sampling procedure. In the analysis, populist statements are incorporated regardless
of who their speaker is.
4. The search strings for the three different countries were as follows:
Switzerland: migration OR immigration OR zuwanderung OR ﬂüchtling OR ausländer OR
asyl OR einbürgerung OR ausschaffung “SVP” OR “SP” OR “Lega” OR “FDP”
United Kingdom: migration OR immigration OR refugee OR foreigner OR asylum OR
naturalisation OR deportation Labour OR “Scottish National Party” OR SNP OR “Liberal
Democrats” OR “Lib Dems”
France: migration OR immigration OR réfugié OR étranger OR asile OR naturalisation OR
expuls OR reconduite “Front National” OR “FN” OR “Parti socialiste” OR “PS” OR “Corsica
Libera” OR “Parti libéral démocrate” OR “PLD”
5. According to earlier research (e.g. Spink and Jansen 2005), the majority of search engine
users will only review search results on the ﬁrst three result pages (assuming there are 10
search results per page by default).
6. For some news outlets, it was not possible to change the order of the reader comments.
In these outlets (Le Figaro, Le Monde, Le Parisien, Rue89, Blick, SRF, and Watson), the 10
newest reader comments were selected for the sample.
7. While the unstandardized Lotus can be directly interpreted and represents the percen-
tage agreement of coders with the category most used by all coders, the standardized
Lotus is a chance-corrected version that also takes the number of categories used by
coders into account (Fretwurst 2015a, 2015b). For a good summary of Lotus’s advantages
and an example of its application for international comparative content analysis, see also
Hopmann, Esser, and de Vreese (2016). Furthermore, Brennan and Prediger’s (1981)
Kappa is more robust in assessing reliability of rare categories—as is the case with popu-
list key messages—than Krippendorff’s alpha and Cohen’s kappa (see Quarfoot and
Levine 2016).
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8. The mean difference in populist messages from media speakers between opinion-
oriented stories and straight news in the United Kingdom is .38 (p < .001), in Switzerland
.16 (p < .05), and in France .10 (n.s.).
9. British straight news contains more populist messages by politicians than do British
opinion-oriented stories, with a mean difference of .33 (indicating a surplus of populist
messages by politicians in straight news), while the mean differences for France (−.05)
and Switzerland (−.02) indicate that there are no differences between story types.
10. Since an article can contain populist messages from both political andmedia speakers, an
ANOVA could not be conducted to evaluate this hypothesis. Therefore, a one-sample t-
test comparing the mean difference between the share of political andmedia speakers to
zero was calculated instead.
11. The mean difference between populist messages from political and media speakers in
the United Kingdom is .42 (indicating a considerable surplus of politics-induced populism
in news articles), whereas in France, the mean difference is just .07 (indicating the lack of
any such surplus). The mean difference for Switzerland is .17.
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Populism and social media popularity 
How populist communication benefits political leaders on 
Facebook and Twitter 
Sina Blassnig, Nicole Ernst, Sven Engesser, and Frank Esser 
Abstract 
Research has shown that social media is a particularly well-suited channel for distributing 
populist messages. However, the literature has yet to examine the kinds of reactions that 
populist messages trigger in social media and whether populist leaders garner more online 
support than political leaders who do not promote populist views or communicate in a 
populist manner. This chapter addresses these questions. This chapter defines populist 
communication, reviews recent research findings, and describes the results of an analysis of 
Facebook posts and tweets of 36 political leaders in six countries. 
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“Without the tweets, I wouldn’t be here,” Donald Trump told Financial Times journalists in 
the Oval Office on April 2, 2017. Claiming over 100 million Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram followers, he added, “I don’t have to go to the fake media.” 
President Trump’s open disdain for the established, traditional news media has been a 
recurring theme in his prolific social media output. Commentators readily label him a 
populist. But what exactly defines political leaders and parties as populist? And how is it that 
social media seem to have dealt them such a good hand? 
Research has shown that social media is a particularly well-suited channel for 
distributing populist messages (Ernst et al. 2017; Groshek and Engelbert 2012; Stier et al. 
2017). But do populist actors also garner more support on the internet than politicians who do 
not represent populist views or communicate in a populist way? If so, what will the political 
landscape look like if typically non-populist politicians compete by sending populist 
messages on social media? 
In this chapter we address these questions. We set out a definition of populism that 
now has wide currency in the academic world. We describe a framework that allows 
populism to be measured in social media messages, and we review recent research. We 
describe what we learned when we analyzed the tweets and Facebook posts of 36 diverse 
political leaders in six countries over a three-month period. Finally, we consider the potential 
impact of populism on liberal democracies in the new-media world. 
What is populism? 
For decades, populism was viewed as a “notoriously vague term” (Canovan 1999). It has 
been variously defined as an ideology, a political strategy, a style, or a discourse (Hawkins 
2010; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Laclau 2005; Mudde 2004; Weyland 2017). 
However, in the last few years scholars have increasingly come to a consensus in 
regarding populism as a “thin ideology” (Abts and Rummens 2007; Mudde 2004; Stanley 
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2008; Taggart 2000), as politicians can combine it with different ideological positions from 
the left to the right. 
This thin populist ideology assumes a simplistic dichotomy between the pure, good 
people and a corrupt, aloof elite; and it demands that politics should be an expression of the 
unrestrained popular will. Populists present themselves as the only true representatives of the 
supposedly unheard public interests. Their ideology has three core dimensions: people-
centrism, anti-elitism, and restoring sovereignty (e.g., Mény and Surel 2002). 
What is populist communication? 
How do we tell how populist someone is? Here we follow a “communication-centered 
approach” (Stanyer, Salgado, and Strömbäck 2017). This means that we study political 
leaders across the political spectrum and infer how populist each of them is, based on how 
often he or she uses a set of populist key messages. Building on the existing literature (Bos, 
van der Brug, and Vreese 2011; Cranmer 2011; Jagers and Walgrave 2007), nine populist 
key messages have been defined that can be assigned to the three core dimensions of 
populism (Wirth et al. 2016). Listed below, these key messages in political leaders’ 
statements are seen as expressions of populist ideology (Ernst et al. 2017). 
People-centrism, the first dimension, contains four key messages that advocate for the 
people. A politician can demonstrate that he or she is close to the people, stress their virtues, 
praise their achievements, or describe them as a homogenous group. 
Anti-elitism, the second dimension, combines three hostile key messages towards the 
elite: discrediting them, blaming them, or emphasizing their detachment from the people. 
Restoring sovereignty, the third dimension, is characterized by two key messages: 
advocating for the people’s sovereignty, or denying that of the elite. 
Populist political leaders on social media 
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Social media play a major role in the way all political leaders come across in a hybrid media 
system (Chadwick 2017). But, according to recent research, social media can particularly 
assist populist leaders or communication (Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017; Ernst et al. 
2017). 
Why is this? Firstly, politicians can communicate directly with the people, bypassing 
traditional gatekeepers such as journalists. Secondly, social media allow them to engage 
more closely with their followers and to come over as highly approachable. Thirdly, they can 
adopt a more personalized and emotionalized approach: they can share photos of their 
personal life and offer a look behind the scenes (see also Remillard in this volume on 
Trudeau’s personalized use of Instagram). Finally, social media make it easier for political 
leaders to connect with specific target groups, like-minded people, or “kindred souls” (Jacobs 
and Spierings 2016) who share their political ideology. This, for example, lets populists use 
harsh words to attack a common enemy without being subjected to criticism from political 
opponents or critical observers (Engesser et al. 2017). 
Despite these close theoretical connections, researchers have only recently started to 
examine populism with regard to social media. Most studies up to now focus on politicians 
who are already identified as populists. This is what Stanyer, Salgado, and Strömbäck (2017) 
call an “actor-centered approach.” An early study by Groshek and Engelbert (2012) showed 
that leaders of the Dutch Party for Freedom and the US Tea Party Patriots (TPP) used social 
media for the typical populist strategy of “double differentiation” (Kriesi 2014). This means 
that they simultaneously distanced themselves from the political establishment as well as 
from extremist groups. 
In a similar vein, Van Kessel and Castelein (2016) concluded that Dutch populist 
leaders used Twitter as an adversarial tool of opposition. Focusing on populist leaders in 
Latin America, Waisbord and Amado (2017) found that Twitter had not led to more dialogue 
between presidents and the public. Instead, they used the platform strategically to influence 
the news and public agenda. Like Dutch and American populist leaders, Latin American 
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presidents also used Twitter to attack elites, and specifically journalists and the traditional 
news media. Other actor-centered studies have investigated who follows or supports 
populists on social media. Bartlett, Birdwell, and Littler (2011) and Heiss and Matthes (2017) 
came to similar conclusions that the average online supporter of populist politicians or parties 
was male and less educated. He displayed low levels of political trust but was highly 
motivated to participate in political discussions or activities. 
Communication-centered studies that examine how a broad range of politicians use 
specific populist communication elements on social media are less common so far. Two 
earlier studies by ourselves (Engesser et al. 2017; Ernst et al. 2017) reinforce the assumption 
that social media are particularly well suited to spread populist ideology. They also show that 
the different elements of populist communication are communicated in a rather fragmented 
way on Facebook and Twitter. Politicians from extreme parties (both right-wing and left-
wing) and opposition parties use more populist key messages. Furthermore, populist 
communication is more common on Facebook than on Twitter. 
While we focused on the content of populist key messages, Bracciale and Martella 
(2017) analyzed the populist communication style of Italian political leaders. They showed 
that a specific style was linked to populist content. This mostly reflected the leader’s political 
communication style and was less influenced by the political divide between left and right. 
This led to different combinations or nuances of populist styles. 
Finally, there are studies that have investigated how populist communication on 
social media affects the populist attitudes of citizens (Hameleers and Schmuck 2017); or how 
citizens perceive populists’ profiles and messages on social media (Enli and Rosenberg 
2018). Interestingly, populist politicians come across as more authentic on social media than 
traditional politicians do, according to the study by Enli and Rosenberg (2018). Overall, the 
summarized studies support the theoretical assumptions that populists, as well as populist 
communication, have an affinity with social media. 
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Populism and social media popularity cues 
While populism seems very compatible with social media, it is less well understood how 
populist communication affects the popularity or reach of social media messages. 
Social media work to a distinctly different logic from that of traditional mass media 
(Klinger and Svensson 2015; Mills 2012). When users like or share politicians’ tweets or 
Facebook posts, they help them to reach a wider audience beyond their direct followers and 
friends. This can be related to Vaccari and Valeriani’s (2015) distinction between a primary 
and a secondary audience as well as to the model of a two-step flow of communication (Katz 
and Lazarsfeld 1955). Additionally, popularity on social media may win politicians more 
attention in traditional news media (Fürst and Oehmer 2018; Chadwick 2017). Consequently, 
political leaders have an incentive to post or tweet messages that they expect to elicit a lot of 
likes and shares. 
In this chapter, following Porten-Cheé et al. (2018), we refer to user reactions such as 
likes, shares, favorites, and retweets as popularity cues, and interpret them as indicators of 
attention, relevance, or endorsement of social media messages. As such, we expect that 
specific characteristics of a message such as, for example, the occurrence of populist key 
messages, may have a positive influence on the number of likes and shares a Facebook post 
or tweet gets. 
In general, there is not much research yet on which aspects of politicians’ 
communication lead to higher numbers of popularity cues. However, amid a growing body of 
research on populism and social media, Bobba (2018) has conducted one of the few such 
studies. Examining the Facebook activity of Italy’s populist Lega Nord and its leader, Matteo 
Salvini, Bobba’s findings suggest that populist Facebook posts receive more likes than non-
populist posts. Focusing on Switzerland, Keller and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2018) 
concluded that how successful politicians were on social media depended on their personal 
background, political activity, and media coverage, as well as their followership and the 
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platform. Focusing on characteristics of individual messages, two studies by Bene (2017a, 
2017b), based on Hungarian election campaigns, found that emotionally negative Facebook 
posts received more likes. A study by Heiss, Schmuck, and Matthes (2018) in Austria also 
found that negative content and emotional language increased user reactions, but positive 
emotional expressions had a stronger impact on user engagement than negative ones. 
Testing the theory: our own study 
From here on in this chapter, we build on these initial studies and try to expand their findings 
by investigating the relationship between populist communication and popularity cues across 
different social media platforms (Twitter and Facebook), a wide spectrum of politicians, and 
several countries. 
There are various reasons to expect that populist key messages could engender more 
popularity cues. Firstly, populism can motivate marginalized social groups to participate in 
political action (Jansen 2011). This could especially apply to social media popularity cues: 
liking or sharing a political message requires little resource or effort. Secondly, populism is 
often attributed a high news value or a high compatibility with the logic of news media 
(Mazzoleni 2008). As Trilling, Tolochko, and Burscher (2016) show, what renders a message 
newsworthy may also contribute to its social media shareworthiness. Thirdly, the studies 
described above empirically support the theory that populist content, or communication 
styles often associated with populism (emotionalization, negativity, and personalization), 
make Facebook posts more likely to be shared, liked, or commented on. Hence, we expect 
political leaders to receive higher numbers of popularity cues when they communicate 
populist key messages. 
While we expect to find similar effects across the countries we study, we anticipate 
differences between social media platforms and different types of politicians. Firstly, we 
expect that populist communication would have a stronger positive effect on popularity cues 
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on Facebook than on Twitter. The two platforms have different user demographics and serve 
different purposes for political leaders’ communication. Furthermore, results of our earlier 
study (Ernst et al. 2017) indicated that politicians’ Facebook content is more populist than 
that of their tweets. Secondly, we expect that leaders of political parties that are typically 
labeled as “populist” in the scientific literature would be more successful on social media and 
that they could also profit more from communicating populist key messages. We expect that 
politicians typically known as “populist” – for example, Nigel Farage or Marine Le Pen – 
also communicate in a more populist way on social media. Likewise, we assume that their 
followers or supporters on Facebook and Twitter also have more populist attitudes and 
therefore may be more inclined to like or share populist posts or tweets (Müller et al. 2017). 
How we did it: method and data 
To investigate the research questions and formulated expectations, we analyzed the content 
of Facebook posts and tweets by 36 political leaders from six countries – Switzerland (CH), 
Germany (DE), the United States (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), Italy (IT), and France 
(FR) – during three politically routine months from September to November 2015 without 
any election campaigns.1 
For each country, we selected the leaders of the four largest parties in parliament 
across the left–right spectrum that could be assigned to the following categories: social 
democratic, economic liberal, conservative/Christian democratic, and green, as well as those 
of the most influential party commonly classified as populist in the scientific literature.2 We 
defined political leaders as the politicians who held the highest position in the party hierarchy 
and/or country (party leader and/or head of government) in 2015. Based on these criteria, we 
investigated the verified Facebook and Twitter profiles of 36 political leaders. Our sample 
included political leaders of six parties that we identified as typically populist beforehand: 
Toni Brunner, Swiss People’s Party (SVP/CH); Frauke Petry, Alternative for Germany (AfD/ 
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DE); Marine Le Pen, Front National (FN/FR); Beppe Grillo, Five Star Movement (5S/IT); 
Nigel Farage, UK Independence Party (UKIP/UK); and Sarah Palin, Tea Party Patriots 
(TPP/USA). 
We used Facepager (Jünger and Keyling 2013) to download all Facebook posts and 
tweets, including the number of popularity cues. We coded only tweets and Facebook posts 
in which a politician made an explicit statement on an issue or a target actor. The final 
sample included 345 Facebook posts and 221 tweets (N = 566). 
Our dependent variable – social media popularity cues – was measured as the sum of 
likes and shares on Facebook, and the sum of favorites and retweets on Twitter. Additionally, 
we coded whether a social media message contained populist communication based on the 
nine key messages described above. For each populist key message, we coded whether it was 
present in a social media statement or not. The nine populist key messages were 
operationalized using a broad range of categories that are rooted in theory and build on 
existing empirical studies. (For more details, see Ernst et al. 2017 and Wirth et al. 2016.) 
The material was coded by a team of intensively trained student coders, which 
reached acceptable levels of reliability. The average Brennan and Prediger’s kappa across all 
populist key messages is .83. For a more detailed description of the methodological 
approach, see our previous study: Ernst et al. (2017). 
Table 7.1 shows how the data were calculated, alongside a detailed account of the 
method and statistical analysis. 
In brief, for each tweet and Facebook post, we counted popularity cues: Facebook 
likes and shares, and Twitter favorites and retweets. We also calculated whether at least one 
of the nine populist key messages was present in any post/tweet, and what proportion of 
tweets/posts per politician contained at least one populist message. We differentiated male 
from female politicians. We also took account of whether each subject’s party was in 
government or opposition; and whether the party was typically classified as populist. We 
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additionally took into account the general profile reach, counting how many Facebook page 
likes or Twitter followers a politician had. 
What we found 
Political leaders in our sample received on average 2,649 popularity cues in response to each 
social media post. However, the numbers varied considerably. Most posts got few user 
reactions, while a small number got an exceptionally large response. Twenty-two posts were 
not liked, shared, favorited, or retweeted at all, whereas the most successful Facebook post in 
our sample was liked or shared 99,688 times in total. 
There were also notable differences between the two platforms and the different types 
of popularity cues. Facebook posts prompted many more popularity cues (4,108 on average) 
than tweets (373 on average). On both platforms, users more often endorsed a message by 
liking or favoriting it than recirculated it by sharing or retweeting it (Facebook posts received 
on average 3,550 likes and 557 shares; tweets received on average 223 favorites and 150 
retweets). 
To test our expectations regarding the use of populist key messages and its 
combination with the platform and populist leaders, we calculated negative binomial 
regression models.3 These models particularly fit the distribution of the dependent variable 
and allow the investigation of different effects and interactions while controlling for 
additional influences such as country differences, gender, party incumbency, and profile 
reach. 
Firstly, we looked at the effect that populist communication has on popularity cues, 
regardless of the platform and the nature of the politician. Contrary to our expectations, an 
individual social media post with a populist key message did not receive significantly more 
popularity cues than a non-populist message (see Table 7.1, Model 1, line A). 
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However, we did find a significant influence from populist communication on the 
aggregated politician level (see Table 7.1, Model 1, line B). This means that the more often 
political leaders posted populist key messages, the more popularity cues their tweets or 
Facebook posts received. Thus, for followers it may matter more how populist a political 
leader’s communication is overall than whether an individual message is populist. If a 
political leader regularly posts or tweets populist key messages, this may have a spillover 
effect on his or her non-populist posts. 
Secondly, we examined the role of the social media platform. The regression models 
confirm that Facebook posts got significantly more popularity cues than tweets (see Table 
7.1, Model 1 & 2, line C). And populist key messages were more successful on Facebook 
than on Twitter. According to the model, populist Facebook posts received 5.5 times more 
popularity cues than non-populist Facebook posts (see Table 7.1, Model 2, line E). 
On Twitter, on the other hand, communicating populist key messages seemed to have 
the opposite effect. Political leaders actually got fewer popularity cues in response to populist 
tweets. Using populist key messages in a tweet led to only 30% of the popularity cues that a 
non-populist tweet would expect (see Table 7.1, Model 2, line A). This is rather surprising 
but may be explained by the characteristics of these two different platforms, and we discuss 
this more below. 
Finally, we compared typically populist leaders with typically non-populist leaders. 
Overall, regardless of whether an individual post contained populist key messages, leaders of 
typically populist parties seemed to be more successful on both Facebook and Twitter than 
leaders of other parties. This means that social media posts by populist leaders were 
significantly more liked, shared, favorited, or retweeted than posts by non-populist leaders 
(see Table 7.1, Model 1 & 2, line D). This is in line with our expectations that being a 
populist may have a positive influence on political leaders’ popularity and reach on social 
media. 
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However, contrary to our expectations, populist leaders did not profit more from 
posting populist key messages than non-populist leaders (see Table 7.1, Model 2, line F). 
Social media posts by political leaders of populist parties were overall more popular, 
regardless of whether the individual message was considered populist or not. 
Looking back to our theoretical considerations (above), we expected that populist key 
messages would lead to more popularity cues and that this effect would be more pronounced 
on Facebook and for populist leaders. These expectations can only partly be supported by our 
analysis. 
To summarize our findings: while populist posts received more popularity cues on 
Facebook, this was not the case for Twitter. However, messages by political leaders whose 
average communication was more populist did get higher popularity or reach on both 
platforms. The same was true for leaders of typically populist parties. Moreover, typically 
“populist” and “non-populist” political leaders alike received more popularity cues on 
Facebook when their posts included populist key messages. 
As an aside, it is interesting to note how news media journalists may lend politicians 
enormous extra reach by republishing their social media posts. Two cases from our study 
illustrate this phenomenon. 
Firstly, Nigel Farage, while leader of UKIP, posted the following message both on 
Facebook and on Twitter on October 12, 2015: 
It is not patriotic to give away control of our country to overseas bureaucrats, 
it is a surrender. 
This statement carries an anti-elitist message against supranational institutions as well 
as a demand for the country’s (and implicitly the people’s) sovereignty. The post received 
relatively high popularity cues on Facebook, being liked by 3,397 followers and shared 654 
times. On Twitter, the same message got only 398 favorites and 491 retweets. This is despite 
the fact that Mr. Farage then had more than twice as many followers on Twitter as on 
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Facebook. Even more interestingly, the British tabloid newspaper Daily Mail cited this 
message on the same day that Mr. Farage had posted it on social media. 
We found a similar example with Marine Le Pen, leader of Front National.4 On 
September 30, 2015, she sent out the following statement, again both on Facebook and 
Twitter: 
Reduction of APL [housing assistance] to fund the reception of migrants: the 
foreign preference of the government in action! [Réduction des APL pour 
financer l’accueil des migrants: la préférence étrangère du gouvernement en 
action!] 
Her anti-elitist populist message, this time against the national government, received 
even higher numbers of popularity cues on Facebook with 16,442 likes and 10,881 shares 
(but only 156 favorites and 366 retweets on Twitter). Again, it was picked up by the news 
media on the same day when the French edition of the Huffington Post published her tweet. 
Thus, although earlier research suggests that, overall, only a small share of social 
media posts actually contain populist key messages (Ernst et al. 2017), they may garner 
disproportionate attention and reach, both directly on social media and indirectly through 
traditional news media. 
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Table 7.1 Factors influencing the number of popularity cues a post receives. (Predictions 
based on negative binomial regression [N = 566]) 
  
Popularity cues 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  Incidence rate 
ratios (IRRs) 
Confidence 
interval 
Incidence rate 
ratios (IRRs) 
Confidence 
interval 
 (Intercept) 1.19 [0.69, 2.06] 1.21 [0.71, 2.09] 
      
 Controls     
 Gender (male) 1.37 [0.93, 2.01] 1.32 [0.91, 1.93] 
 Party incumbency 2.90*** [2.01, 4.19] 3.12*** [2.17, 4.49] 
 Profile reach 1.00*** [1.00, 1.00] 1.00*** [1.00, 1.00] 
      
 Country (Switzerland was set 
as baseline category) 
    
 Germany 25.08*** [13.19, 47.69] 25.93*** [13.55, 49.61] 
 United Kingdom 26.78*** [15.56, 46.10] 24.84*** [14.57, 42.33] 
 United States 25.30*** [13.85, 46.22] 23.10*** [13.00, 41.03] 
 Italy 45.96*** [27.12, 77.90] 46.03*** [27.25, 77.76] 
 France 14.28*** [7.84, 26.04] 13.20*** [7.30, 23.85] 
      
 Independent variables     
A Populism index 1.27 [0.80, 2.00] 0.31** [0.151, 0.650] 
B Populism index 
(aggregated) 
580.07*** 
[34.83, 
9662.09] 
1111.03*** 
[65.01, 
18989.31] 
C Facebook 14.74*** [10.97, 19.81] 13.00*** [9.59, 17.61] 
D Populist leader 5.36*** [3.54, 8.12] 5.57*** [3.64, 8.53] 
E Facebook*populism index   5.52*** [2.43, 12.52] 
F Populist leader*populism 
index 
  1.28 [0.50, 3.25] 
 Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) 
8399.255 8391.380 
 Log likelihood −44185.63 −4179.194 
 Omnibus-test  504.385*** (df = 12) 517.252*** (df = 14) 
Note: IRRs with confidence intervals in brackets. Values < 1 indicate a negative effect; 
values > 1 indicate a positive effect. ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Table 7.1 displays the regression models. For the calculations, we used a populism index as 
independent variable, which was present if a Facebook post or tweet contained at least one of 
the nine populist key messages. The populism index was aggregated at the politician level, 
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indicating the share of tweets or posts per politician that contained a populist key message. 
Furthermore, we coded whether a party was typically classified as populist in the literature 
(e.g., Aalberg et al. 2017; Van Kessel 2015) as dummy variable (1 for populist party, 0 for 
non-populist party). The models also contain dummy variables for Facebook (1 for 
Facebook, 0 for Twitter), gender (1 for male, 0 for female), and party in power (1 for 
government, 0 for opposition party), as well as a variable controlling for the general profile 
reach, which refers respectively to the number of Facebook page likes and the number of 
Twitter followers per politician. While the first model only looks at the main effects of the 
independent variables, the second model additionally incorporates interaction terms between 
the populism index and Facebook and populist leader respectively. 
For the interpretation of the independent variables, we focus on the incidence rate ratios, 
which correspond to exponential B-coefficients. Values higher than 1 indicate a positive 
influence; values below 1 indicate a negative influence on popularity indicators. Values with 
a p-value below .05 (confidence interval does not include 1) are statistically significant. 
Source: Table created by Author 
Recap and outlook 
Social media give politicians an unfiltered communication channel to their followers. This 
fits populism’s ideal of a direct connection to the people as well as populist leaders’ self-
perception as the voice of the people. With Facebook and Twitter, political leaders can 
circumvent the traditional news media, which populists often view as biased, hostile, or even, 
in Donald Trump’s words, “the enemy of the people.” 
Thus, social media offer populists an ideal platform to appeal to the people, demand 
the people’s sovereignty, and criticize the elite. 
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Social media also give an indirect advantage to populists in providing the means for 
disaffected citizens to express themselves and form online communities, which, in turn, lets 
politicians – particularly populist ones – tap into the potential of such partisan online crowds. 
It is another example, as Gerbaudo (2018) points out, of how well matched populism is with 
social media. This network effect is also a reason to continue exploring the relationship 
between populism and popularity cues. 
Our empirical findings support earlier evidence that populism may help politicians of 
any stripe increase their social media popularity and reach. While leaders of typically 
populist parties were more successful overall with their Facebook posts and tweets, populist 
key messages from anyone had a positive influence on popularity cues. 
However, this may depend on the platform. While Facebook posts with populist key 
messages received more likes and shares, populist tweets were actually less favorited or 
retweeted than non-populist tweets. This may be explained by the specific characteristics of 
these two platforms and their user demographics. Twitter is a more elite medium, which 
political leaders mostly use to interact with fellow politicians, journalists, or other elite 
actors. Facebook, in comparison, has a broader user base across different social groups and 
allows for closer and more personal interactions. (This observation is, of course, contradicted 
by Donald Trump’s5 often-populist Twitter use, which Stromer-Galley describes as vulgar 
eloquence in this volume). 
However, our findings also show that political leaders who sent populist key 
messages more often overall also got more popularity cues on both platforms. Thus, while on 
Facebook the effect of populist communication could also be found for individual populist 
posts, on Twitter, the politician’s image, or how populist he or she was overall, seemed to 
matter more to followers than what he or she actually said in an individual tweet. 
Furthermore, we found that both typically “populist” and typically “non-populist” 
leaders could use populist key messages to gain popularity on social media, at least on 
Facebook. This could encourage politicians to use populist communication not only to gain 
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reach on social media but also to gain visibility in mainstream media (see Chadwick 2017). 
The effect of populist communication on popularity cues in connection with the “network 
effect” of social media, which further pushes popular content, may also explain why the most 
outrageous tweets (e.g., by Donald Trump) or specifically populist Facebook posts attract 
enormous attention from the traditional news media and the public (see Gerbaudo 2018). 
If social media actually give an advantage to populist leaders or encourage normally 
non-populist political leaders to use populist communication, this may be seen as problematic 
from the perspective of liberal democracy. Although populism may legitimately express 
criticism of a growing gap between governments and citizens, scholars have argued it 
threatens to undermine central pillars of a liberal democracy (Kriesi 2014; Abts and 
Rummens, 2007). This is because treating the people as a homogenous group denies the idea 
of a pluralist society in which minorities should receive special protection. The demand for 
unrestricted popular sovereignty challenges the division of powers. Also, the hostile 
juxtaposition between the people and the elite may hamper considered, fact-based 
deliberation and compromise. Thus, if social media give an advantage to populist leaders, 
they may have negative consequences for political communication in liberal democracies 
(see Waisbord 2018). 
However, this of course also depends on how important social media will be for 
political communication in the future and whether or how much political leaders are willing 
to adapt their communication to gain higher popularity or reach on these platforms. Thus, 
besides extending the scope of our findings with regard to politicians, countries, and other 
contextual factors, there is a case for future research to explore whether non-populist political 
leaders adapt their communication to fit the network logic of social media. And to investigate 
what the actual impact is of online popularity cues on citizens’ perceptions, attitudes, and 
political actions. 
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Notes
1 An exception is Switzerland, where national parliamentary elections were held on October 
18, 2015. However, due to the Swiss direct democratic system, elections are seen as 
less important than the regular public votes on referenda on initiatives, of which none 
took place within the sampling period. 
2 For the US, due to its party system, only four parties were chosen: the Democratic Party, 
the Republican Party, the Green Party, and the Tea Party Patriots. 
3 We chose negative binomial regression due to the distribution of the dependent variable, 
which is, typically for count distributions, right-skewed and has a standard deviation 
larger than the mean. This choice is in line with other recent studies using popularity 
cues as dependent variable (Bene 2017a; Keller and Kleinen-von Königslöw 2018; 
Saxton and Waters 2014; Trilling, Tolochko, and Burscher 2016). 
4 In June 2018, Front National changed its name to Rassemblement National. 
5 As Mr. Trump did not hold any leader position in the party or country in 2015, he is not in 
our sample. 
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Hitting a Nerve: Populist News Articles Lead to
More Frequent and More Populist Reader
Comments
SINA BLASSNIG, SVEN ENGESSER, NICOLE ERNST, and
FRANK ESSER
Although research on effects of populist communication has increased, it is still unclear how
populism in news articles affects the readers’ manifest behavior, such as whether and how
they comment on online news. To address these issues, we conducted a content analysis of
online news articles (N = 332) and corresponding reader comments (N = 2786) during
election campaigns in France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. We find that populist
keymessages by political andmedia actors in news articles do not only provokemore reader
comments but also prompt citizens to use populist key messages themselves in their com-
ments – regardless of how journalists contextualize these statements.
Keywords populism, populist communication, online news, reader comments, elec-
tion campaigns
It is a widely established hypothesis that populism in the media affects media users (Aalberg,
Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017; de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, &
Stanyer, 2018). However, most empirical studies have focused on attitudinal effects (Bos, van
der Brug, & de Vreese, 2011, 2013; Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017, 2018; Hameleers &
Schmuck, 2017; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017). It remains an open question if populism in the
media may also induce populist behavior, such as the expression of populist ideology in
public discourse. We know that the use of uncivil media may lead to an increased use of
incivility in political expressions (Gervais, 2014), but we do not know if this finding from
incivility research can also be applied to the area of populist communication.
Previous research has shown that populist communication can influence populist atti-
tudes (e.g., Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; Müller et al., 2017), attitudes towards migrants
(e.g., Matthes & Schmuck, 2017; Wirz et al., 2018), emotions (Wirz, 2018b; Wirz et al.,
2018), the perception of political actors (e.g., Bos et al., 2013), voting behavior (e.g., Sheets,
Bos, & Boomgaarden, 2016), and political engagement (e.g., Hameleers et al., 2018). These
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studies have mostly relied on experimental settings, while empirical studies under real-life
conditions are scarce (rare exceptions: Bos et al., 2013; Müller et al., 2017; Wirz et al., 2018).
Most of these experiments measured only planned and not manifest behavior. However,
because planned behavior may be influenced by social desirability, past behavior, and
anticipated emotions, it is often only an inaccurate approach to actual behavior (Armitage
& Conner, 2001; Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001). More recently, research has also started to
analyze effects of populist communication on user reactions on social media, relying on
content analysis instead of surveys or experiments (Blassnig, Ernst, Engesser, & Esser,
forthcoming; Bobba, 2018). This approach using digital trace data (Howison, Wiggins, &
Crowston, 2011) has the advantage of a higher external validity. This is specifically relevant
with regard to populist communication; in an artificial experimental situation, citizensmay be
more hesitant to express populist messages due to social desirability.
To narrow this substantive and methodological gap in the research, we pursue the
question of how populist online news influences the number and content of reader
comments. Reader comments are a particularly worthwhile object of investigation
because of their dual nature. They can be regarded not only as an expression of commu-
nication behavior but may also influence other readers (e.g., Lee, 2012; Lee & Jang,
2010; Zerback & Fawzi, 2016). Furthermore, by focusing on online news, we can
investigate populist statements by three key groups of actors – politicians, the media,
and citizens (de Vreese et al., 2018) – and their interactions within the same platform.
We follow a communication-centered approach (de Vreese et al., 2018; Stanyer,
Salgado, & Strömbäck, 2017) and conceptualize populism as a “thin” ideology (Hawkins,
Carlin, Littvay, & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Mudde, 2004) that political actors, journalists,
and citizens can express via specific populist key messages (Blassnig, Ernst, Büchel,
Engesser, & Esser, 2019; Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017; Müller et al.,
2017; Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, & Wirth, 2018; Wirth et al., 2016; Wirz et al., 2018).
We conducted a content analysis of news articles and corresponding reader comments
during election campaigns in France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. We find that
populist key messages by political and media actors in news articles do not only provoke
more reader comments but also prompt citizens to use populist key messages themselves in
their comments – regardless of how journalists contextualize these statements.
Populist Online Communication
Connecting approaches in political science and communication science, we conceive of
populism as a “thin” ideology (Mudde, 2004) or a “set of ideas” (Hawkins & Kaltwasser,
2018; Taggart, 2000) that can manifest discursively in the communication of political
actors, media actors, or citizens (de Vreese et al., 2018).
At the core of populist ideology lies the Manichean juxtaposition of the pure, good
people to a corrupt, detached elite, as well as the demand that politics should be an expression
of the unrestrained popular will (Mudde, 2004). Furthermore, populist ideology conceives of
“the people” as a monolithic entity that can have a common will, common desires and
common interests. Consequentially, specific social groups who do not share the people’s
“good” characteristics, values, or opinions are perceived as out-groups or as “dangerous
‘others’” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 3). While “the elite” is subject to a vertical
differentiation from “the people”, “the others” are the target of a horizontal exclusion (Abts &
Rummens, 2007). Following this conceptualization, populist ideology consists of four
dimensions: people-centrism, anti-elitism, popular sovereignty, and the exclusion of others.
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With regard to the fourth dimension, it is disputed whether the exclusion of others
is a core element of populist ideology or specific of right-wing populism (see e.g.,
Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017). Following de Vreese et al. (2018), we argue that
the construction of specific out-groups is inherent in populism’s monolithic concep-
tion of the people but that not all types of populism necessarily exclude a specific
social group.
This populist ideology can be communicated by various actors by means of
populist key messages. Consequentially, we do not argue that there are populist actors
per se but that populism is a matter of degree and that anyone can become
a “populist” by communicating populist key messages (de Vreese et al., 2018).
From a political communication perspective, three key actors are of particular interest
as communicators of populist key messages: 1) political actors, 2) the media, and 3)
citizens (de Vreese et al., 2018).
Political actors have been featured most prominently in research on populism.
Previous research shows that, on the one hand, populist communication is most often
used by parties at both extremes of the political spectrum, opposition or challenger
parties (Ernst et al., 2017). On the other hand, politicians of mainstream or moderate
parties also rely on populist communication to some extent (Blassnig, Ernst, Büchel,
& Engesser, 2018). Although new media allow politicians to circumvent traditional
gatekeepers (Ernst et al., 2017), political actors are still highly reliant on journalistic
media to gain a broad publicity for their messages. In turn, due to a high news value
and compatibility with media logic, populist messages specifically meet the selection
criteria of news media (Mazzoleni, 2008).
This leads to the second actor group of populist communication: the media.
Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann (2017) distinguish between populism through the
media and populism by the media. In brief, from the perspective of populism by the
media, the communicators of populist messages are the media (i.e., journalists)
themselves, whereas populism through the media relates to populist messages by
political actors that are disseminated through the media. Thus, the media can act as
originators of populist key messages as well as a platform for populist communica-
tion by other actors, mostly by political actors. Furthermore, journalists can, of
course, also criticize or challenge populist messages by political actors (Wettstein
et al., 2018).
Such mediated populist messages by political or media actors are then received
by citizens – the third actor group (de Vreese et al., 2018). On the one hand, this
raises questions about the effects of populist communication on citizens (see
e.g. Müller et al., 2017). On the other hand, citizens can become populist actors
themselves. Especially online media allow the audience to engage easily with populist
content by liking, sharing, or commenting. Thereby, citizens themselves can voice
populist ideas in reaction to news coverage, which Esser et al., (2017) refer to as
“populist citizen journalism.”
The characteristics of online news media, such as the attention economy of the
Internet, an increasingly commercialized media logic, and a more direct connection to
the people, may foster populist communication by political actors, the media, and citizens
(Blassnig et al., 2019). Online, these three actor groups can directly interact, and their
communication is intertwined within the same platform. Populist key messages by
political actors are cited and interpreted by the news media, and resonate with citizens
as readers who like, share, or comment on such messages.
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Online Reader Comments in the Public Sphere
The ability to directly comment on online news articles allows readers to actively engage
with the news. In the literature, reader comments are associated both with positive as well
as with negative developments for the online public sphere.
From the perspective of the media, high numbers of reader comments generate
website traffic and contribute to high click rates (Anderson, 2011). Thus, reader com-
ments can serve as popularity cues, indicating the attention received or the relevance of
an article (Bene, 2017; Porten-Cheé, Haßler, Jost, Eilders, & Maurer, 2018). They may
raise news consumer engagement and loyalty and are, therefore, often desirable from
a commercial point of view (e.g., Vujnovic, 2011). Comments may also allow a more
reciprocal exchange between journalists and their readers (Lewis, Holton, & Coddington,
2013). However, problematic aspects, such as incivility or hate speech, present challenges
for journalists and media organizations (e.g., Coe, Kenski, & Rains, 2014; Stroud,
Scacco, Muddiman, & Curry, 2015).
For citizens, reader comments provide a public space to interact with news content, voice
their opinions, learn about other opinions, and debate with others (Ruiz et al., 2011; Springer,
Engelmann, & Pfaffinger, 2015; Stroud et al., 2015; Ziegele, Quiring, Esau, & Friess, 2018).
Reader comments can contribute to a deliberative online public sphere, given that they adhere
to specific standards, such as civility, reciprocity, or openness (Dahlberg, 2011). From
a liberal individualist perspective, comments serve the uninhibited self-expression, possibly
at the expense of deliberative standards (Freelon, 2015).
From a communitarian perspective, reader comments may serve as a means to
collaborate with like-minded others to advance specific ideological goals while disenga-
ging from outsiders (Freelon, 2015). Additionally, comment sections can constitute
counter publics, where citizens express opinions that challenge the mainstream media
or the perceived dominant public sphere (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). Thus, from
a participatory point of view, encouraging citizens to write comments may raise inclusion
and opinion diversity, and promote a broader participation in the online public sphere
(Ruiz et al., 2011; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015; Weber, 2014; Ziegele et al., 2018).
However, user comments are often also viewed as an aspect of several problematic
developments in the online public sphere. Incivility and its effects on the deliberative quality
of online discussions have been a central concern in previous research (Coe et al., 2014;
Gervais, 2014; Ziegele et al., 2018). In contrast to counter publics, it has also been argued that
comments may act as “echo chambers” that reinforce the opinion perceived as dominant
within a certain media outlet or social group (Jamieson & Cappella, 2010; Walter,
Brüggemann, & Engesser, 2016). Several authors have warned that in a high-choice media
environment, this may lead to increasingly polarized or fragmented audiences (Blumler &
Kavanagh, 1999; Sunstein, 2002; Van Aelst et al., 2017). However, a growing number of
recent empirical studies have put this into question (e.g., Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Webster
& Ksiazek, 2012).
Several of these aspects may render reader comments particularly prone to populist
communication (Blassnig et al., 2019). Perceiving comment sections as communitarian
spaces, counter publics, or echo chambers involves the construction of in- and out-groups,
the conception of a people with a closed, collective identity, and the use of “us” vs.
“them” rhetoric, which are all central characteristics of populist communication (Abts &
Rummens, 2007; de Vreese et al., 2018; Mudde, 2004). The role of comments as liberal
individualist self-expression brings to mind the populists’ self-proclaimed defense of
freedom of speech and zeal against the “political correctness” of the elites (Moffitt,
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2016; Mudde, 2004). Additionally, reader comments are subject to less editorial control,
norms, and gatekeeping processes that may filter out or attenuate populist communication
in editorial content (Krämer, 2017).
The Influence of Populism in News Articles on Reader Comments
Our focus lies on the connection between populism in online news articles and the
corresponding reader comments. On the one hand, as popularity cues, comments may
contribute to higher click-rates and circulation of online news articles that contain
populism, thereby providing a higher reach for these populist messages. On the other
hand, the reader comments themselves may include and propagate populist statements.
In general, the characteristics of online news articles influence the level of participa-
tion in comment sections. Based largely on news value theory, previous research suggests
that controversial issues, political or social conflicts, and negative or provocative mes-
sages (Tenenboim & Cohen, 2014; Ziegele, Breiner, & Quiring, 2014; Ziegele et al.,
2018), certain news factors (Weber, 2014), or a generally high news value (Ziegele et al.,
2018) can increase the number of commenters that respond to an article.
Populist communication has been described as highly compatible with media logic and
attributed with a high news value (Mazzoleni, 2008). Populist messages often co-occur with
a negative, emotionalized, or dramatized communication style (Ernst, Blassnig, Engesser,
Büchel, & Esser, 2019). Therefore, it can be assumed that the occurrence of populist key
messages may have a positive impact on the amount of comments an article receives. This is
also supported by initial empirical evidence that populist content (Blassnig et al., forth-
coming; Bobba, 2018) and related stylistic devices (Bene, 2017; Heiss, Schmuck, &Matthes,
2018) stimulate audience response on social media.
Based on the literature on effects of populist communication, these findings could be
explained by different persuasion processes. From the perspective of social identity
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 2004), populist communication invokes specific in-group and
out-group identities (Hameleers et al., 2017; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 9; Schulz,
Wirth, & Müller, 2018): the pure people as threatened in-group against the corrupt elites
and dangerous “others” as out-groups (Hameleers et al., 2018). This perception of in-
group deprivation and out-group threat can mobilize people and trigger collective action
(Hameleers et al., 2018; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears,
2008). Furthermore, populist communication could provoke reactions via emotional
persuasion processes (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018; Wirz, 2018b). Populist messages
can be explicitly emotional or include characteristics that make them more likely to elicit
emotional responses through appraisal processes (Wirz, 2018b). Both positive and nega-
tive emotions – mostly anger, fear, hope, and pride – have been associated with populism,
whereas especially anger and hope have been shown to increase the persuasiveness of
populist demands (Wirz, 2018b) and may also increase the willingness to respond to such
messages.
This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: Articles that contain populist key messages receive higher numbers of reader
comments.
a. Articles that contain populist key messages by political speakers receive higher
numbers of reader comments.
b. Articles that contain populist key messages by media speakers receive higher
numbers of reader comments.
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Journalistic content does not only have an impact on how many people comment on
news articles but also on the content of online discussions (Gervais, 2014; Walter et al., 2016;
Ziegele et al., 2018). Toepfl and Piwoni (2017) found that the emphasis structure of news
articles predicts the emphasis frames used in attendant reader comments. Gervais (2014)
shows that the use of media with higher levels of incivility leads to an increased use of
incivility in the political expression of citizens. Walter et al. (2016), focusing on the topic of
climate change, suggest that comment sections function as echo chambers.
Similarly, we believe that populism in news articles and populism in reader comments
are related to each other. Krämer (2014) argues that populist communication activates a type
of “populism schema,” i.e., cognitive schemata that are related to the core dimensions of
populist ideology. Accordingly, we may assume that populist media content has priming
effects, making latent populist attitudes of recipients more salient in the short or long term
(Krämer, 2014). Generally, (media) priming refers to effects of mediated content on people’s
subsequent judgements or behaviors (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Carpentier,
2002). More specifically, priming effects increase the (short-term) accessibility of certain
concepts in memory, which may then have an increased likelihood of being used in subse-
quent evaluations (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2002). Thus, from the perspective of priming,
populist communication activates preexisting populist ideas or attitudes in the memory of
recipients, which means that the user is more likely to use them in judgements or evaluations
in response to a message. In newspaper articles, populism is usually not presented as
a thoroughly elaborated ideology, but as a collection of fragments. In this context, schema
theory assumes that it is often sufficient to highlight one element of a cognitive cluster to
coactivate other elements of the cognitive cluster (Bartlett & Burt, 1933; Brewer &
Nakamura, 1984; Iran-Nejad, 1984). Thus, a news article that contains one dimension of
populist communication may also make other dimensions more salient and, consequently,
activate populist attitudes in total (Müller et al., 2017).
Populist ideas may serve as an interpretative framework for various events and can
therefore also be understood as a frame (Aslanidis, 2015; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018).
In addition to the priming approach, the cognitive effects of populist communication can
also be examined with a framing approach. Previous studies have for example argued that
populist communication affects recipients’ attitudes via value framing (Wirz, 2018a) or
blame attributions (Hameleers et al., 2017).
Findings by Müller et al. (2017) suggest that exposure to populist messages in the news
leads to more populist attitudes, but only for those citizens who already agreed with populist
ideas beforehand, overall fostering polarization. Similarly, Hameleers and Schmuck (2017)
found in an experiment that populist messages communicated via social media increase
populist attitudes only if recipients supported the source of the message. According to Wirz
et al. (2018), anti-immigrant messages in the media lead to more negative cognitions toward
immigrants, while populist content in general leads to more negative emotions.
Therefore, we formulate the second hypothesis, as follows:
H2: Comments are more likely to be populist if they respond to an article containing
populist key messages.
a. Comments are more likely to be populist if they respond to an article containing
populist key messages by political speakers.
b. Comments are more likely to be populist if they respond to an article containing
populist key messages by media speakers.
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The question arises whether this effect depends on how the media contextualize
populist statements. The media may convey populist key messages by politicians in
different ways. In addition to being originators of populist messages and gatekeepers
for populist statements by political actors, the media may also interpret populist actors or
ideas in their coverage and evaluate them positively or negatively (Esser et al., 2017;
Wettstein et al., 2018). The media may neutrally disseminate populist key messages,
attenuate or criticize them, or support, legitimize or reinforce them (Blassnig et al., 2019),
and this may also influence the effect that they have on readers and their comments. Thus,
how journalists transmit and interpret populist key messages may influence how citizens
react to such articles in reader comments. Therefore, we formulate an additional open
research question, as follows:
RQ1: Does the contextualization of populist key messages in news articles have an
influence on the use of populist communication in reader comments?
Method
We conducted a quantitative content analysis of reader comments and the respective news
articles during election campaigns in France (2017), Switzerland (2015), and the United
Kingdom (2015). Additionally, we focused on online news coverage of the issue of
immigration.
Sample
In the selection of the countries, we followed a most different systems within most similar
systems design. On the one hand, we selected countries that have similar political,
economic, and cultural settings within Western Europe. In addition, in all three countries
(right-wing), populist parties were rather successful in the last European or national
elections and have similar positions with regard to migration policy and EU integration.
On the other hand, France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom differ distinctly with
regard to their types of political systems and media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004;
Lijphart, 1999). This allows to investigate the relation between populism in articles and
reader comments in varying contexts and enables a higher generalizability of our findings
within Western Europe (Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017).
The investigation period covers the six weeks before the most recent, regular national
elections in the three countries. For the United Kingdom, we included the national
parliamentary elections on May 7, 2015, for Switzerland, the national parliamentary
elections on October 18, 2015, and for France, the presidential elections, with the first
round occurring on April 23 and the second round on May 7, 2017. Election campaigns
offer themselves as an inquiry period to investigate populist communication and reader
comments, as they provide a pointed view of a country’s political communication culture
(Esser & Strömbäck, 2012) as well as a particularly contested environment in which
populism is most likely to manifest itself (Plasser & Ulram, 2003). As populism is a rare
and fragmented phenomenon in the overall news media coverage, the identification of
a political issue that is affine to populism and has the potential of higher levels of populist
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messages was crucial (Ernst, Esser, Blassnig, & Engesser, 2018). We focused on the
populism affine topic of immigration because this topic is a polarized and conflict-laden
issue and is particularly prone to right-wing populist rhetoric (Taggart, 2017). Recent
comparative studies conducting qualitative interviews have found that journalists and
politicians across several European countries see the topic of immigration as one of the
most important drivers of populism (Salgado et al., 2019; Stanyer et al., 2019).
Additionally, content analyses across European countries found that immigration was
the most commented on topic in print news and among the topics that showed the highest
share of populist messages (Ernst et al., 2018; Esser et al., 2019). Consequently, immi-
gration is a highly important topic that is similarly relevant across the three investigated
countries. It poses a particular challenge to responsible media coverage and may be
specifically vulnerable to populist reader comments (Sheets et al., 2016).
We incorporated five online news outlets per country, comprising print-parent,
TV-parent, and pure online outlets (see Table 1). For each country, we included the
online outlets of two leading upmarket daily newspapers, the dominant mass-market
daily paper, one TV-parent outlet, and the most important pure online outlet in each
country.
To sample the relevant online news material, we followed a user-based sampling
approach, placing the user perspective at the center and incorporating search strategies that
are common in the everyday practice of the average Internet user. In this way, the sample is
less representative of the overall population of news articles but more representative of the
population that the users are actually confronted with. We relied on Google to search the
specific news websites, using the same web browser (Google Chrome) in the “incognito”
browsing mode for all searches and disabling the search history to ensure comparability and
replicability. To ensure that the sampled articles related to the topic of immigration as well as
to domestic politics, we used an immigration search string that additionally contained
commonly used abbreviations or labels for four selected parties per country.1
For each news outlet, we then googled the search string translated into the respective
language, restricted the search to the respective news website (site:website.com) and the
time frame to the selected six weeks, and downloaded the first 30 listed news items (the
first three pages). This yielded n = 433 news article of which n = 332 received at least one
comment. For these articles, we sampled the first ten reader comments –, i.e., the first ten
comments, chronologically, that were posted in direct response to the article.2 The final
sample comprises 332 articles and 2786 reader comments.
Table 1
Online news outlets
Country
France Switzerland UK
Print-parent Up-market Lefigaro.fr Nzz.ch Telegraph.co.uk
Lemonde.fr Tagesanzeiger.ch Theguardian.com
Mass-market Leparisien.fr Blick.ch dailymail.co.uk
TV-parent Public Info.france2.fr Srf.ch Bbc.co.uk
Pure online tempsreel.
nouvelobs.
com/rue89
Watson.ch Huffingtonpost.co.uk
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Operationalization and Coding Procedure
Populist Key Messages. We regard populist communication as a formative measure
(Diamantopoulos, Riefler, & Roth, 2008) based on the four dimensions and correspond-
ing twelve populist key messages (see Table 2). The key messages were operationalized
as dummy variables based on Cranmer (2011), Jagers and Walgrave (2007), and Wirth
et al. (2016). For each category, we coded at the story level whether a given populist key
message was present in an article or comment.
Speaker. For each populist key message, we coded whether the speaker was a political
actor, a media actor, or a citizen. Populist statements by other actors were not incorpo-
rated in the analysis. A political speaker was a political actor who was quoted in the story
either directly or indirectly. If the journalist herself made a populist statement, the speaker
was coded as a media actor. For reader comments, the speaker was coded as citizen
(except if the commenter was evidently a political or media actor).
Populism indices were calculated for the three speaker types, which were present if at
least one of the twelve populist key messages was used in a story or comment by the
respective speaker type.
Contextualization. In the event that there was a populist key message in a news story, we
coded whether the author (i) disseminated the message neutrally, (ii) explicitly attenuated
or criticized the message, (iii) provided a favorable context for the message that sup-
ported, reinforced, or legitimized it, or (iv) whether the author voiced populist key
messages himself.
A team of ten intensively trained student coders had to pass several pretests as well as the
final reliability test based on English-language material (31 online news articles and 30 reader
comments, n = 61) and reached acceptable levels of reliability. The average Brennan and
Prediger’s K cross all populist key messages was .75. For the two speaker types (political
speaker and media speaker), Brennan and Prediger’s K was .79, and the contextualization
displayed a Brennan and Prediger’s K of .82 (see Table A in the online appendix).
Analysis
Depending on the specificities of the data and dependent variables, we employed different types
of regression methods to answer the hypotheses. H1a and H1b were tested using negative
binomial regression. This accounts for the right-skewed and overdispersed distribution of the
count of comments per article, which served as the dependent variable. To test H2a andH2b and
answer RQ1, we conducted multilevel regression models containing fixed-effects components
to account for the fact that reader comments are nested within the articles they respond to.
Findings
Overall, journalists from British, French, and Swiss online media used at least one populist
keymessage in 65 percent (n = 214) of the news articles analyzed. In 61 percent of these cases
(n = 131), the journalists conveyed a populist message that originally came from a politician;
and in 37 percent (n = 79), the journalists made their own populist statement. In terms of
dimensions, journalists most often included anti-elitist messages in their stories (55%,
n = 181). Less often, they used or cited messages related to people-centrism (22%, n = 72),
exclusionism (11%, n = 35) or sovereignty (5%, n = 15). The articles received, on average,
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272.48 comments (MIN = 1,MAX = 3997, SD = 601.67). Citizens voiced at least one populist
key message in approximately a third (34%, n = 951) of all analyzed reader comments.
Similar to the politicians and journalists, the citizens most often used anti-elitist keymessages
(28%, n = 786) and less often expressed key messages related to people-centrism (3%,
n = 96), exclusion (3%, n = 94), or sovereignty (1%, n = 32).3
Hypothesis 1 postulated a positive relationship between populist keymessages in articles
and the total number of comments they receive in return. A negative binomial regression
controlling for differences between countries and outlet types (see Table 3), shows that, as
expected, populist communication by political speakers as well as by media speakers in
articles is positively and significantly associated with higher numbers of comments. For the
interpretation of the results, we focus on the incidence rate ratios (IRR), which correspond to
exponential b-coefficients. Values higher than 1 indicate a positive influence, and values
below 1 indicate a negative influence on the number of reader comments an article receives.
More precisely, when the independent variable is present (in the case of dummy variables),
the expected count of reader comments has to bemultiplied by the IRR (Trilling, Tolochko, &
Burscher, 2016). This suggests that articles in which journalists include populist statements
by political actors trigger 2.28 times more reader comments, and articles in which journalists
make their own populist statements drive up the number of reader comments by a factor of
1.80. This supports both H1a and H1b.
Observing the control variables, we see that news articles in Great Britain and France
receive more reader comments overall than Swiss articles do and that readers of mass-
market and pure online news websites comment less than readers of upmarket outlets.
To test hypotheses H2a and H2b and answer RQ1, we conducted four multilevel
models (see Table 4) with maximum-likelihood estimation (ML). The dependent variable
in all four models is populist communication by citizens in reader comments, which
Table 3
The influence of populist communication in articles on the total number of comments
Number of Comments
IRR CI
(Intercept) 61.46*** [45.87, 82.35]
Countrya United Kingdom 8.76*** [5.84, 13.16]
France 1.41* [1.01, 1.99]
Outletb Mass-market 0.50*** [0.33, 0.74]
Pure online 0.24*** [0.16, 0.35]
Article Populism by Political Speaker 2.28*** [1.68, 3.09]
Populism by Media Speaker 1.80*** [1.29, 2.51]
AIC 3863.81
Log likelihood −1923.91
Omnibus-test 236.82*** (df = 6)
Note. Negative binomial regression predicting the total number of comments in response to the
articles (N = 332). IRRs with confidence intervals in brackets. Values < 1 indicate a negative effect;
values > 1 indicate a positive effect. AIC = Akaike information criterion, IRR = incidence rate
ratios, CI = confidence interval. aSwitzerland was set as baseline category. bUp-market was set as
baseline category.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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indicates whether the commenter uses at least one populist key message. The units of
analysis are reader comments, which are nested in the articles they respond to. Hence, the
independent variables – source of the message (from the journalist himself or from
a political source) and contextualization of the message (neutral transmission, negative
attenuation or positive amplification by the journalist) – are both located at the second
level, while the dependent variable is located at the first level. Additionally, we controlled
for the length of a comment at the first level and for differences between types of outlets
at the second level.4
In a first step, we assessed whether it is useful to apply a multilevel model. If we compare
the intercept-only model (Model 1) with the baseline model (χ2(2) = 19.81, p < .001), we can
conclude that the intercepts vary significantly across articles and significantly improved the
model fit. In a second step,we added fixed-effects for the control variables (Model 2).Aswe can
see in Table 4, the length of the reader comment has a significant impact on whether its author
includes a populist message. It is relatively obvious that the longer a comment is, themore likely
it is that it contains populist communication. The type of the outlet, however, does not have any
significant influence on the amount of populism in reader comments. Thus, no differences can
be found between upmarket, mass-market, or pure online outlets. A model comparison demon-
strated that the model fit significantly increased for model 2 (χ2(1) = 128.87, p < .001).
Hypotheses H2a and H2b predicted that populist communication by political speakers as
well as by media speakers would increase the probability that citizens respond with populist
key messages in their comments as well. To test these hypotheses, we added two fixed effects
for populist communication by political speakers (dummy) and populist communication by
media speakers (dummy) to themodel. Again, a model comparison revealed that themodel fit
improves for model 3 (χ2(1) = 18.42, p < .001).We find clear support for both subhypotheses.
Populist communication by political speakers (β = 0.086, t(326) = 3.88, p < .001) and by
media speakers (β = 0.051, t(326) = 2.37, p < .05) significantly predict populist reactions in
reader comments. On online news sites, citizens thus felt motivated to spread populist views
and propositions if the underlying news articles also made populist statements.
Finally, RQ1 asked whether the contextualization of populist key messages by journalists
might have an influence on the amount of populism in reader comments. To answer this
question, we added fixed effects to the model for whether journalists either muted or strength-
ened (attenuated or amplified) populist statements by politicians. Since we regarded it also as
amplification if the journalists themselves acted as the originators of populist key messages,
model 4 does not include populism by media speakers as an independent variable. A model
comparison showed that adding these variables does not improve the model fit (χ2(1) = 2.40, n.
s.). Additionally, when we look at model 4, neither attenuation nor amplification have
a significant effect on populism in reader comments, while populist communication by political
speakers remains a significant factor (β = 0.083, t(325) = 3.74, p < .001). Thus, populist key
messages by politicians seem to affect populism in reader comments regardless of whether
these messages are attenuated, amplified, or transmitted neutrally by the media. For readers
who operate with populist arguments, the interpretation and embedding by the journalist is
largely irrelevant; such readers mainly focus on statements by politicians.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article set out to investigate how populism in the media affects the media users.
Specifically, we analyzed the influence of populist statements by political and media
actors in news articles on immigration on the number and content of reader comments
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during election periods in France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Our findings
suggest that populism in articles leads to more frequent and more populist reader com-
ments. These effects may be explained by several causal mechanisms such as priming,
framing, or emotional persuasion processes. Thus, populist messages in online news
articles seem to hit a nerve with the readers by activating populist attitudes, in-group
and out-group identifications, or eliciting emotions that prompt them to comment more
and in a more populist manner.
Populism seems to generate more attention among readers and encourage citizens to
engage in online discussions. As discussed above, this may be explained by populism’s
news value, its ability to mobilize citizens by activating in-group and out-group identi-
fications, or emotional persuasion processes. On the one hand, this can be seen as
desirable from a participatory viewpoint, if populist communication raises participation
and possibly opinion diversity in the online public sphere. On the other hand, this may
also help to propagate the populist key messages in the articles, which may be regarded as
problematic from the perspective of liberal democracy, as we will elaborate below. In
both cases, if populism generates a high user response, it may be beneficial from
a commercial viewpoint for the media to cite or voice such messages in their content.
Whether reader comments can be considered desirable, of course, depends on their
content. In this regard, our results imply that populism in the news may incite more
populist content by readers and, thus, foster a proliferation of populist ideas. In line with
our theoretical expectations based on schema theory and similar argumentation by Müller
et al. (2017), populist key messages in the news seem to have priming effects on citizens
that activate a populism schema and prompt them to use such populist elements them-
selves in their responding reader comments.
Furthermore, it does not seem to matter whether journalists moderate populist messages
by political actors or not. Neutrally transmitted populist key messages lead just as much to
more populism in reader comments as attenuated or amplified populist statements do. This
would imply that simply reporting on populist actors and their statements is sufficient to
activate populist commenters. However, we only coded for explicit attenuation or amplifica-
tion by journalists. Future research should include a more fine-grained measurement of
moderation that includes any type of challenge or support for populist statements to con-
clusively answer this question, especially since other research suggests that populist state-
ments are more often challenged by journalists, at least in print news (Wettstein et al., 2018).
If reader comments contribute to the dissemination of populist communication in the
online public sphere, this can be regarded as problematic from the perspective of liberal
democracy. While some scholars regard populism as an inherent feature of a democratic
system (Canovan, 1999; Mény & Surel, 2002), it is more often described as a threat, as
populism undermines central aspects of liberal democracy (Abts & Rummens, 2007;
Taggart, 2000) and may negatively impact political communication (Waisbord, 2018).
However, if a reader comment is populist, this does not necessarily mean that it is uncivil
or impolite. In fact, our material showed that populist comments can indeed lead to
arguments that may be considered as deliberative. Thus, citizens may also formulate
legitimate criticism in a populist way. Additionally, as our data shows, exclusionist key
messages, which are most closely linked to extreme right-wing or racist statements, are
rather rare. Much more common is an anti-elitist rhetoric, mostly against the political
establishment. First, this may have to do with the fact that media outlets may delete
openly racist or discriminating comments. Second, during election campaigns, citizens
may be specifically prone to voice their discontent with the political elite.
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Some additional limitations need to be considered. First, although our study is com-
parative across three countries and different types of media outlets, the scope of our sample
is limited. Thus, the found effects would need to be replicated in other countries, specifi-
cally with regard to non-Western or non-European countries. Additionally, with our focus
on elections and the topic of immigration, we study populism under most-likely conditions.
Populism in news articles as well as in reader comments may additionally be fueled by the
polarized context of elections as well as by the controversial and populism-affine topic.
Consequentially, the results can be generalized to other issues only with caution. Based on
other recent studies (Ernst et al., 2018), we would expect the overall levels of populism in
news articles to be lower for less populism-affine issues and therefore also the effects on
reader comments to be weaker. Nevertheless, we believe that the high importance and
prevalence of immigration in current political news renders our results specifically relevant
for populist communication. Second, our sampling procedure leads to additional limita-
tions. Since we only sample the first ten reader comments that directly respond to the
articles, our findings may not apply to comment sections overall. However, existing
research shows that not only the articles but also previous comments may influence if
and how readers formulate subsequent comments (Zerback & Fawzi, 2016; Ziegele et al.,
2014; Ziegele, Weber, Quiring, & Breiner, 2017). We therefore believe that the first ten
reader comments are influenced less by the subsequent reader comments and are more
directly a response to the original article. On the other hand, primacy effect research lets us
expect that the first ten reader comments arguably receive the most attention from other
users (e.g., Anderson, 1965). Consequently, they may substantially influence subsequent
reader comments and disproportionally steer the direction of the discussion in the comment
section. Third, we do not know how the respective media outlets moderate their comment
sections. Thus, the criteria for deleting comments are unclear and the comment function
may be blocked entirely for certain articles. This could influence our results if populist
communication was systematically related to being deleted by journalistic moderators. This
is conceivable since populist communication is often associated with taboo-breaking and
controversial language and the media outlets would probably delete reader comments that
contain uncivil anti-elitist attacks or racist exclusionist statements. If this were the case, our
results would rather underestimate the effects. Fourth, we did not code for other substantive
characteristics of reader comments, such as incivility or deliberativeness. For future studies,
it would be interesting to investigate how they relate to populist communication in reader
comments. Finally, relying solely on content analysis of digital trace data has certain limits.
For one thing, we cannot control for citizens’ attitudes, sociodemographic characteristics, or
political opinions. Only a small share of online news readers actually use the comment
function; hence, reader comments are not representative of public opinion (Springer et al.,
2015; Walter et al., 2016). Thus, our findings may only apply to a specific group of people
who are particularly prone to comment on news articles as one of the first commenters.
Nevertheless, we believe that these comments are relevant as they may also influence
attitudes, opinions, or perceptions of public opinion of inactive observers that only read
comment sections without commenting themselves (Lee, 2012; Lee & Jang, 2010; Zerback
& Fawzi, 2016). Moreover, although our findings confirm our theoretical expectations that
populist communication has priming effects, we cannot effectively determine which under-
lying cognitive or affective processes explain these effects best. This is a disadvantage in
comparison to experimental settings in exchange for the higher validity of digital trace data.
Future research can determine which theoretical model fits best.
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Overall, our study demonstrates that (1) populist key messages resonate with citizens
and are disseminated by them (populism resonates); (2) populist key messages lead to more
populist key messages (populism multiplies); and (3) we find that, at least in our case,
journalistic contextualization does not matter significantly. With the continuing rise of
populist political actors in several countries, such as France, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom, specifically on the right side of the political spectrum, the media is repeatedly
confronted with the question of how to cover such populist actors and issues. Although other
recent studies suggest that the media often challenge populist actors and their statements
(Wettstein et al., 2018), our results imply that even the attenuation of populist messages by
media speakers does not lead to a reduced number of populist reader comments. While
a high participation in the online public sphere is desirable, high levels of populism may have
negative consequences for political communication in liberal democracies. Therefore, we
need more research on how citizens react and contribute to online populist communication.
Notes
1. The search strings for the three different countries were as follows:
CH: migration OR immigration OR zuwanderung OR flüchtling OR ausländer OR asyl OR
einbürgerung OR ausschaffung “SVP” OR “SP” OR “Lega” OR “FDP” UK: migration OR
immigration OR refugee OR foreigner OR asylum OR naturalisation OR deportation Labour OR
“Scottish National Party” OR SNP OR “Liberal Democrats” OR “Lib Dems” FR: migration OR
immigration OR réfugié OR étranger OR asile OR naturalisation OR expuls OR reconduite “Front
National” OR “FN” OR “Parti socialiste” OR “PS” OR “Corsica Libera” OR “Parti libéral
démocrate” OR “PLD”.
2. For those news outlets where it was not possible to change the order of the reader comments
(Le Figaro, Le Monde, Le Parisien, Rue89, Blick, SRF, Watson), the ten newest reader comments
were selected for the sample.
3. An overview of descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Tables C and D in the
online appendix.
4. As additional robustness checks, we ran the multi-level models with the three countries as
well as with the 16 news outlets as additional random effects on the third level of the models. Either
way, we could replicate the same results for all four models. However, since the inclusion of a third
level did not improve model fit, we preferred the presented models with two levels.
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Article
Populist politicians are often associated with the successful 
use of social networking sites (SNS). First, research shows 
that SNS—particularly Facebook—are well-suited channels 
for distributing populist messages (e.g., Ernst et al., 2017; 
Groshek & Engelbert, 2012; Stier et al., 2017). Second, 
studies demonstrate that citizens with high populist attitudes 
are more likely to use Facebook to obtain political informa-
tion (Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017; Schulz, 2018). 
Finally, initial research indicates that populist actors and 
populist messages are both drivers of user reactions on 
Facebook (Blassnig et al., 2020; Bobba, 2019). However, so 
far, studies on the relationship between populist communi-
cation and user reactions on SNS have relied exclusively on 
quantitative content analyses of digital trace data and have 
therefore largely focused on the supply-side of populist 
communication.
Taking a demand-side perspective, one may assume that 
reactions to populist messages on SNS are influenced by 
the characteristics of the message, the sender, and the recip-
ient. On the one hand, existing research demonstrates that 
the effects of populist communication are moderated by 
recipients’ preexisting populist attitudes (Hameleers, Bos, 
& de Vreese, 2018; Müller et al., 2017). Findings by Müller 
et al. (2017) show that exposure to populist messages 
reinforces both prior agreement and disagreement with 
populist ideas. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
prior populist attitudes may moderate whether a recipient 
likes, shares, or comments a post with a populist message 
or by a populist politician. On the other hand, experimental 
studies suggest that the source of the message may influ-
ence the effect of populist messages in Facebook posts 
(Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017). However, it is still unclear 
whether and how these two factors—populist messages and 
populist actors as the senders of messages—interact. Do 
populist actors activate a corresponding schema—a “popu-
lism schema”—that increases the perception of populist 
elements (i.e., anti-elitism, people-centrism, and popular 
sovereignty) in their messages?
To address this research gap, this study analyzes the effect 
of populist communication on user reactions using an online 
survey experiment. Thereby, it adds to the existing literature 
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Abstract
Populist politicians are often associated with the successful use of social networking sites (SNS). However, it is still unclear 
whether the popularity of populist posts is driven by the nature of the messages, by the populist actors as the source, or by the 
interaction of both factors. By following a 2 × 2 experimental design (N = 647) and by manipulating populist versus nonpopulist 
messages in a Facebook post and a typically populist versus mainstream politician as the source, this study contributes to 
the existing literature in two ways. First, it shows that both populist messages and populist actors foster the perception of 
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with a twofold contribution. First, by following a 2 × 2 design 
(N = 647) and by manipulating populist versus nonpopulist 
messages in a Facebook post and a typically populist versus a 
mainstream politician as the source, the study allows us to 
investigate how populist messages and populist actors inter-
act and how both components foster user reactions. We 
assume that a populist actor as the source of a message acti-
vates a populism schema, which increases the perception of a 
message as being populist. Second, this study complements 
existing content analyses on populism and user reactions by 
analyzing not only the effect of populist communication on 
user reactions but also how the effect is moderated by recipi-
ents’ populist attitudes.
Popularity on SNS
SNS have become a very important channel for political 
actors to communicate with their constituencies. On the 
one hand, SNS provide a platform where messages can be 
sent directly to a large audience of like-minded supporters 
while circumventing the media (Ernst et al., 2017). On the 
other hand, messages on SNS are not only distributed to 
the primary audience following the sender of the message 
but also to a secondary audience; when individuals like, 
share, or comment on a message, the content becomes vis-
ible to their followers or friends as well (Vaccari & 
Valeriani, 2015). This two-step flow of communication 
(Katz, 1957) follows a genuine logic in the online world, 
which has been referred to as “privileging popularity” 
(Webster, 2011, p. 54). This means that popular content is 
privileged over unpopular content both by the sender of a 
message, who seeks to promote content that resonates with 
the audience, and by the audience, which uses popularity 
as a selection criterion given the multitude of information 
online (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018).
In light of the importance of popularity for the distribu-
tion of content on SNS, a growing body of research has 
evolved around the concept of popularity cues. The term 
refers to user reactions such as likes or shares of content on 
SNS (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018). Recent research has identi-
fied several characteristics that drive popularity online, 
including the newsworthiness of content (Trilling et al., 
2016), emotionality (Bene, 2017a; Berger & Milkman, 
2012; Dang-Xuan et al., 2013; Heiss et al., 2019; Keller & 
Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018), the presence of populist 
claims (Blassnig et al., 2020; Bobba, 2019), and character-
istics of the source of the message (Blassnig et al., 2020; 
Bobba, 2019; Heiss et al., 2019; Keller & Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, 2018). These findings suggest that posts by 
populist actors perform particularly well with regard to 
online popularity. Both populist communication and popu-
list leaders have been identified as drivers of user reactions. 
In the following section, we will therefore have a closer 
look at populist communication and its potential effects on 
user engagement.
Populist Communication and Its Effects
Populism can be conceived of as a “set of ideas” (Hawkins & 
Kaltwasser, 2018) or as a “thin” ideology that sees society 
divided into two antagonistic groups, the pure people and the 
corrupt elite, and that postulates that politics should be an 
expression of the people’s will (Mudde, 2004). This ideology 
manifests as the expression of populist ideas in the form of 
populist communication (de Vreese et al., 2018; Wirth et al., 
2016). Populist communication is characterized by messages 
blaming or discrediting the elite (anti-elitism), praising or 
approaching the people (people-centrism), and statements 
demanding more power for the people (people’s sovereignty) 
(Wirth et al., 2016).
From a communication-centered perspective (Stanyer 
et al., 2017), a politician becomes populist by communicat-
ing populist messages to the public. This implies that, first, 
any politician across the political spectrum may use populist 
communication and that, second, politicians can be populist 
to different degrees depending on the extent to which they 
send populist messages. In contrast, research following an 
actor-centered approach defines specific parties or politi-
cians as a priori populist (Stanyer et al., 2017). Various stud-
ies have compiled categorizations identifying populist actors 
(see, for example, Rooduijn et al., 2019). Empirical research 
indicates that members of these typically populist parties use 
populist communication to a larger extent than members of 
nonpopulist parties (Ernst et al., 2019).
On the demand-side, populism manifests in the form of 
populist attitudes that can be defined as the degree of agree-
ment with a populist ideology at the individual level 
(Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz, Müller, et al., 2018). 
Accordingly, someone with high populist attitudes has a neg-
ative attitude toward the elite (anti-elitism), perceives the 
people as homogeneous and virtuous (people-centrism), and 
supports the demand that the people should be granted more 
power (people’s sovereignty) (Schulz, Müller, et al., 2018). 
These populist attitudes are relatively stable and operate as a 
latent demand or a disposition that can be made salient by 
specific contexts or contents (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018).
Activation of a Populism Schema
Populist attitudes can also be conceived of as a cognitive 
schema—a “populism schema” (Krämer, 2014). Schema 
theory suggests that human cognition is organized in the 
form of relational topic clusters. Accordingly, schemata can 
be described as domain-specific relational clusters or mental 
structures that organize our memory and influence the 
human perception and processing of new information 
(Bartlett & Burt, 1933; Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Iran-
Nejad, 1984). A “populism schema,” thus, describes a rela-
tional cognitive cluster related to the core ideas of populist 
ideology (i.e., anti-elitism, people-centrism, and popular 
sovereignty). This cognitive schema may be activated by 
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populist communication. Consequently, we may assume 
that populist posts by politicians on SNS have priming 
effects (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2002), increasing the 
(short-term) accessibility of a populist cognitive schema in 
the memory of recipients. Hence, populist communication 
activates preexisting populist attitudes by making them 
more salient. According to schema theory, highlighting one 
element of a cognitive cluster is often sufficient to coacti-
vate other elements of the cognitive cluster (Bartlett & Burt, 
1933; Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Iran-Nejad, 1984). 
Messages that contain one dimension of populist communi-
cation may also make other dimensions more salient and 
activate a populist schema in total (Müller et al., 2017). 
Following this argument, one can assume that actors who 
are typically associated with populist ideas or known for 
populist communication may similarly activate a populism 
schema. The activation of such a schema may increase the 
salience of populist attitudes and bias message processing 
toward schema-congruent elements (Galambos et al., 1986; 
Lodge & Hamill, 1986). Specifically, on SNS, where politi-
cal actors send out messages with a high frequency, the 
image of a politician as populist and their overall extent of 
populist communication may have a spillover effect on mes-
sages that do not contain any populist elements. There is 
initial evidence that the source of a message influences the 
effect of populist messages communicated via SNS: 
Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) show in an experiment that 
populist Facebook messages only reinforce citizens’ popu-
list attitudes for those who support the source of the mes-
sage. However, the interaction of populist (vs. nonpopulist) 
messages and populist (vs. nonpopulist) actors as the source 
of a message has not yet been investigated. This leads to our 
first hypothesis:
H1. A Facebook post will be perceived as more populist if 
the sender is a typically populist actor compared to a typi-
cally nonpopulist actor, regardless of whether it contains 
populist messages.
Effects on User Reactions
Experiments have shown that populist messages reinforce 
populist attitudes but only for people who identify with pop-
ulist politicians or citizens (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017) or 
who have a higher feeling of relative deprivation (Hameleers, 
Bos, & de Vreese, 2018). Measuring long-term exposure to 
populist communication based on content analysis and panel 
survey data, Müller et al. (2017) show that exposure to popu-
list messages in the news increases populist attitudes but 
only for those citizens who already had higher populist atti-
tudes beforehand. For citizens with low populist attitudes, 
exposure to populist communication leads to a lower agree-
ment with populist ideas. These findings provide support for 
the theoretical assumption that populist communication 
makes mainly preexisting populist attitudes more salient and 
suggest that these prior populist attitudes act as a moderator 
of the effects of populist communication. The argument that 
exposure to information that confirms recipients’ preexisting 
beliefs reaffirms those beliefs, whereas exposure to informa-
tion that challenges preexisting beliefs leads to a rejection of 
that information and a doubling-down on those beliefs does 
not apply exclusively to populist attitudes. It can also be 
linked to broader concepts such as motivated reasoning 
(Kunda, 1990), confirmation bias (Klapper, 1960), or atti-
tude polarization (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009).
In addition to attitudinal effects, research has also investi-
gated the effects of populist communication on behavioral 
outcomes or intentions. Findings by Hameleers, Bos, Fawzi, 
et al. (2018) indicate that the combination of people-centrist 
and anti-elitist messages increases the likelihood that people 
will become politically engaged. From a theoretical perspec-
tive, this can be explained based on social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 2004), according to which populist com-
munication invokes specific in-group and out-group identi-
ties (Hameleers et al., 2017b; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018; 
Schulz, Wirth, & Müller, 2018). The perception of the people 
as a deprived in-group and the elites as an out-group threat 
may have a mobilizing effect on people and trigger collective 
action (Hameleers, Bos, Fawzi, et al., 2018; Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
studies have started to investigate the effects of populist 
communication in social media posts on citizens’ reactions 
based on digital trace data. Initial empirical evidence sug-
gests that populist communication leads to more user reac-
tions in reaction to politicians’ Facebook posts (Blassnig 
et al., 2020; Bobba, 2019), as well as to more reader com-
ments and more populist reader comments in response to 
online news articles (Blassnig et al., 2019). The results by 
Blassnig et al. (2020) further suggest that populist leaders 
receive more user reactions overall on Facebook and Twitter 
than mainstream political leaders. However, these studies 
were based on content analyses and therefore cannot control 
for recipients’ sociodemographic characteristics, political 
orientation, or populist attitudes. Building on research on 
the effects of populist communication, we expect that the 
populist attitudes of recipients will act as a moderator. First, 
we expect that mainly those recipients who agree with popu-
list ideas will be mobilized into collective action by such 
messages. Second, since user reactions on Facebook—
specifically likes and shares that are the most common 
reactions—can be mainly interpreted as positive reactions 
toward a message (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018), we assume that 
recipients are more likely to react to a Facebook post by a 
populist politician and/or a post containing populist mes-
sages if they have high populist attitudes. This leads to the 
following hypotheses:
H2a. Recipients are more likely to react to a Facebook 
post containing populist messages than to a nonpopulist 
Facebook post.
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H2b. Recipients with higher populist attitudes are more 
likely to react to a Facebook post containing populist 
messages than recipients with lower populist attitudes.
H3a. Recipients are more likely to react to a Facebook 
post by a typically populist politician than by a main-
stream politician.
H3b. Recipients with higher populist attitudes are more 
likely to react to Facebook posts by a typically populist 
politician than recipients with lower populist attitudes.
Thus far, content analyses have shown that both populist 
messages and populist actors are separate predictors of user 
reactions. Since we assume that populist messages and typi-
cally populist politicians activate a similar cognitive schema, 
this leads to the question of whether the content and actors 
are substitutes for each other in terms of their effects or 
whether they will have an interaction effect.
RQ1. Do the effects of populist messages and populist 
actors on user reactions interact?
Figure 1 summarizes the hypotheses with regard to the 
influence of the populist message and the populist actor on 
user reactions in a moderation model.
Finally, although they can all be interpreted as indicators 
of popularity or virality, different types of user reactions such 
as likes, shares, and comments can be differentiated with 
regard to their degree of activation (Berger & Milkman, 2012) 
and the user intention behind them (Bene, 2017b). Liking a 
Facebook post requires minimal action and implies the rather 
passive expression of approval, agreement, or affirmation. 
Sharing a post requires a stronger activation of users, who 
disseminate the message within their own network and may 
add an individual annotation or opinion to the original post. 
Finally, by commenting, users may voice their opinions about 
the content or source of an original post, engage in a dialogue 
with the source, or interact with other users. Thus, populist 
messages and actors may differently affect the likelihood of 
recipients liking, sharing, or commenting. Since there has not 
been much research on this, we have formulated an open 
question in this regard.
RQ2. Do populist messages and populist actors as well as 
recipients’ populist attitudes have different effects on 
users’ likelihood to like, share, and comment on a post?
Methods
Participants
Participants (N = 647) were recruited by the professional mar-
ket research company Respondi in the German-speaking part 
of Switzerland with an online access panel. They received a 
standard incentive for participation. Due to the research inter-
est, participants were asked in the beginning how often they 
use Facebook for any purpose. Participants who stated that 
they never use Facebook were excluded from the sample. Of 
the remaining 647 participants, 6.5% used Facebook less than 
monthly, 10% monthly, 19.5% weekly, 31.7% daily, and 
32.3% used Facebook several times a day. Through a quota 
procedure, we additionally aimed at a sample representative 
of the Swiss population regarding gender, age, and education. 
Women accounted for 50.9% of the participants. The partici-
pants were between 18 and 69 years old (M = 43.23, 
SD = 13.66). With regard to education, 55.8% had a university 
or college degree, 32.6% completed high school or vocational 
training, and 11.3% had only mandatory education.
Design and Procedure
The experiment was administered online in February 2019. 
The participants were informed that they will see a political 
Facebook post and will be asked questions about this post. 
However, they were not informed in advance about the cen-
tral concepts of interest in the study. After giving informed 
consent, the participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four treatment groups: (1) a populist message by a typically 
populist politician, (2) a nonpopulist message by a typically 
populist politician, (3) a populist message by a typically non-
populist politician, or (4) a nonpopulist message by a typi-
cally nonpopulist politician.
Each group was presented with a Facebook post that was 
designed for the purpose of this study. The posts consisted of 
a message arguing for a stronger control of immigration and 
a picture of a link to a nonfictitious article by the Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung on the negative long-term consequences of 
immigration. The claim (for more control of immigration) 
was consistent across all stimuli, whereas the exact wording 
and the sender of the post were adjusted according to the 
experimental manipulation.
While seeing the Facebook post, the participants were 
able to react directly to the post by using imitations of 
Facebook’s user reactions (like/reactions, share, and com-
ment). Afterward, the participants reported their intention to 
Figure 1. The influence of populist messages and populist actors 
on user reactions: a moderation model.
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like, share, or comment on the post, and their political orien-
tation, populist attitudes, and support for the promoted claim. 
Furthermore, the participants’ perceptions of populist com-
munication and the politicians’ party affiliation were assessed 
as a treatment check. Finally, the participants were thanked 
and informed about the fictitiousness of the posts and the 
purpose of the study.
Manipulation of Independent Variables
Populist versions of the post included three populist key 
messages blaming the political elite, approaching the people, 
and demanding the people’s sovereignty. These populist key 
messages were formulated based on content analyses mea-
suring populist communication in politicians’ speeches, 
social media posts, or the media (Wirth et al., 2016). A pre-
test (N = 107) using the same items as in the treatment check 
(see next section) confirmed that the populist version of the 
post was perceived to be significantly more populist than the 
nonpopulist version of the post.
Two real Swiss politicians were chosen as the senders of 
the Facebook posts. We selected two well-known official 
representatives of typically populist and nonpopulist par-
ties who are regularly present in the media. Based on a pre-
test (N = 65) assessing the image of politicians, Roger 
Köppel, a national councilor for the Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP), was chosen as the typically populist actor. As the 
typically nonpopulist politician, Gerhard Pfister, a national 
councilor and party leader of the Christian Democratic 
Party (CVP), was chosen.
Measurement of Dependent and Control 
Variables
User Reactions. While seeing the Facebook post, the partici-
pants were able to directly react to the post by clicking on 
imitations of Facebook’s popularity cues for likes, reactions 
(“love,” “wow,” “haha,” “angry,” “sad”), and shares, or by 
using a comment box. In addition, after seeing the post, the 
intention or willingness of the participants to react to the post 
was measured by three items asking them to estimate the 
likelihood that they would like, share, or comment on the 
post on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (highly likely). As 
the dependent variable for H2a to RQ2, an index was built 
computing the mean values for the willingness to like, share, 
or comment on the post (Cronbach’s α = .791).
If the participants reported a likelihood above 3 for either 
liking, sharing, or commenting on the post, the motive behind 
this intention was asked for. The participants indicated on a 
scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 5 (fully applies) which 
of the six to eight proposed motives applied (e.g., “by click-
ing on ‘Like’ on this Facebook post, I want to signal that I 
like the content of the post” or “by sharing this Facebook 
post, I want to show my friends that I’ve read the post”). If 
the participants reported a likelihood below 3 for liking, 
sharing, or commenting on the post, they were similarly 
asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 
5 (fully applies) which motives applied to not reacting to the 
post (e.g., “I do not agree with the content of the post”).
Populist Messages. The main objectives were to test (1) 
whether populist actors influence the perception of the mes-
sage as containing populist elements and (2) whether popu-
list communication fosters user reactions. To test these 
hypotheses, it was essential to assess whether participants 
perceived the Facebook posts as representing populist com-
munication, that is, containing people-centrist statements, 
anti-elitist statements, or statements demanding popular sov-
ereignty. Therefore, a treatment check was implemented 
after the measurement of the dependent variables. On a scale 
from 1 (does not apply at all) to 5 (fully applies), participants 
indicated their perception of populist messages (eight items, 
for example, “The Facebook post demanded more political 
influence for the people”). An index was built by computing 
the mean values for all items (Cronbach’s α = .696).
Populist Attitudes. Populist attitudes were measured with a 
scale by Schulz, Müller, et al. (2018). The items reflected 
three subdimensions of the populist ideology: anti-elitism, 
the perceived homogeneity of the virtuous people, and a 
demand for people’s sovereignty. All items were measured 
on a scale ranging from 1 (do not agree at all) to 5 (totally 
agree). An index was built using all 12 items of the scale, 
which showed good reliability (Cronbach’s α = .846).
Party Affiliation. As an indicator of whether the participants 
recognized and correctly identified the politicians, they had 
to specify to which party they believed the politicians 
belonged. This was asked with a single-choice question with 
the five largest Swiss parties, “other” and “do not know” as 
possible answers.
Political Orientation. As a control variable, political left–right 
orientation was measured with a single item ranging from 1 
(left) to 7 (right).
Support of the Promoted Claim. The participants were asked to 
indicate how much they agreed with the central claim of the 
Facebook post that immigration to Switzerland should be 
curtailed. The participants were asked whether they agreed 
with this claim on a scale from 1 (do not agree at all) to 5 
(totally agree).
Results
Treatment Check
Before testing our hypotheses, we performed two treatment 
checks to assess participants’ perception of the experimental 
manipulation. First, we checked whether the participants 
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were familiar with the political actor and correctly identified 
his party affiliation. This was a necessary precondition for 
the experimental manipulation of the source, as the effect of 
a typically populist versus nonpopulist source can only occur 
when participants know the respective actors. Roger Köppel, 
the populist actor, was correctly identified by 71.5% of the 
sample, while Gerhard Pfister, the nonpopulist actor, was 
correctly identified by 29.3% of the sample. In the following, 
we will run analyses both based on the full sample (N = 647) 
and based only on the subset of participants who correctly 
recognized the politicians (n = 327).
Second, the perceived degree of populism in the posts 
was assessed. Neglecting the two different sources, the per-
ception of the populist messages in the populist and non-
populist posts was compared by means of an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). The analysis revealed that the recogni-
tion of populist messages varied significantly between the 
groups and in the expected direction. Populist messages 
were recognized significantly more by the participants in 
the populist message group (M = 3.357) than by the partici-
pants in the nonpopulist message group, M = 2.948, F(2, 
647) = 69.267, p < .001, η2 = .097.
Effect of the Actor on the Perception of Populism
H1 postulates that not only the populist message but also the 
populist actor may activate a populism schema and thus 
influence the perception of a Facebook post as populist. To 
test this hypothesis, a two-factor ANOVA was conducted 
with the populist versus nonpopulist message and the popu-
list versus nonpopulist actor as independent variables and the 
index of the perception of populist messages as the depen-
dent variable. We restricted the sample to those participants 
who correctly identified the party affiliation of the political 
actor in the post (n = 327), as the manipulation of the source 
depends on the recognition of the actors (i.e., the manipula-
tion can only be effective if the participants recognize the 
actors as populist or nonpopulist). After ensuring the condi-
tion of recognition, both the content (populist message), F(2, 
327) = 35.408, p < .001, η2 = .099, and the source (populist 
actor), F(2, 327) = 10.060, p < .01, η2 = .030, have a signifi-
cant main effect, but there is no significant interaction, F(2, 
327) = 1.521, ns. As expected, the Facebook posts were per-
ceived as more populist if the message was populist or the 
source was a typically populist politician. The estimated 
marginal means analyses (see Figure 2) further show that for 
both politicians, the posts that contained populist messages 
were perceived as more populist. Furthermore, posts that did 
not contain any populist messages were perceived as signifi-
cantly more populist when the source was a populist politi-
cian. Thus, the presence of a typically populist actor as the 
source of a message contributed to the perception of popu-
lism in a message, even if the message itself did not have any 
populist elements. H1 can thus be confirmed for participants 
who were familiar with the source of the message.
Effects of Populism on User Reactions
In the next step, we investigated the effects of populist mes-
sages and populist actors as sources on user reactions to posts. 
Overall, 56.6% of participants (n = 366) clicked on at least 
one of the simulated user reactions. The most clicked was the 
“like” button with 23.5% (n = 152), followed by the “share” 
button with 11.9% (n = 77), the possibility to write a direct 
comment (10.8%, n = 70), and the reactions “angry” (10.5%, 
n = 68) and “sad” (9.1%, n = 59). Less clicked were the reac-
tions “wow” (6.8%, n = 44), “haha” (4.5%, n = 29), and “love” 
(0.3%, n = 2). The reported likelihood of interacting with the 
post was relatively low overall (M = 1.848, SE = 1.192). This 
index presents a mean value for the willingness to like, share, 
and comment.1 The willingness to “like” the post was the 
highest (M = 2.07, SE = 1.655), followed by the willingness to 
“comment” on the post (M = 1.76, SE = 1.229) and the willing-
ness to “share” the post (M = 1.71, SE = 1.340).
Figure 2. Estimated means and confidence intervals for the perception of populism for populist vs. non populist message and actor.
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To address the remaining hypotheses, a moderation model 
was computed using PROCESS (Hayes, 2018), model 2.2 As 
depicted in Figure 3, this model assesses the direct effects of 
the message (populist vs. nonpopulist), the source (populist 
vs. nonpopulist), and populist attitudes on participants’ will-
ingness to interact with the post. Furthermore, the model esti-
mates the interaction effects of the message and source and of 
both of these factors with populist attitudes. In addition, age, 
sex, political orientation, and support of the promoted claim 
were included as covariates. The variables were mean- 
centered for products, and HC3 correction was used to obtain 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (Hayes & Cai, 
2007). Overall, the model explained a significant amount of 
the variance in the likelihood of interacting with the post, 
F(10, 647) = 17.38, p < .001, R2 = .26. Table 1 lists the descrip-
tive statistics for the dependent variable and the moderator.
First, the analysis estimates the effect of the populist mes-
sage compared to the nonpopulist message. There is a ten-
dency for the populist message to elicit a higher willingness 
for user reactions (b = .139, SE = 0.083, p < .1), but the effect 
is narrowly above the standard p-value threshold. Thus, H2a 
can only be supported in terms of a tendency. However, there 
was a significant interaction effect between the treatment of 
the populist message and populist attitudes on the likelihood 
of reacting to the post (b = .274, SE = 0.132, p < .05). This 
supports H2b. While there was no difference for individuals 
with low populist attitudes, individuals with high populist 
attitudes were more likely to react to the populist Facebook 
post than to the nonpopulist Facebook post (see Figure 4). In 
addition, higher populist attitudes by themselves also con-
tributed significantly to the willingness to react to the post 
(b = .319, SE = 0.072, p < .001).
Second, the model compares the effect of the populist 
actor to the nonpopulist actor as the source of the message. 
The populist actor as a source does not have a significant 
main effect (b = –.135, SE = 0.083, ns) on the likelihood of 
user reactions, and there is no significant interaction between 
the actor and populist attitudes (b = –.195, SE = 0.165, ns). 
There is also no significant interaction between the populist 
actor and the populist versus nonpopulist message (b = .035, 
Figure 3. Statistical model of the moderation (based on Hayes, 2018).
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and moderator of the four experimental groups.
Populist actor Nonpopulist actor
 Populist message 
(n = 159)
Nonpopulist message 
(n = 167)
Populist message 
(n = 161)
Nonpopulist message 
(n = 160)
 M SD M SD M SD M SD
User reactions 1.80 1.26 1.79 1.13 2.04 1.32 1.76 1.01
Populist attitudes 3.37 0.66 3.37 0.67 3.34 0.68 3.38 0.73
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SE = 0.044, ns). However, as argued above, the recognition of 
the political actor is crucial for triggering a cognitive schema.
Therefore, we restricted the sample to those participants 
who correctly identified the party affiliation of the two politi-
cians (n = 327) and tested the same moderation model. Again, 
the model was significant overall, F(10, 327) = 9.12, p < .001, 
R2 = .29. With the restricted sample, the main effects of the 
populist actor and the interaction with populist attitudes 
remain nonsignificant. However, we find a tendency toward 
a negative interaction between the populist message and the 
populist actor (b = –.491, SE = 0.269, p = .069). Thus, the dif-
ference between populist and nonpopulist messages seems to 
be larger for the nonpopulist actor than for the typically pop-
ulist actor (see Figure 5). Therefore, H3a and H3b must be 
rejected, and this rather unexpected result with regard to 
RQ1 will be addressed in the “Discussion” section.
With regard to the control variables, political orientation 
(b = .178, SE = 0.064, p < .01) and support for the claim 
(b = .164, SE = 0.062, p < .01) have a positive effect on the 
likelihood of reacting to the posts. This means that partici-
pants were more willing to react to the Facebook post when 
they were more right wing and more supportive of a stronger 
control of immigration.
In the final step, to answer RQ2, we tested the moderation 
model for the intentions to like, share, or comment on the 
posts separately and found interesting differences for the dif-
ferent types of user reactions. For the intention to like the 
Facebook post as the dependent variable, there are no signifi-
cant effects of the populist message, populist actor, populist 
attitudes, and no significant interactions. The likelihood to 
like the Facebook post was, however, higher for individuals 
who had a more right-wing political orientation (b = .267, 
SE = 0.077, p < .001) and who supported the claim of the 
posts (b = .362, SE = 0.078, p < .001). For the intention to 
share the Facebook post, we find a significant effect of 
populist attitudes (b = .402, SE = 0.177, p < .05), a tendency 
for populist messages (b = .242, SE = 0.132, p = .067), and a 
significant interaction between populist messages and popu-
list attitudes (b = .418, SE = 0.209, p < .05). However, there 
were no significant main effects or interactions with regard 
to the populist actor. Finally, for the intention to comment on 
the post as the dependent variable, we again find a rather 
unexpected significant negative interaction between the pop-
ulist message and the source of the message (b = –.673, 
SE = 0.298, p < .05). Participants were more willing to com-
ment on the populist post if it was by the typically nonpopu-
list politician.
These differences in the results may be partly explained 
by the different motives behind the willingness to like, share, 
or comment on a Facebook post. For those who indicated 
that they would probably like the post (willingness > 3), the 
three most important motives were to signal that they agree 
with the source of the post (M = 4.28, SE = 0.919), share the 
views of the politician (M = 4.23, SE = 0.867), or like the con-
tent of the post (M = 4.20, SE = 0.958). For those who indi-
cated that they would probably share the post (willingness > 3), 
the most important motives were to show that they share the 
views of the politician (M = 4.13, SE = 1.141), that they agree 
with the source of the post (M = 4.07, SE = 1.174), and that 
they would want their friends to also read this post (M = 4.02, 
SE = 1.122). The most common motives to comment on the 
post (willingness > 3) were on one hand, similar to liking and 
sharing, to show that they share the views of the politician 
(M = 3.25, SE = 1.547) and to express agreement with the 
content of the post (M = 3.24, SE = 1.516). On the other hand, 
another common motive for commenting was to criticize the 
content of the post (M = 3.28, SE = 1.466). In contrast, partici-
pants who reported that they would probably not like, share, 
or comment on the post mostly reported that they generally 
do not like, share, or comment on any political content 
Figure 4. Interaction effect of the populist message and populist 
attitudes on user reactions.
Figure 5. Interaction effect of the populist vs. nonpopulist 
message and the populist vs. nonpopulist actor on user reactions.
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(M = 3.78, SE = 1.377), do not share the politician’s views 
(M = 3.39, SE = 1.486), or do not agree with the source of the 
content (M = 3.33, SE = 1.499).
Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of this study was, first, to examine whether a typi-
cally populist actor elicits a populism schema similar to pop-
ulist messages and how these two factors—content and 
source—interact. Adding to previous research on populist 
communication, we tested whether the perception of populist 
messages differs for typically populist and nonpopulist poli-
ticians. As expected, Facebook posts that did not include 
populist messages were nevertheless perceived as populist if 
the source was recognized as a typically populist politician. 
Thus, our study confirms that communication by populist 
actors can elicit a populism schema, even if the particular 
message does not contain populist elements (H1). The sec-
ond objective of this study was to test the widespread 
assumption that populist messages and populist actors are 
more likely to trigger user reactions on SNS. As expected, 
the effect of populist messages on user reactions was moder-
ated by populist attitudes. Recipients were more likely to 
react to a populist message than a nonpopulist message but 
only if they had high populist attitudes. Hence, H2b was sup-
ported and H2a only in terms of a tendency.
In contrast, the expectation that user reactions would also 
be fostered by a typically populist politician (H3a), espe-
cially for participants with high populist attitudes (H3b), was 
not supported. Although the presence of a populist actor as 
the source of the message increased the perception of the 
message as representing populist communication, this did 
not affect participants’ likelihood to interact with the post. 
Our results thus suggest that user reactions are driven more 
by the message than by the actor sending the message. 
Furthermore, there was a negative interaction between the 
populist actor and populist messages for those participants 
who recognized the actors (RQ1). On one hand, these find-
ings might be influenced by the specific actors chosen for 
this study. On the other hand, the findings may at least in part 
be explained by looking at the three main types of popularity 
cues on Facebook separately (RQ2).
For likes, we did not find an effect of populist communi-
cation or the populist actor. Rather, participants were more 
willing to like the post if they agreed with the message’s 
main claim. This could be explained by the fact that liking a 
post requires a lower degree of activation and may be a rather 
habitual or an automatic response (Alhabash et al., 2019). 
For shares, we found the expected interaction effect of popu-
list messages and populist attitudes. Participants were more 
likely to share populist Facebook posts, especially if they 
had high populist attitudes. Finally, for comments, we found 
a negative interaction between populist communication and 
the actor; recipients were more likely to comment on popu-
list messages if they came from the nonpopulist actor. We 
can only speculate about the reasons behind this. Comments 
were driven by both approval and rejection of the message. It 
may be that the “surprising” use of populist communication 
by nonpopulist actors leads to more comments, be they affir-
mative or negative. The unexpected use of populist messages 
by a moderate politician could on one hand give recipients 
with high populist attitudes the impression that their views 
have arrived in mainstream politics. On the other hand, it 
could also elicit a certain “backlash” effect (see also 
Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017) by recipients who do not sup-
port populist ideas. Future research should investigate the 
motives for commenting on populist posts in more detail.
Of course, this study does not come without limitations. 
First, we chose specific political actors and a specific issue 
for the Facebook posts. Immigration as a topic was chosen 
because it has been identified as one of the central drivers of 
populism in Western Europe (Salgado et al., 2019; Stanyer 
et al., 2019; Taggart, 2017). It remains a question for future 
research whether Facebook posts on other issues, especially 
left-wing issues, elicit the same effects on user reactions. 
However, this focus allowed for better internal and external 
validity. Whereas the SVP in Switzerland is widely identified 
as a typically populist right-wing party, there is no equivalent 
populist left-wing party that could be expected to elicit a 
similarly strong populism schema. Although we chose prom-
inent politicians who are both often featured in the media, 
only approximately half of the participants could correctly 
identify their party affiliation. Specifically, the nonpopulist 
actor was less known, despite being the leader of the fourth-
largest party in Switzerland. This may be explained by the 
federalist political system of Switzerland. Nevertheless, we 
would expect stronger effects for more well-known political 
actors, and future research could include multiple actors to 
generate more robust findings.
Second, participants in this study were presented with an 
isolated Facebook post in an experimental context, and we 
measured their self-reported willingness to interact with this 
post. Actual behavior in a real-world setting might differ from 
this hypothetical situation. On one hand, reactions may be 
overestimated in the experiment, as individuals know about 
the anonymity of the situation, which is not given in the real-
world context. On the other hand, reactions may also be under-
estimated in an artificial setting due to social desirability and 
due to the fact that generally only a small, highly active, and 
motivated proportion of the public shares or comments on 
political content online (Newman et al., 2016). In comparison 
to content analyses on user reactions, this is a disadvantage, 
but only an experimental setting allows the controlling of par-
ticipants’ populist attitudes. Furthermore, it also allows for 
including participants in the study who would not interact with 
a Facebook post, who cannot be accounted for in content anal-
yses. Therefore, content analyses and experiments on this 
topic should be seen as ideal complements to each other.
Third, we only measured effects of populist messages on 
a very specific and limited form of intended behavior, namely 
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on the use of reactions on Facebook. The activation of a pop-
ulism schema and the perception of the people as a deprived 
in-group and the elites as an out-group threat may have addi-
tional consequences on other online and offline behavior that 
we cannot assess within our study. Future research should 
investigate whether populist messages has effects on other 
types of intended or manifest political engagement, and 
whether these effects are similarly moderated by citizens’ 
populist attitudes.
Fourth, the perceptions of populism in the posts cluster 
around the middle response on the scale. This may indicate 
that the populist stimuli were perceived as only “mildly” 
populist, while the nonpopulist stimuli were also perceived 
as somewhat populist. This may have several reasons: First, 
one group within the nonpopulist treatment had a populist 
actor as the source of the message, which, as we show, 
enhances the perception of the posts being populist. Second, 
also the issue of the newspaper article or the political claim 
that was made may be perceived as populist. Furthermore, 
the scale we employed to measure the perception of populist 
communication in a post was not designed to measure an 
absolute level of perceptions of populism, but to compare 
these perceptions between the experimental groups. As the 
populist posts were perceived to be populist, and the differ-
ence between the experimental groups is significant and has 
a medium effect size, we can conclude that the experimental 
manipulation was successful. Nevertheless, future research 
could aim to find stimuli that are perceived more/less popu-
list for the respective conditions.
To summarize, this study demonstrates that the effect of 
populist communication on user reactions on SNS seems to 
be moderated by recipients’ populist attitudes but that the 
effect also depends on the sender as well as the type of user 
reaction. It relies on a nonstudent sample, and the partici-
pants are representative of the Swiss population with regard 
to gender, age, and education. Overall, this study contributes 
to research on populist communication in two ways. First, it 
shows that not only populist messages but also typically pop-
ulist actors may activate a populism schema. While content 
analyses have found that populist communication is a rather 
limited and fragmented phenomenon in the media (Hameleers 
et al., 2017a; Müller et al., 2017) and on SNS (Ernst et al., 
2017), this finding indicates that the perceived amount of 
populist communication may be much higher. Second, the 
study complements existing content analyses by demonstrat-
ing that the effect of populist communication on user reac-
tions is moderated by recipients’ populist attitudes. Thus, 
although populist communication may contribute to a higher 
reach or popularity on SNS, this is dependent on the charac-
teristics of the politicians’ followers.
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Notes
1. As an example, a participant who reacted with a like to the post 
may have indicated that they would be very much willing to 
like the post (5) but not at all willing to share (1) or comment 
(1), which would then result in a mean value of 2.3.
2. In contrast to Hayes’s (2018) basic statistical model 2, an addi-
tional interaction term between the two moderators, populist 
actor and populist attitudes, was added.
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